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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
Leaks are occurring day and night, causing fam ilies to wake from  the stench o f  
hydrogen sulfide, and having immediate bouts o f  diarrhea, vomiting, burning 
eyes and noses in both children and adults. I  think it's really improper fo r  the 
health o f  our community to depend on which way the wind blows.
Puna Resident, October 1992
In theory, geothermal e n e r^  provides a safe and effective alternative to fossil fuel energy 
sources in many locations around the world. It has also been one o f the most 
controversial land-development schemes in Hawai i ' since statehood in 1959. Once 
touted as a panacea for Hawai i's dependence on imported oil, geothermal development 
has been the proverbial "boondoggle": a development failure that clearly indicates that 
geothermal is not an appropriate energy option in Hawai i.
Unlike most o f the volumes o f scientific, political, and sociological articles, papers, 
theses, and dissertations that have been written on this subject, the following chapters of 
Hawai i's geothermal story provide an alternative perspective to the popularized myth 
about the issue. Most writers have claimed that, although the pursuit o f geothermal has 
had some problems, the research and development o f geothermal energy in Hawai i has 
been based on a noble pursuit o f a safe indigenous energy source that is necessary in the 
context o f a growing oil importation crisis. That analysis avoids a basic question: Would 
a historical perspective o f this energy "paradigm," jfrom conception to production, 
indicate that geothermal development is no more noble and justifiable than the
' Hawaiian words are not Italicized as foreign words in Üiis paper because the author respects the Hawaiian 
language as being indigenous to the place tiiat is being written about. The correct spelling of Hawaiian 
words such as "Hawai i" includes the use of the 'okina (glottal stop). The Hawaiian spelling is included in 
this paper except when the word refers to names of people, titles and organizations diat do not include the 
correct spelling in their name.
1
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environmentally and culturally destructive pursuits in Hawai i's colonial history such as 
the sandalwood trade, whaling, cattle ranching, and sugar cane and pineapple cultivation?
Hawai i's post-plantation era economic base has been tourism. Geothermal energy 
development was originally developed to help facilitate tourism by establishing an 
"energy colony" on the Big Island for transporting electricity via underwater cable. 
Geothermal was also developed with the hope that heavy industries such as the 
processing o f undersea mining materials and a new spaceport would be attracted to the 
islands. While the price tags on such large-scale pursuits have discouraged private 
investors, there continues to be interest in expanding geothermal development for both 
electric and non-electric uses such as "geothermal spas," food drying, hydrogen 
production and other direct uses o f heat
Since the early 1970's, the State o f Hawaii and Hawaii County (the Big Island) have been 
in the business of constructing and promoting geothermal energy as a development 
strategy, not as an energy strategy. The best evidence o f this is the fact that cheaper, 
cleaner and more effective means to reduce oil consumption, such as "demand-side 
management," solar hot water, and transportation efficiency have received little 
government support in Hawai i when compared to geothermal.
From the time the first geothermal power plant was approved in the late 1970's, there has 
been a consistent voice o f conditional support for geothermal development in Hawai i, in 
part due to years o f public relations efforts on the part o f the State. This voice argues that 
geothermal is good for H aw aii as long as it is clean and safe. Politicians, bureaucrats, 
environmental organizations and many residents living close to the power plant share this 
opinion. This position begs the question, after 25 years of problems, vriien do we admit 
failure? If, as many people believe, the geothermal developers and regulators have 
improved their performance, does this alone justify continued support for current and 
expanded facilities? This paper documents problems with this industry that have been so 
severe, that any improvement in facility performance or regulatory oversight looks
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encouraging, in the context o f the "belief that geothermal is necessary. Given the 
political history and severity of impacts on the community, the mere improvement o f 
regulatory oversight does not mean that geothermal is now clean, safe, cost-efficient and 
culturally appropriate.
This paper presents a slice o f geothermal history from the perspective o f people who have 
felt the impacts and demanded more appropriate energy options. This analysis provides 
examples o f how the State and County’s support and promotion have been contradictory 
to its necessary role as a regulator o f industiy. This regulatory negligence has occurred at 
the expense o f taxpayers and the impacted community over the past 25 years. These 
chapters discuss the impacts o f geothermal development in Hawai i such as toxic air 
emissions, groundwater contamination, and noise pollution. The impacts on Native 
Hawaiian cultural and religious beliefs and practices are addressed as a form of 
environmental injustice, as are the impacts on the residents o f a relatively poor and 
politically marginalized community in the lower (Eastern) Puna area o f the island o f 
H aw aii.
This paper focuses on problems with regulatory oversight o f two geothermal projects. 
Puna Geothermal Venture and the Hawai i Geothermal Project (HGP-A). Other 
important aspects of this story -  including earlier, abandoned projects involving well- 
drilling in native rainforest by The Estate o f James Campbell and the related development 
of a 500 megawatt geothermal complex with an interisland cable, are not discussed in 
detail in this paper. These past projects do however, further document the ill-conceived 
nature o f this pursuit o f industrial development.
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CHAPTER 2 
Overview o f geothermal development in H aw aii
Throughout the world, the earth’s heat has been used in many ways and for various 
purposes. In H aw aii's recent history, geothermal energy has primarily been used to 
produce electricity by drilling deep wells (over 5000 feet) into geologic hot spots along a 
rift zone of Kilauea volcano on the Island o f Hawai i. The successful wells have tapped 
into an area where fluid is found at a high temperature with sufficient pressure and rock 
permeability. A change in pressure (due to the presence o f the well) forces steam, 
(containing toxic hydrogen sulfide)* and brine (containing silica and heavy metals) to the 
wellhead. The steam powers turbines directly and/or by heats a secondary fluid, pentane 
(an extremely hazardous chemical), which runs turbines, is cooled and re-heated again. 
After the steam has been used by the power plant, it is disposed with the brine by either 
dumping it onto the ground and creating surface "ponds," as was the case at the former 
HGP-A facility, or reinjecting it back underground via injection wells, as is the case at 
the Puna Geothermal Venture facility.
Brief History
Most promotional materials and many academic papers written about geothermal 
development in Hawai i introduce the subject with a seemingly "Hawaiian story" o f how 
the concept o f geothermal energy for electricity production was first proposed for 
H aw aii.
In 1881, King David Kalakaua and his Attorney General discussed with Thomas 
Edison the possibility o f using power from Hawaii's volcanoes to produce 
electricity to light Hawaii's capital, and transmitting this power by submarine 
cable to the other islands (Department o f Business, Economic Development and 
Tourism 2000).
' Hydrogen sulfîde (HgS) is also known as "poison gas" because it is lethal and relatively common in urban 
and rural communities. It smells like rotten eggs and is detectable at less than 5 parts per billion (ppb).
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But the real story begins further back in 1778 with the arrival o f Captain Cook and the 
subsequent "unification" o f the islands in 1795 when King Kamehameha took control o f 
the entire island chain. In 1820, Christian missionaries started to arrive and hula was 
prohibited, the Hawaiian language was outlawed in schools and Western laws began to be 
implemented. Hand in hand with this political and cultural imperialism came the 
development o f export capitalism, the imposition o f private property and sale o f land to 
foreigners (the "Great Mahele") and the beginning o f direct political control o f the 
Monarchy by haole (white) businessmen.
The Hawaiian Monarchy o f the late 1800's was not only mimicking the opulent styles o f 
European cultures, it was desperately trying to gamer political recognition in order to 
prevent the impending coup d'etat o f the Hawaiian nation by tiie United States. To this 
end. King Kalakaua allegedly attempted to remedy an economic depression in the islands 
by signing a reciprocity treaty, which allowed sugar and rice produced in Hawai i to be 
imported into the U.S. duty-fiee. As feared by the treaty's opponents in Hawai i, this 
agreement secured U.S. economic and political control in H aw aii by requiring an 
exclusive export arrangement and the eventual exclusive use o f Pearl Harbor by the 
Americans (Kuykendall 1967). In 1881, King Kalakaua set off around the world to 
advertise Hawai i to populations o f potential immigrant laborers (to work the plantations 
that would expand in response to the treaty) and to demonstrate political sophistication 
and gamer support for Hawai i as a sovereign nation.^ Upon the insistence of the sugar 
planter lobby, William Armstrong, who was Kalakaua's attorney-general and Charles 
Judd, a prominent haole politician, accompanied the King on his trip, ostensibly to insure 
that the King did not invite other countries to buy land and set up shop in Hawai i (Ka 
Lahui H aw aii 1993).
 ̂Due to the importation of foreign diseases into a relatively isolated culture, the population of Hawaiians 
was down to 58,000 from 300,000 in only one hundred years since the arrival of Cook.
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At the time o f Kalakaua's reign, white foreigners owned 80% of the property and almost 
all o f the political control o f the Islands (Fuchs 1961). Kalakaua's successor. Queen 
Liliuokalani, was imprisoned in 1893 when American businessmen, supported by the 
U.S. Marines, successfully overthrew the Hawaiian government
It was in this context that King Kalakaua and Armstrong met with Thomas Edison in 
New York. It is a 1881 newspaper report from New York that is the source o f the state's 
claim that "King David Kalakaua and inventor Thomas Edison were progressive men 
who lit Honolulu with hopes o f geothermal energy in Hawaii's future" (Department o f 
Business and Economic Development 1989). The article actually reported that it was Mr. 
Armstrong (not the King or any other Hawaiian), who did all the talking and offered the 
idea o f the volcano producing electricity. Armstrong inquired about the possibility o f 
laying electrical wires as submarine cables between the islands. Edison replied that "it 
would cost so much, thafs all" {New York Sun September 9,1881). This reply was 
remarkably prophetic, given the fact that in 1992, after the state and federal government 
spent over $64 million dollars on an 500 megawatt inteiisland cable project, the Hawai i 
state government formally abandoned its plans on the grounds that it was just too 
expensive given the low probability o f sufficient geothermal edacity  in Puna 
(Hannemann 1992).
This social and political context is important to any discussion about the importance o f 
regulatory oversight o f any industry in Hawai i, including geothermal. Hawai i became a 
state in 1959 having not yet emerged from a plantation economy. Geothermal drilling 
began in Puna in 1961 -  the same year that the State's land-use law was developed. By 
this time, the Hawaiians had suffered many years o f political repression (not to mention 
poverty and death from disease brought by profit-hungry businessmen and soul-hungry 
missionaries). The lawmakers and government regulators o f the new state inherited an 
economic and political system that had been perfected over the years to protect and 
advance the interests o f the large landowners.
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Since the 1970% the State o f Hawai'i has been active in the geothermal business and has 
considered this to be the crux of an aggressive alternative energy policy. Under the guise 
o f energy "self-suificiency," geothermal has been promoted as a solution to Hawai i's 
dependence on oil. This has been a false promise because electricity generation uses 
residual "waste" oil from refining transportation fuels and constitutes less than 30% of 
total oil use. The culmination o f this policy happened during Hawai i's economic boom 
in of the 1980's whereby the State planned and pursued a project for 500 megawatts of 
geothermal energy to be developed and supplied to industries, resorts, businesses and 
residents on O ahu via a 200-mile undersea cable from the island o f Hawai'i. After years 
of public opposition and effective lawsuits challenging the environmental and economic 
viability o f this $5 billion development plan, the state formally announced a change of 
policy. In 1992, geothermal development officially became a "Big Island only" energy 
alternative for Hawai'i.
Geothermal development has been primarily planned and permitted in the Puna district o f 
the Big Island (area East o f Kilauea Volcano). This area is known as the East Rift Zone 
o f the Kilauea volcano, and it's one o f the most active volcanic areas in the world. Along 
this narrow zone, the geothermal reservoir has been tapped in an area of very recent 
(geologically speaking) faulting and lava extrusions.
The State has declared most of this Rift Zone, and a majority of land in Puna, as a 
"geothermal resource subzones" in order to facilitate this industrial development as an 
acceptable land use in areas otherwise zoned for agricultural and conservation. The area 
contains an active volcanic crater (Pu'u O'o) that produces a more-or-less continuous flow 
o f lava; a native lowland rainforest; thousands o f acres of productive farmland; a few 
small towns; and numerous rural subdivisions. Puna is also the home of Pele. Native 
Hawaiian "Pele Practitioners" respect all volcanic processes and manifestations as a fonn 
of the goddess Pele. These Hawaiians believe that mining for geothermal steam is a 
desecration o f her body and spirit and the cultural traditions associated with their family 
amakua (deity).
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As o f2001, a total of 23 geothermal wells have been drilled on the Kilauea volcano in 
Hawai'i (see Table 1). Five o f these wells were funded exclusively by government 
agencies and legislative appropriations. The other wells were drilled by six different 
geothermal companies that have explored and operated primarily on land owned by The 
Estate of Campbell Estate and the Kapoho Land and Development Company.
Starting in 1973, the U.S. Department o f Energy and the National Science foundation 
assisted the State with grants to fund geothermal research and exploration on the Island o f 
Hawai'i (the Big Island). This exploration resulted in the development of Hawai i's first 
commercially viable geothermal well, called Hawaii Geothermal Project -Abbott (HGP- 
A). For over ten years, this well and associated power plant was operated without 
effective pollution abatement technology or regulatory oversight from the state or federal 
government. The used steam and brine were disposed o f in unlined pits, instead o f 
injected back into the ground. Hydrogen sulfide and other pollutants were released into 
the adjacent neighborhood during regular well "clean-outs" and accidents.
In the early 1980's, a wealthy landowner. The Estate o f James Campbell (Campbell 
Estate), teamed up with oil and gas developers from Wyoming, True Oil Company, to 
begin exploratory drilling for up to 200 megawatts (later changed to 100 megawatts) o f 
geothermal power in the rainforest just east o f Volcanoes National Park. Before any 
wells were drilled, public opposition and volcanic eruptions forced a speedy land-swap 
with the State. This moved the project into a formally protected (under the State's 
Natural Area Reserve program) forest called Wao Kele O Puna.
In 1989, the State began drilling more experimental wells called "Scientific Observation 
Holes. " These were non-producing wells drilled along the Rift Zxme in order to attempt 
to further define the extent o f the useable resource. The program ended in 1991 when a 
judge halted federal funding until a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement was 
prepared. The rainforest drilling came to a halt soon after that. In 1993, True
8
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Geothermal decided, for a variety of reasons, to abandon their project and turn their well 
over to the State. True's project was the target o f intense local and national opposition to 
destroying one of the Country's last tropical lowland forests and infringing on Native 
Hawaiian rights. True and Campbell Estate were also impacted by the problems 
associated with the development of the 500 megawatt Geothermal Cable Project. The 
State was able to continue promoting geothermal development without the large-scale 
projects. Puna Geothermal Venture became the" Big Island first" geothermal project.
In the 1980's, Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) started building a wellfield adjacent to 
the old HGP-A site. By that time, more residents and small farms surrounded the area, 
and despite numerous pleas and protests, the plant was granted land-use and pollution 
permits by the State and County in a location less than 2,000 feet from nearby homes. In 
the early 1990's, PGV experienced technological and managerial problems resulting in 
delays and accidents. The State's response to PGV's problems was to initiate a more 
aggressive campaign to convince the public that, despite the accidents, this geothermal 
facility was perfectly safe. Mainland experts were flown in and a "management plan" 
was written, but many o f the problems persisted. PGV is currently producing 30 
megawatts, but has recently received approval from Hawaii County to expand the facility 
to 60 megawatts.
The role of the federal government has also been extensive. The Department o f Energy 
coordinated a massive Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed o f the 500- 
megawatt Geothermal Cable Project.^ The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has been directly involved with regulatory oversight o f groundwater protection and 
PGV’s use of reinjection wells. EPA expanded their review o f PGV to also include a full 
environmental compliance investigation. EPA also conducted a formal review of PGV's 
emergency response planning, and issued an environmental justice grant to a group of 
residents for a community air and noise monitoring program.
 ̂ In 1991, the Department of Energy was ordered, by a federal Judge in Blue Ocean Preservation Society v. 
Watkins, to complete an E.I.S. prior to the appropriation of further funds for the geothermal cable project
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Despite federal involvement in geothermal from the beginning, it is the involvement of 
the State and County that merits a detailed analysis in this paper. These are the levels o f 
government that are in need of urgent regulatory reform. For the past twenty-five years, 
their promotion of geothermal has damaged their ability to adequately regulate this 
industry in Hawai'i.
10
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CHAPTERS
HGP-A
The HGP-A well and associated power plant was a result o f the Hawaii Geothermal 
Project ("Project"). This Project officially started as a research effort by scientists from 
the University of Hawaii to assess the potential o f geothermal development and drill the 
first deep geothermal well (over 6,000 feet deep) in lower Puna, Subsequently, the 
researchers coordinated a consortium of county-state-federal-utility partners to develop 
geothermal energy in Hawai'i. The geothermal research and development program that 
involved the HGP-A "wellhead generator project" was envisioned as one o f the "phases" 
of a project that would eventually lead to the production o f over 500 megawatts o f energy 
in Puna. The State planned to export the energy to O 'ahu in an undersea electrical cable 
that would be four times deeper than any other cable in the world.
Early History
In 1948, two great grandsons o f Hilo missionaries, Richard and Charles Arthur Lyman 
consolidated 12,000 acres o f their family's land holdings in lower Puna and created a 
family corporation called the Kapoho Land and Development Company. Most of the 
land, which encompassed the ahupua'a (traditional land division) o f Kapoho, was sold to 
farmers and shoreline developers. The Lymans used the remaining lands for agriculture, 
primarily papaya and sugar cane. Richard ("Papa") Lyman served as a Territorial/State 
Senator from the H aw ai'i Island from 1956 to 1962 and also became a Bishop Estate 
Trustee in 1959 until his death in 1988 (Keyser 1999). This position, as trustee to the 
largest private landowner in Hawai'i, was extremely influential, both politically and 
financially.
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In 1960, Senator Lyman traveled to Japan and learned that Sumitomo Electric Cable 
Company was making a cable to transport electricity between the islands in Japan 
{Honolulu Star-Bullelin November 6,1960). Lyman returned to Hawai i and 
immediately began to plan and promote geothermal energy development in Puna as a 
way of providing electricity for the State's population center on O 'ahu. Eventually the 
idea o f an undersea electrical cable became the focus o f millions o f dollars o f federal 
funding. In 1990, Sumitomo was a partner in one o f two consortia that were negotiating 
with the State and electric company to develop the 500-megawatt inter-island geothermal 
cable project.
After returning from his trip to Japan, Lyman solicited support from California-based
Magma Power Company (also a partner in one o f the consortia bidding on the
Geothermal/Cable Project) to come to Hawai'i and explore for geothermal power. A
Honolulu newspaper reported that Lyman had plans for major industrialization o f the
island as a result o f geothermal development
This would open up new avenues o f industry for Hawaii, such as 
production of aluminum from the large deposits o f bauxite ore along 
Hamakua Coast, manufacture o f paper products from waste bagasse 
from sugar mills, the utilization o f salt products, magnesium, iodine and 
other elements of commercial value from the ocean, the possibility of 
making our own nitrate fertilizers. (Honolulu Star-Bulletin December 4,
1960)
In 1961, Magma Power teamed up with a Los Angeles company to form Hawaii Thermo 
Power. Dr. Agatin T. Abbott, geologist at the University o f Hawaii (UH), was a 
consultant to Thermo Power/Magma Power's unsuccessful drilling attempts in Puna. 
During the official announcement about the exploratory drilling effort. Dr. Abbott 
reiterated Lyman's goal to develop geothermal energy for use on O 'ahu by transmitting 
the electricity for 200 miles via and underwater cable {Honolulu Star-Bulletin February 
15,1961). The company drilled a few unsuccessful shallow wells along the middle and 
lower part o f Kilauea's Middle East Rift Zone (see Figure 1, Map o f Puna) and 
determined that there was insufficient geothermal potential. According to Lyman,
12
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Magma Power "had mechanical difficulties and gave up" {Honolulu Advertiser December 
4,1960).
Lyman also solicited the help o f his friend Gordon Macdonald, also a geologist at the 
University o f Hawai'i. Initially, Lyman sought help to divert lava flows with dykes but 
eventually Macdonald also became one of many scientists involved with the Hawaii 
Geothermal Project. Lyman's plans to build dykes and his practice of bulldozing lava to 
plant crops earned him a reputation o f making Pele, the local volcano goddess, angry and 
causing more lava flows in Kapoho {Honolulu Star-Bulletin November 6,1960).
Years later, in 1972, an Engineer at UH submitted a $2.7 million geothemial research 
proposal to the National Science Foundation (NSF). Despite the fact that matching funds 
($100,000) were promised by both the state legislature and the county government, the 
proposal was not funded. Instead, NSF awarded a smaller grant to a Colorado 
geophysicist who planned to drill a deep (3,500 feet) near the Kilauea crater in Hawaii 
Volcanoes National Park (Goodman and Love 1980), A group o f Native Hawaiians, 
called the Congress o f Hawaiian People, objected to the proposed drilling because the 
location was "on the sacred religious grounds o f our ancestors" {Honolulu Star-Bulletin 
March 5,1973). The Congress also requested that an environmental impact statement 
(BIS) be completed and commented on before any drilling began. Although the deep 
well drilling was proposed in the heart o f a National Park using federal funds, there was 
not a federal EIS or an environmental assessment (EA) completed for the project. In fact, 
there were no permits required at all for this activity despite the potential impact on the 
environment with air, noise and water pollution.
While the first deep well was being drilled at Kilauea, the UH scientist re-organized his 
research plan and submitted a new grant proposal to NSF for geothermal research. The 
expanded scope of the proposal included research and development o f geothermal energy 
that would result in the production o f electricity. The requested amount o f $5 million 
was only partially funded, but the project also benefited from the previous $200,000 
allocation from the state and county (Goodman and Love 1980).
13
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The initial research activities o f the Hawaii Geothermal Project involved technical 
geophysical analyses as well as feasibility studies on the potential environmental, 
socioeconomic, legal and regulatory problems that could "hinder" geothermal 
development in Hawai'i. The principal investigator for these studies was Dr. Robert 
Kamins, who was a professor o f economics at the University o f Hawaii. Not 
surprisingly, the social impacts associated with the loss o f a quiet rural lifestyle and the 
cultural impacts o f potentially injuring the goddess Pele and her domain were not 
addressed in these studies. In fact, the original name for the Project was the "PELE 
Project" (Pele Energy Laboratory Experiments). The scientists claimed that their intent 
was to "honor Pele, the Hawaiian Goddess o f Fire and resident o f island volcanoes" 
(University of Hawaii 1972). The name was changed when scientists were apparently 
informed that this was a cultural insult.
After a year o f surface measurements and analysis, supervisors at NSF urged the project 
scientists to make a decision about when and where to drill the exploratory well. The 
agency emphasized the fact that they could fund research endeavors but not commercial 
exploration (Goodman and Love 1980). Dr Abbott became the director o f the HGP-A 
("A" for Abbott) well drilling program and by 1975 additional funds from the State 
legislature ($500,000), federal government ($1,064,000) and Hawaiian Electric Company 
($45,000) were secured. One o f the stated goals o f drilling program was to develop 
"efficient, environmentally clean systems for conversion o f underground heat resources 
to useful energy" (Goodman and Love 1980).
A "site selection committee" chose two sites for consideration. One was in the lower 
East Rift Zone in the Kapoho/Pohoiki area approximately three miles east o f the town of 
Pahoa located on a recent (1955) lava flow. The other site was three miles west, in the 
upper Opihikao area close to die Pahoa-Kalapana road. Both sites offered promising 
geophysical signs o f finding a potential reservoir o f heat. Goodman and Love (1980) 
claim that the deciding factor in choosing the Kapoho/Pohoiki site was its "geologic"
14
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characteristics. But, as Goodman and Love mention earlier in their review, this site 
happened to be the only one in which the landowner was Richard Lyman's Kapoho Land 
and Development Corporation.
The Hawaii Geothermal Project was financed using state and federal funds and the well 
drilling posed serious impacts to the environment. Nevertheless, there was not an 
Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) completed for the 
well drilling nor were there any state, county, or federal permits issued. Consequently, 
there was no consideration given to the potential impacts o f well-drilling, waste disposal, 
flow testing and future power generation on the adjacent rural subdivisions during the site 
selection and pre-drilhng period. There was also no opportunity for public comments and 
no assessment of the Native Hawaiian concerns that were raised a few years earlier 
during the drilling at Kilauea summit. The motivation for maintaining a low profile on 
the drilling program was strong. The project developers needed to keep federal money 
flowing into their program without delays. This became evident a few years later after 
public hearings on the of the proposed HGP-A power facility. The Department of Energy 
threatened to stop the Project altogether "if the rights of native Hawaiians are not 
resolved" {Honolulu Star-Bulletin July 28, 1978).
In late 1975, about a month before the drilling o f the HGP-A well, the first environmental 
report from the geothermal researchers was released. It was a preliminary report on 
baseline environmental studies in Puna. The report stated that an environmental impact 
analysis might be required after the exploratory well was drilled in the event that further 
geothermal activities are planned. Although the brief report contained some baseline data 
on mercury concentrations in the air and in vegetation and an analysis o f groundwater 
chemistry, it did not contmn any data or discussion about hydrogen sulfide. The report 
does, however, acknowledge the presence of planned subdivisions and a quiet, serene, 
undisturbed rural character o f the area (Kamins 1975).
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Hawai'i*s First Geothermal Production Well
In late 1975, the well site had been prepared and drilling commenced on the well, named 
"HGP-A" (Hawaii Geothermal Project-Abbott). A complete absence o f regulatory 
oversight allowed the drilling contractors to take risks. In this case, the geology o f this 
rift zone included numerous lava tubes that presented a serious challenge to the drilling 
company. One of the University scientists reported that when the drill hit lava tubes it 
was veiy difficult to maintain circulation o f the drilling muds, which is what gets the 
debris out o f the well. H ie expense of pouring more and more mud down an endless hole 
was averted by attempting to "plug it up" by dumping bagasse (sugar cane waste), cotton 
seed hulls and "anything they could think o f  down the well (Halbig 1980).
Halfway through the six-month drilling operation, the project started to run out o f money 
($1.6 million had already been allocated). The federal Energy Research and 
Development Administration (ERDA) had taken over funding responsibilities from NSF, 
and additional funding ($150,000) was relatively easy to get considering the well drilling 
had already begun. In April o f 1976 the well was completed to a depth of 6,450 feet and 
temperatures were recorded at over 600® F (Hawaii Geothermal Project 1976). 
Subsequently, more money was allocated from ERDA and the State (totaling $439,000) 
for well testing.
The initial unabated open venting o f the well was conducted for four hours as a grand 
display o f "human-controlled" geothermal energy. The steam and brine rose over a 
hundred feet in the air and produced a noise that exceeded 122 dBA^ (Goodman and 
Love 1980). The hydrogen sulfrde (H2 S) content o f the steam was measured at a
* Noise level in a community ambient setting is commonly measured in decibels (which is a measure of 
sound pressure) with an adjustment "A" (dBA). This measurement approximates the response of the 
human ear by discriminating against frequencies that are not predominating in the average human's hearing 
range. The decibel scale is a non-linesu logarithmic scale and consequently the perceivable loudness 
doubles every 3 dBA increment. The EPA recommends that outdoor noise levels not exceed 55 dBA 
during the day and 45 dBA during the night in residential areas.
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concentration o f950,000 ppb^ (GeothermEx 1992). Other toxins, including mercury and 
radon were also documented in significant quantities (GeothermEx 1992 and Thomas 
1981 and Thomas 1980). The discovery o f a relatively high temperature well was also a 
discovery o f high level o f toxic chemicals, particularly HzS, relative to other geothermal 
reservoir around the world (the average HaS concentration at the Geysers in northern 
California is 200,000 ppb). This is consistent with the general knowledge about 
geothermal resources -that high temperature resources are associated with a high 
concentrations of pollutants (Nicholson 1994).
There was some noise pollution associated with well drilling itself, but the first real 
indication of the impending land-use conflict in lower Puna came during the well testing 
of HGP-A. Starting in 1976, flow tests, which measured the well's temperature, pressure 
and mass flow rate, were conducted three different times over the next six months. These 
tests were designed to discharge the well to clean it out and possibly induce a higher rate 
of flow. The drilling mud and rock chips (and the remains o f anything else that had been 
dumped in there) were shot out o f the well with the high temperature fluid at sonic 
velocity (Hawaii Geothermal Project 1976). Although the well had a muffler installed 
after the first venting, the noise level at the public roadway (which fronts the closest 
houselots) was still 87 decibels and was estimated to decline to 70 decibels (the sound of 
a busy highway) one mile away. The mufflers only reduced the noise level at the well site 
fi-om 125 to 95 dBA (Chen 1980). The loud roar combined with noxious HgS emissions 
from ventings and flow tests at HGP-A quickly became unreasonable impacts for nearby 
residents.
By 1976, there were three subdivisions adjacent to the drilling site that had already been 
established and a total o f twelve families lived within one mile of the well. This intrusion
 ̂HjS is commonly measured in both parts per million (ppm) and parts per billion (ppb), depending on the 
concentration. For example, the HjS level in geothermal steam from the Hawai'i s wells can be as high as 
1,400 ppm (1,400,000 ppb), but HjS in the ambient air can be measured at less than 5 ppb (.005 ppm). This 
p ^ e r uses only "ppb" in order to avoid possible confusion by changing the units of measurement. Ambient 
concentrations of less than 700,000 ppb can be lethal, and levels as low as 5 ppb can be an odor nuisance.
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in an otherwise extremely quiet rural area prompted the Leilam Commumty Association
to complain to State and County representatives and demand that the well testing be
stopped. In another subdivision, one o f the closest residents to the well. Bill Reich
complained to the newspapers that the well's H2 S emissions were making him and at least
40 other people veiy sick. Reich argued that the well should be shut down until the smell
was removed {Honolulu Advertiser April 12,1977). Despite the complaints, the Project
Director, John Shupe testified, at a congressional hearing in Honolulu the following year,
that the Project had "veiy good cooperation and understanding from the people in the
Kapoho area" (U.S. Congress, Senate 1978). This public outciy was particularly
troublesome given the assurances that the Project's environmental consultants, Barbara
and Sanford Siegel, had made a few months earlier.
If our experience in Hawaii and elsewhere holds lessons it is that we are 
fortunate to have the controlled environmental situation on record and 
cleanest geothermal well yet discovered or developed anywhere {Honolulu 
Advertiser January 20, 1977).
At the urging o f County officials, the HGP-A project director met with the residents and 
tried to console them by stating that "the well was experimental and that the tests would 
be a nuisance for only a limited time" (Goodman and Love 1980). It is clear that this 
statement was no consolation for those who had built their homes on beautiful and 
affordable rural subdivision lots. It is not clear whether the project director was speaking 
out o f ignorance (since the plan was to use the well in an experimental power plant and 
encourage large-scale commercial exploration and development) or whether he was 
intentionally misleading the community in order to buy time to finish the flow tests and 
secure more grants and permits to build and operate a power plant near the wellhead.
The final flow test was scheduled to last for 90 days (much longer than the usual length 
o f 10-14 days) but it was shut down after 42 days due to odor and health complaints from 
residents (Shupe and Yuen 1978). H2 S was emitted during the well-testing because the 
steam and brine were discharged, unabated, into the air and into an unlined "drain field."
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The extensive flow tests resulted in damage to the production casing o f the well. This 
allowed the deep high temperature fluid to circulate into the shallow part o f the well and 
created high wellhead pressure and a substantial "gas cap" (Thomas 1990).
Consequently, the well casing needed repair and gases had to be vented regularly to 
relieve pressure. Additionally, more flow tests were planned.
The HGP-A Power Plant
The next stage of development for the Hawaii Geothermal Project was a conversion from 
research to development. In order to secure more funding from ERDA (which was 
reorganized into the Department o f Energy), the project had to move into the reahn of 
"application and utilization" and out o f the hands o f scientists at the University. A 
development consortium, composed o f the State, the County, the University (represented 
by the HGP-A scientists) and the island's utility company, Hawaii Electric Light 
Company (HELCO), was created in early 1977. The group was formally named the 
HGP-A Development Group and the state energy resources coordinator at the 
Department of Planning and Economic Development became the executive director. The 
Group agreed that its mission was to build a power facility to demonstrate the feasibility 
o f geothermal electrical production using the HGP-A well and to further characterize the 
resource (Goodman and Love 1980). Soon after HELCO joined the consortium it sent a 
letter to its stockholders stating that it would not use its own capital to build a geothermal 
power facility in Puna due to the seismic and volcanic risks in the area (Leilani 
Community Association 1977).
Fortunately for HELCO, the U.S. Department o f Energy (DOE) primarily funded the 
three megawatt HGP-A Wellhead Generator Feasibility Project and construction was 
completed in 1981. Prior to 1978 the Project had spent $3.4 million from federal, state, 
county, and private sources. The subsequent four-year wellhead generator contract with 
DOE included state and federal grants totaling $6.2 million (Goodman and Love 1980).
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An EIS was prepared for the generator project because it was "intended to stimulate a 
new energy development o f potentially great effect” (Department o f Planning and 
Economic Development 1977). Finally, a "special permit" was required from the County 
Planning Commission because the project site was classified by the State for agricultural, 
not industrial, uses. The approval process started at the County Planning Department 
where recommendations were made, followed by public hearings and decision-making by 
the Planning Commission. In June o f 1978, after the completion o f the draft, final and 
revised EIS and two public hearings, the Commission submitted a formal 
recommendation for permit approval to the Land Use Commission (at that time, these 
permits also needed approval by the State Land Use Commission). The Land Use 
Commission was an agency under the administrative authority o f the Department o f 
Planning and Economic Development (now the Department o f Business, Economic 
Development and Tourism). This Department was named as the applicant for the permit, 
and not surprisingly, the Land Use Commission approved the recommendation o f the 
County.
The stated intention o f the Development Group, headed by the Department o f Planning 
and Economic Development, was to sell electricity to the utility as if  it were an 
independent power producer. But the utility, HELCO, was part o f the development 
consortium, and the proposed operator o f the power facility. The Project was also to be 
considered as a "research" endeavor instead o f commercial venture for the purposes o f 
public ftmding and permit approvals. After the power plant came on-line, the State 
advertised the success o f HGP-A as "the first commercial geothermal electricity in 
Hawaii" (Department of Planning and Economic Development 1982). In 1980, a contract 
was signed between the Project developers and HELCO, which stated that HELCO was 
to "operate and maintain the geothermal wellhead, power plant, and switching station 
facilities", as well as purchase the electricity produced by the plant. This created the 
potential for conflicts related to decisions about the safety and security of the facility vs. 
economic returns o f this "experimental" facility.
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The exact type of generator and associated equipment for power production and waste 
disposal was not disclosed at the time o f permitting. Instead, die developers proposed 
further short and long-term flow tests in order to get more information (after more than 
1000 hours of flow-tests that had taken place in 1976-77). The proposed open ventings 
prior to and during construction were to be "limited" to a total o f 10-20 tests that would 
last up to eight hours in any twenty-four hour period (Planning Department 1978).
Despite all o f these flow tests, the resulting power plant design was still seriously 
defective. According to a Hilo engineer who was involved with HGP-A's design and 
construction, the plant lacked the ability to function adequately because of the high 
temperature, pressure and silica content o f the steam (Hirai 2001).
In addition to the details o f the power generation and pollution control equipment, there 
were a number of unresolved issues in the final permit that were raised in the EIS review 
process and the during the public hearings. Many o f these issues were not addressed at 
all by the Planning Commission or the LUC. The Planning Department claimed that 
"stringent controls and conditions were attached to the permit" (Planning Department 
1981). But the permit did not include any specific environmental conditions. Instead, the 
developer was required to take "every precaution" to "reduce any nuisances, whether it is 
noise or fumes, which may affect the residents and properties in the area." Compliance 
with this condition was left to the discretion of the Planning Director (Mielcke 1978). 
Another condition required the permittee to comply with all regulations and requirements 
o f the State Department of Health (DOH). This was a bit premature given the fact that 
there were no state regulations related to HzS emissions, groundwater protection, or noise 
standards at the time. In fact, DOH never became involved with the regulation o f HGP-A 
at all (see C h^ters 5 and 6).
The Project commenced without adequately addressing the following issues:
1. An H2 S abatement system was only considered because o f the odor complaints from 
the community. Despite the relatively high concentration o f H%S in the steam, the
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proposed abatement system could only achieve a H2 S reduction o f 90-95% of H2 S 
from the cooling towers and rock mufïlCT. The cooling towers were designed to be the 
closest structure to the public road (25-30 feet) and adjacent to the Leilani subdivision. 
Since HGP-A’s steam contained 700,000—900,000 ppb o f H2 S, the "abated" emission 
concentration (during normal plant conditions) could be as high as 35,000-90,000 ppb 
from the power plant. This was added to the H2 S emissions fix>m the brine disposed in 
the settling ponds. The resulting impact on the surrounding ambient air quality 
depended on meteorological conditions and the volume and duration o f steam 
discharge.
2. The proposed noise abatement system was inadequate for both periods o f open venting 
and normal operations. After the permit was issued, the project developers disclosed 
that the noise mufflers didn't work well at HGP-A due to the high steam to water ratio 
in the resource (Chen 1980). An analysis of noise issues at HGP-A was completed 
two years after the permit had been issued. The report concluded, "during normal 
operations, residents or prospective residents in areas proximate to the HGP-A can be 
expected to be annoyed" (Burgess 1980).
3. The presence o f toxic levels o f mercury in the geothermal resource was one of the 
most serious environmental concerns among project scientists. But, surveys were 
conducted and early conclusions were made that the geothermal facility would not 
contribute significantly to the fluctuating high levels o f mercury already present in the 
environment during some periods o f natural volcanic activity. But even the Army 
Corps of Engineers (notorious for its lack o f environmental concern) acknowledged 
that "any increase in mercury levels as a result of the well operation may increase the 
hazard.. . .  [I]t is clear that the risks associated with geothermal development and 
associated population growth in Puna should be stated clearly and evaluated" (Pender 
1978).
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4. The waste disposal o f geothermal fluids and non-condensable gases was a serious 
problem that project scientists did not adequately consider. The EIS included 
references to the possibility o f installing a reinjection system (whereby the steam and 
fluid are reinjected back into the geothermal resource area) but it was clear from the 
testimony o f the developers and subsequent correspondence that they never seriously 
considered including a reinjection system in their project
5. Native Hawaiian land rights and cultural impacts related to geothermal development 
were not addressed at all in the EIS or permit application. Most o f the public 
testimony at the Planning Commission's second public hearing was from Hawaiians 
who lived in lower Puna and who opposed the project on grounds that it violated 
religious beliefs and practices and aboriginal land rights to natural resources that were 
stolen during the overthrow of Hawai i by the U.S. in 1893 (See Chapter 6).
6. The expected duration o f the Project was not specifically addressed during the 
permitting process. It was intended to be a research facility that would also prove the 
productivity of the resource to private companies that were already planning 
exploratory drilling projects in the area. The funding, and consequently, the design of 
the project as it related to eflicient power production, as well as, air, noise and 
groundwater pollution control, were all done with the assumption that this facility 
would only be operational for a couple o f years. This conflicted vrith a twelve-year 
contract period for the Project between the U.S. Department o f Energy, which held 
ultimate fiscal responsibility, and the Research Corporation o f the University o f 
Hawaii (Chen 1982).
The HGP-A well tapped into what became known as the "K^poho Reservoir." The 
earliest data on this resource indicated that the high temperature, high ratio o f HjS and 
high ratio o f dissolved solids would become a serious challenge the engineers and other 
scientists involved with the industry. Also, the scientists reported that the "nearly even 
mix of water and steam is unlike any other yet discovered, and defies present geological
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theory" (Hawaii Business 1981). These conditions were known to decrease the 
commercial viability o f a geothermal well. At HGP-A, the temperature and pressure 
were much higher than could be tolerated by "state-of-the-art" technology. Critical 
details like the structure and materials used in the control valves and generating turbine 
posed serious problems for the experimental facility (Hawaii Business 1981). When 
there were problems at the plant, there were also problems outside the fence, in the 
community.
In 1982, before the power plant was fully operational, problems related to noise and H^S 
emissions prompted two major challenges to the Project. H ie first was a review o f the 
environmental compliance o f the County permit. By April o f 1982, the County Planning 
Department had received enough complaints from the community to hold a public 
meeting on the HGP-A facility near the site in Pahoa town. The second was a lawsuit 
filed on behalf o f residents who wanted more environmental and health impact analysis 
as well as better pollution control at the facility.
Less than a month after the public meeting, the Development Group submitted a formal
response to the County that defended their ability to be a nuisance by stating that they
need only prove that they have been responsible about taking precautions to "reduce any
nuisances" (HGP-A Development Group 1982). Furthermore, the Development Group
dismissed all o f the health complaints by stating the following:
A public meeting at gny location in the State could reveal significant 
health problems o f the type asserted by Puna residents, without there being 
any relationship to geoAermal development. Some people may live near 
freeways; some near airports; some near areas with large amounts o f dust; 
some in areas with large amounts o f pollen; some near volcanic 
discharges. The HGP-A Development Group believes that health 
problems in Puna are typical o f locations, which do net have a geothermal 
generator. There is thus no reason to believe that the HGP-A well has 
caused the health problems, which were reported.
This rationalization ignores the fact that the affected residents do not live next to an 
aiiport or highway and the complaints o f odor nuisances and health impacts correspond
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to both the wind direction and proximity o f the family to the geothermal plant. During 
the April 15 public meeting, the Planning Department stated that the majority o f 
complaints were received during times when there were problems at HGP-A (e.g. start-up 
and shut-in periods) (Hawaii County Planning Department 1982). Also, during most o f 
that period, between June 1981 and March 1982, the power plant was not operating and 
steam was vented through the rock muffler. This steam was injected with 3200 gallons o f 
caustic solution per day, but it only neutralized, at best, 90% of the HzS (Hawaii 
Geothermal Generator Project 1982). The public testimony during the meeting was also 
consistent about the fact that the reported health problems in both adults and children 
were not present prior to the drilling o f HGP-A and during times when the well was not 
in use.
The Development Group did agree to attempt to reduce the hazard created on the adjacent 
public road when the steam bypasses the generator and is vented through the rock 
muffler. HELCO allegedly "discovered" that when the trade winds were blowing (which 
is almost always) the steam drifted off of the three-foot pile o f rocks (the "rock muflier") 
and onto the adjacent roadway causing toxic and hazardous driving conditions. A 
chimney hood with a height designed to reduce the problem was authorized for 
construction. Noise pollution complaints were addressed in the formal response by 
stating that the Project had adopted its own noise standard o f 65 dBA at the property 
boundary, and that the noise level had been reduced to below that standard (HGP-A 
Development Group 1982).
In response to nuisance complaints about the "rotten egg" smell, the location o f monitors 
was changed to improve documentation o f H2 S levels in the community, but this resulted 
in the removal o f an on-site monitor, thus reducing early detection o f emissions on-site. 
Unfortunately, there was no proposed or required improvement o f the H^S abatement 
system itself to accompany the attempt to improve monitoring. A major source of 
fugitive H2 S emissions occurred during the turbine shut-down periods due to the fact that 
the steam was released through the rock muffler with an inefficient (90% reduction)
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chemical abatement process or vented unabated directly into the air (Hawaii Geothermal 
Generator Project 1982).
Four months after the County's public meeting on HGP-A, a group o f residents, 
organized as "Puna Speaks," filed the first citizens' geothermal lawsuit in Hawai i against 
the Department o f Energy, the University o f Hawaii, the State, the County, HELCO,
Puna Geothermal Venture and Barnwell Geothermal Corporation. The residents wanted 
the federal court to enjoin the operations o f all o f geothermal wells in lower Puna (HGP- 
A, Barnwell, and Thermal Power/PGV) until the applicable permits and environmental 
laws were followed. The principle issue was the inadequate compliance o f the HGP-A 
project with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the federal EIS law.
By this time, there were four other geothermal wells, within two miles of the HGP-A site. 
They also used open-venting and other testing procedures resulting in air and noise 
emissions. A local doctor testified that the H%S emissions from these wells were causing 
illness in the community -  as much as 10% o f the residents had documented health 
impacts fi-om geothermal development He also testified that his own health was 
compromised during a visit to the HGP-A facility {Honolulu Advertiser September 30,
1982). The case went to trial after a failed attempt to mediate a settlement, and federal 
Judge Harold Fong ruled against Puna Speaks. Judge Fong ruled that the Department o f 
Energy satisfied the requirements NEPA. This ruling was made despite the fact that no 
EIS was prepared for the HGP-A project and the cumulative impacts fi-om the adjacent 
geothermal wells were not considered in the Environmental Assessment.
During the mediation and settlement discussions related to the Puna Speaks lawsuit, the 
community suggested that a buffer zone be created between geothermal development and 
nearby residents. This issue, along with the ofiiers raised in the lawsuit, was not resolved 
and consequently more families moved into the adjacent subdivisions over the next ten 
years without any disclosure o f the present and future geothermal impacts. One o f the 
closest residents to the Puna Geothermal Venture's development site was told by her
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realtor before she bought the property that she could make money and benefit from the 
prospect o f  geothermal leases from the resource underneath her one-acre lot (Martinovich 
2000).
HGP-A continued to operate through the rest o f the 1980's. Documented complaints 
about noise and air pollution impacts varied from month to month and year to year. A 
review o f the air and noise monitoring data shows that, with very few exceptions, the 
ambient H2 S measurements were only recorded as hourly averages or even daily 
averages, but did not include peak levels. This means that a highly concentrated plume 
o f H2 S gas could reach a monitoring station for a  few minutes or hours but not get 
documented because the hourly or daily average could drop the reading many times 
lower. Nevertheless, a limited sample o f the H2 S monitoring data from the fenceline at 










One of the major problems at the facility that contributed to H2 S and noise emissions, 
were the regular periods o f unabated "open venting" o f the well. These events occurred 
for hundreds of hours during planned repairs and accidental releases from plant 
malfunctions during its seven and a half years o f operation (see Table 2). In 1982,
 ̂It is important to distinguish between "ambient" levels and "emission" levels. For example, the 
geochemistry of one of the Puna Geothermal Venture's Wells contains over 1,400,000 ppb of H^S. During 
an uncontrolled venting of the well, the H2 S emissions were estimated to be 180 pounds per hour. The 
highest ambient air concentration of HjS near the property boundary (less than 2000 feet from the well) 
was measured at 29,000 ppb. The ambient air quality around the geothermal facility depends on 
meteorological conditions, distance of monitor from the well, flow rate of the steam and brine and duration 
of steam release. This paper references specific H2 S levels as ambient air quality measurements unless
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Hawaiian Electric Company (parent of HELCO) was asked by the Development Group to 
investigate the possibility o f avoiding open venting during down times at the plant. The 
conclusion, which was accepted by the developers and the County, was that it was 
"physically not possible to accommodate the steam during down time" unless there was 
major redesign work done on the entire facility (Kono 1982). Years later, when the 
County was threatening to revoke their permit, the managers o f the facility proposed to 
install a second steam/brine separator unit "in order to reduce open venting time" (Coops 
1989). The power plant was also not staffed on a 24-hour basis until HELCO was 
required to do so by the County in late 1989 -  a couple months before its closure.
The noise level at the fenceline during periords of open venting was as high as 90 dBA 
(Kubacki 1984). These releases, along with numerous other gas leaks in the power plant 
were caused to a great extent by the rapid rate o f corrosion o f the equipment. This 
included the piping, turbine, HiS abatement system, chemical holding tanks, noise 
muffler, cooling system etc. The main part o f the HgS abatement system, the "John Zink" 
incinerator, was designed for an HiS rate o f 33 lbs. per hour, but received an average 
flow o f 44 lbs. per hour (Bell and Thomas 1988). This contributed to its malfunctions 
and downtime for repairs. Between 1982 and 1985, there were 463 hours o f power 
outages due to equipment failure. The failure o f the H2 S abatement system was 
responsible for 75 percent o f those hours (EPRI 1985). Outside o f the facility, all o f the 
steel surfaces such as the fencing, became corroded, especially those facing the cooling 
tower and brine ponds, which are both sources o f steam emissions. Nearby residents 
reported that nails, screws, and other metal materials on the outside o f their homes also 
corroded quickly and needed to be replaced often.
The high silica content of the resource caused another major maintenance problem in the 
brine disposal system. There was a troublesome build-up o f silica in the brine muffler 
system and the waste settling ponds after the first year o f operation. The "silica gel" that
otherwise stated. The maximum or "peak" level of H2 S (instead of an hourly average) is used unless 
otherwise stated.
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formed in the ponds prevented the waste fluid from draining into the ground and 
consequently, more and more land area was needed (several thousand square meters of 
ponds) in order for the waste to percolate (Thomas 1990).
By 1985, the Project changed hands and added the geothermal "direct-use" feasibility 
experiment The Development Group transferred its interests in, liabilities for, and 
responsibilities for the HGP-A well and surrounding site to the Natural Energy 
Laboratory o f Hawaii (NELH), a state research institution. DOE formally divested itself 
from HGP-A (after providing $11 million in grants for the power plant alone) (West 
Hawaii Today February 4,1986). Despite DOE's earlier interest in using the equipment 
elsewhere, they agreed to turn over the facility at no cost. The Puna Research Center was 
constructed on the HGP-A site adjacent to the power plant and managed by the Hawaii 
Natural Energy Institute. The Center provided grants to small businesses to develop 
products from HGP-A's "waste heat" (such as fruit and lumber drying, cloth dyeing) and 
geothermal by-products (such as the silica).
The revenues from the sale o f energy did not cover its operating expenses and exorbitant 
maintenance costs, let alone fund "direct-use" research. This was because the power 
plant was kept in operation long beyond its design capabilities (Huizingh 1988). 
Nevertheless, in the mid-1980's, there was little interest among those in the "geothermal 
community" to shut it down and insufficient willingness among regulators to recognize 
that problems were occurring at an increasing rate as the facility decayed. It appears, 
from the correspondence between NELH and the County, that there were several reasons 
for the decision to keep the power plant open as long as possible.
1. The prospects for private commercial development in the near term were dim. The 
price o f oil had dropped significantly and President Reagan (soon to be followed by 
George Bush) had all but eliminated federal funding for geothermal development 
programs. Also the national demand for new supply-side (power plants) energy was 
low due to energy conservation measures and an economic recession. NELH, and
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other geothermal promoters thought that it was important to keep the facility going in 
order to keep geothermal alive in Hawai i.
2. Thermal Power/PGV was planning on using the HGP-A power plant to flow test one of 
their exploratory wells, KS-1 A. A few years later, NELH planned on selling energy 
from the HGP-A well to the proposed PGV power plant (a project that did not have its 
own successful production well until 1993) and supposedly did not want to risk losing 
quality flow rates from the well if  it was closed-in for a year or more. Neither o f these 
plans was successful because o f the potential permitting difficulties and problems with 
getting easements over adjacent properties. Also, in the early 1990's, the condition o f 
the HGP-A well came into question. Considerable investment would have been 
necessary to repair die well for energy production.
3. HELCO continued to rely upon and profit from the two megawatts that the plant 
regularly provided.
4. NELH and University o f Hawaii researchers were interested in acquiring more land 
adjacent to HGP-A for a mini-geothermal industrial park that would service 
commercial geothermal projects using the steam and brine from HGP-A and possibly 
from Thermal Power/PGV. Plans for the creation of additional uses for geothermal 
fluids also served to help keep the well open despite the problems at power plant.
5. NELH believed that they could secure additional funding from the State in order to 
keep the power plant functional despite its problems.
Health concerns and other complaints by residents continued to be dismissed as "largely 
emotional." In 1985, a geothermal industry spokesman from California insisted that 
Hawai i push forward with geothermal development despite economic problems and 
community complaints. "You can drown in pea soup or you can be nourished by it" he 
concluded {Honolulu Advertiser August 27,1985).
30
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Beyond HGP-A
After the land-use permit was issued for the HGP-A power plant in 1978, the Hawaii 
Geothermal Project scientists continued to lobby the state and private industry for 
additional support to expand geothermal development in Puna and elsewhere. In 1978, 
the project directors, John Shupe and Paul Yuen, produced a report that emphasized the 
potential uses for "surplus" geothermal power because the Big Island electricity demand 
was only around 70 megawatts and 40 percent o f that was provided by biomass fuels 
(sugar cane waste). The report listed four possibilities worth investigating;
1. Producing electricity for O ahu and Maui via an inter-island underwater power cable. 
They claimed that this was technically feasible but not "economically sound." Despite 
this negative assessment, this was the only large-scale option that was seriously 
pursued by the State (see Chapter 5).
2. Refining aluminum and processing manganese nodules, which the report noted are 
abundant in the Central Pacific. Manganese refining was estimated to require at least 
200 megawatts o f power and an aluminum refinery would use 400 megawatts.
3. Non-electric uses o f steam and heat for health spas, sugar processing, horticulture, 
drying coffee, timber, papaya, and nuts. Grants allocated for the HGP-A power plant 
included some research money for such investigations.
4. Production o f hydrogen by electrolysis o f water. This was labeled as a "long shot" 
because the production of hydrogen from electricity would be a highly energy 
inefficient process and would require "massive quantities of cost-competitive 
geothermal energy" (Shupe and Yuen 1978).
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A Long Slow Death
The beginning of the end for the HGP-A power plant started in April of 1989. County 
officials toured HGP-A following a minor blowout due to a broken valve. The County 
Planning Director, Duane Kanuha, sent a letter to NELH with a list o f concerns about the 
condition o f the facility. He warned that a recommendation would be submitted to the 
Planning Commission to review or revoke the HGP-A permit. This marked the first real 
attempt by County to take enforcement action for conditions such as rusted pipes and 
valves, steam leaking from pipes and brine flowing outside o f the property boundary 
(Kanuha 1989).
NELH responded by saying that they were "proud o f the success o f this facility" and that 
they had no intention o f closing it down until the proposed PGV facility was operational 
and could make use the HGP-A well. Poor maintenance was attributed to an early debt 
incurred due to a turbine failure combined with the fact that the plant was intended to 
operate for a "short time period." NELH admitted that "the utility was not specifically 
directed to maintain the plant to general utility standards." Nevertheless, there was an 
"immediate action plan" to overhaul the facility in order to keep it operating "safely" until 
PGV comes on line (Coops 1989). Although PGV had not yet secured any state or 
county permits (see Chapter 4), NELH claimed that PGV would begin to deliver power to 
HELCO by late 1989 or early 1990. NELH assured the County that State money had 
been appropriated to overhaul HGP-A and hire a new project engineer in order to assist 
HELCO and PGV by keeping the ailing facility operational for an additional six to eight 
months.
Further discussions continued for the next several months. The County Planning 
Commission indicated interest in closing HGP-A during a hearing on PGV's permit 
application, but no further action was taken until Puna residents organized a major effort 
to shut down the facility following another major leak in early September 1989. During 
the Labor Day holiday weekend, the HGP-A plant was off-line while the turbine was
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being repaired. On Monday, September 5, Harry Kim, Administrator of the County Civil 
Defense Agency, wrote a memo to Don Thomas at HGP-A notifying him that the 
emergency response plan at HGP-A was unacceptable (Kim 1989). Later that night, a 
corroded valve broke and steam was vented at HGP-A for over 24 hours. Like the earlier 
accident in April, emergency responders and residents were not adequately notified o f the 
leak fmm the facility. There was also no staff available at the plant during the night 
when the leaks were commonly detected. Many families, particularly those with small 
children, were evacuated for a day or two but health complaints continued to be recorded 
at the County Civil Defense Agency and Planning Department during the rest o f the week 
(Civil Defense Agency 1989 and Planning Department 1989).
On September 11, 1989, over 100 msidents submitted a petition to the Planning 
Department requesting that HGP-A's permit be revoked due to the ongoing problems at 
the facility that had resulted in air and noise emissions as well as property value loss.
The petition cited a total o f fourteen days when the H%S abatement system failed during 
the previous three months. Persuaded by these complaints, in addition to a slideshow 
presentation by the community and a critical memo from Harry Kim, the Planning 
Department issued a 24-hour shut-down notice to HGP- due to the lack of progress on the 
required maintenance work. HELCO complied with the order and agreed to staff the 
facility on a 24-hour basis, but only until the overhaul work was completed (Planning 
Department 1989).
In October o f 1989 there was another major leak at HGP-A due to a failure in the 
abatement system. A nearby resident sought medical attention and called the Department 
o f Health (DOH) to report respiratory problems due to air emissions. He was told that 
fiiere was no problem at the facility (Petricci 1989). A couple days later, DOH issued a 
statement saying that there had been two separate accidental releases resulting in elevated 
of HgS in the community {Hawaii Tribune-Herald OcXoher 25,1989).
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Hawai i's Governor, John Waihee requested that NELH close the operation o f the power 
plant by the end of the year. Subsequently, the County Planning Commission accepted 
the recommendation from the Planning Department to formally require NELH to initiate 
a process to close down HGP-A. On December 11, the power plant was accidentally 
"tripped" off-line by an island-wide electrical power outage and consequently the well 
was finally closed on that day as well.
The Commission's order did not require that the well be plugged and abandoned, nor did 
it revoke, close or modify HGP-A's operating permit (Special Permit No. 392). The 
Special Permit was issued for activities limited to the "establishment of a geothermal 
research facility and to conduct flow tests" (Mielcke 1978). NELH's Geothermal Mining 
Lease with the Department o f Land and Natural Resources was not terminated or 
modified either. The State mining lease was issued for a term of "ten years and for so 
long thereafter as geothermal resources are produced and utilized" (Department o f Land 
and Natural Resources 1986).
Between 1990 and 1995, the well was used for experiments. This was done in part to 
keep research funds flowing to University scientists and also to justify interest in keeping 
the well and the relevant permits open for future use. In 1990 and 1991 experiments 
were conducted by the Pacific Center for High Technology Research (PICHTR) down 
inside the well to test the technology for a new geothermal heat exchanger. This 
Downhole Coaxial Heat Exchanger project was a collaboration between PICHTR and 
Japanese corporations. The $280,000 funding contribution from PICHTR was allocated 
from the State o f Hawai i, but the intended application o f the technology was for "hot dry 
rock" geothermal reservoirs (i.e. those lacking sufficiait steam for electrical generation). 
This is not the type o f resource found in Hawai i. In fact, the HGP-A well had to be 
temporarily reconfigured to simulate a dry well (PICHTR 1990). During the initial well 
casing and temperature assessments, the scientists discovered an "obstruction" in the well 
at 2,133 feet down. Consequently, NELH had to conduct a series of additional tests and
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finance the removal o f the obstruction with the use o f a drilling rig before further testing 
on the heat exchanger could occur (Hachmuth 1990).
In 1993, the U.S. EPA responded to a petition to assess the potential o f the geothermal 
development area, which encompassed PGV and HGP-A, as a hazardous waste site. The 
EPA conducted a Preliminary Assessment o f the HGP-A site and found that the unlined 
settling ponds remained at the site along with an aboveground tank o f sodium hydroxide 
(description, caustic agent etc.). Chemical samplii% results o f the geothermal wastewater 
in the ponds (which were actually located on Lyman family land adjacent to the HGP-A 
site) included presence o f arsenic, barium, chromium, copper, lead, mercury, and zinc 
(Bechtel 1993).
The following year marked the beginning o f the end for the HGP-A well. In June o f 
1994, the Department o f Business, Economic Development & Tourism (DBEDT) 
circulated a brief letter to NELH, the Governor, other State agencies, and die County 
regarding the condition o f the well. DBEDT reported that the physical condition o f the 
well was poor enough to assume that "any future use o f the well may compromise its 
integrity" (Hannemann 1994). DBEDT, the lead agency responsible for developing the 
HGP-A power plant, was recommending that the well be permanently plugged and 
abandoned, but NELH agreed only to temporarily plug and "secure" the well, but not 
before more tests were conducted inside the well.
Despite the warnings that the safety o f the well was compromised, University o f Hawaii 
and Hawaii Volcano Observatory scientists used the well for tests relating to earthquake 
detection. Although the purpose o f the tests were unrelated to geothermal energy, the 
University requested that the Department o f Health (that had no previous regulatory 
oversight of the facility) have a H2 S monitor and a staff person on-site during the tests 
due to potential problems with high pressure in the well (Goldstein 1994). In order to 
relieve pressure in the well, gas discharges were released prior to the test. These 
emissions caused concern and complaints from nearby residents.
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In January o f 1996, NELH received a permit to permanently plug and abandon the well. 
The permit expired one year later and was not reapplied for until February o f 1998. By 
this time, the U.S. EPA had become directly involved with the regulation o f injection 
wells at the nearby PGV facility. EPA requested that the State or PGV allocate the 
necessary funds to permanently secure the well due to its potential to contaminate 
groundwater. The well was finally abandoned in June o f 1999 at a cost to the state of 
$612,210 (Department o f Land and Natural Resources 1999).
As of mid-2001, none of the HGP-A permits have been terminated. Although NELH 
requested that the geothermal mining lease (S-4602) be cancelled in a letter to DLNR on 
October 16,1998, there has been no action taken by the Board o f Land and Natural 
Resources. There has not been any geothermal-related activity at the site since 1991. 
Nevertheless, there is enough interest on the part o f geothermal industrialists and some 
politicians in using the HGP-A site, remaining facilities, and heat from PGVs wells for 
further research and development. A lthouj^ NELH is no longer interested in any 
involvement in geothermal, they acknowledge the value o f keeping both the state mining 
lease and the County special use permit open. Permits that have not been terminated 
could facilitate future development by allowing an interested developer to request that the 
permit be transferred (as a simple administrative matter) to a new party. The County 
permit should not be able to be used in such a manner due to its specificity about the 
experimental power facility, but the State mining lease contains more general language 
and might be more easily manipulated.
In 1978, the State claimed that the HGP-A generator project would demonstrate how the 
geothermal resource could be used in electrical applications. "The whole point o f a 
demonstration is to discover how to do things the right way," according to the Project's 
director (Kono 1982). By 1989, the Project should have clearly demonstrated how not to 
use geothermal for power generation. Despite the five-year extension of its poor 
operating life, it apparently did not demonstrate this sufficiently to prevent subsequent
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years o f problems at the commercial development project located next door. Puna 
Geothermal Venture.
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CHAPTER 4 
Puna Geothermal Venture
The development of the Puna Geothermal Venture's facility, like the other geothermal 
projects in H aw aii, has had little to do with renewable e n e r^  and much to do with 
facilitating industrial land development. This is most clearly demonstrated by the fact 
that the principle landowner in lower Puna, Richard Lyman, pursued geothermal as a way 
to seek profits fijom industrialization, and the geothermal developers have mainly 
consisted o f large-scale land developers fi-om Hawai i and oil and gas companies fi-om 
the mainland U.S.
Early History
In 1980, Lyman's companies Kapoho Land Partnership and Kapoho Land and 
Development Company entered into an agreement with Dillingham and Thermal Power 
Co. Lyman secured a geothermal mining lease from the state Board o f Land and Natural 
Resources for the Thermal-Dillingham joint venture to explore and develop 25 
megawatts o f power on a 500 acre parcel o f Lyman's land approximately 21 miles 
southeast o f Hilo, between the areas o f Pohoiki and Kapoho on the eastern tip o f the 
island.
Thermal-Dillingham became Puna Geothermal Venture in 1981. At that time Thermal 
Power, owned by Natomas o f San Francisco, was the operator, and Amfac and 
Dillingham, held financial interests as minority partners. Amfac (formerly American 
Factors) was the richest company in Hawai i at the time, primarily due to the acquisition 
o f valuable sugar plantations in the late 1800's (Cooper 1985). One o f those plantations 
was Puna Sugar Company, which was closing down its mill in lower Puna at the same 
time geothermal was getting started.
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According to Thermal Power, it was the "business community" that invited them to 
develop geothermal in Hawai i. (Diamond Shamrock 1985) It is clear that this 
"community" was the Lyman family's Kapoho Land Partnership together with two o f the 
biggest land developers in Hawai i.
Thermal Power became a subsidiary o f Diamond Shamrock Company, a Texas oil 
company. Diamond Shamrock's 1985 promotional materials claimed that they had 
developed a track record gaining expertise and practical experience at the Geysers 
geothermal complex in Northern California. They believed o f themselves to be energy 
"pioneers" and consequently set out to explore and develop a "commercially viable 
resource in Hawai i" (Diamond Shamrock 1985).
The Lyman family (specifically Richard Lyman, C. Arthur Lyman and Albert Lono 
Lyman) eventually formed their own geothermal development company, the Kapoho 
Land Partnership. In 1981, the Lymans teamed up with a newly formed consortium, 
Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV), to secure the State's first commercial "mineral lease " 
from the State in order to have mining lease rights to die geothermal steam under their 
land. The second lease to be issued for geothermal "mining" went to Bishop Estate (and 
subleased to PGV), whose president o f the board of trustees at the time, was Richard 
Lyman.
Exploration Phase
In 1980 the Big Island utility company, HELCO, issued a request for proposal for 
geothermally produced electricity to fulfill their expected need for additional electrical 
generating capacity in 1988 (Department o f Planning and Economic Development 1982). 
Thermal Power/PGV made a proposal to HELCO and began negotiations. PGV also 
secured a special use permit from the County Planning Commission to drill exploratory 
wells on land leased from the Lyman family close to the State's HGP-A facility in the 
Kapoho-Pohoiki area.
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In 1980, Thermal Power contracted the environmental consultants from the HGP-A 
project, Barbara and Sandy Siegel, to produce an environmental report on their well- 
drilling plans. The Siegels submitted the report with these comments about the drill site:
We hope you are as pleased with this study as we are. We see no 
mitigation problems you are not already aware of. In truth, it's pretty 
scruffy countryside — with disturbance by man well back into the 
monarchy (and not all by haoles, either). I doubt that there is a safer place, 
"impact-wise", to driU in Hawaii county except for maybe the Ka'u desert 
(Siegel 1981).
Three wells were drilled and flow tested between 1981 and 1985. Although each o f the 
three wells was allegedly capable of producii^ 2 to 3.2 Megawatts, PGV experienced 
mechanical problems and consequently all o f the wells became unusable for production 
due to their inadequate well casings.
Well KS-1 suffered damage in 1981 soon after well drilling was complete. The 
following year, in October o f 1982, the well vented due to a broken pipe combined with a 
broken noise muffler that caused a gas release and noise that residents described as a 747- 
je t plane taking off. Thermal Power announced to the press that the blowout could have 
been caused by sabotage o f the well. This announcement prompted the harassment of 
some residents by local police, but no formal investigation was warranted. This 
accusation also came two months after Thermal Power had been named in a lawsuit filed 
by nearby residents (see Chapter 3). The uncontrolled flow lasted for 38 hours until a 
drilling supervisor, flown in from New Mexico was able to direct workers wearing 
asbestos suits borrowed from the county fire department, on how to fix the pipe. A 
Hawaii County helicopter hovered above the well in order to clear enough steam for 
workers to redirect the steam release. Three families evacuated their homes during the 
accident (Star Bulletin October 4, 1982). Two months prior to this accident, the County 
Planning Department had received health complaints (sinus problems, headache and 
nausea) from the community saying that the exploration is "very loud and the smell is
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unbearable". The Department did nothing except to refer them to Thermal Power 
Company (Planning Department 1982).
In 1983, four drilling crewmembers were overcome with gas while working at the 
wellhead on remedial measures to improve the damaged casing. PGV reported that there 
was disconnected line that caused HzS (which is heavier than air) to concentrate in a 
sunken area ("cellar") around the wellhead (Puna Geothermal Venture 1983). All were 
taken to the hospital for treatment o f acute HzS exposure. The State Department o f Labor 
and Industrial Relations issued two citations related to this accident for serious and 
general violations o f worker safety. The specific violations included the absence of 
emergency rescue planning and equipment, and allowing employees to enter a hazardous 
area without proper protective equipment and respiratory devices (Labor and Industrial 
Relations 1983). Later in 1983, the well was deemed unusable due to casing leaks 
(GeothermEx 1992).
KS-2 was tested with a "temperature survey" in 1982, which detected a leak in the casing 
at 1,000 feet. A flow test was conducted (despite the danger posed with a compromised 
casing) and the well was shown to be affected by the leak and apparently unable to 
produce an adequate volume o f steam (GeothermEx 1992). PGV revised their casing 
protocol and drilled another well in 1985. KS-1 A held the most promise as a production 
well (estimated to produce 3.2 megawatts) but it too became damaged. In 1992, PGV 
repaired and converted it to an injection well (GeothermEx 1994).
In 1986, with three damaged wells to show for their project, PGV signed a contract with 
HELCO to produce 25 megawatts of electricity for 30 years. Half o f the power was to be 
delivered by the end o f 1989 and the remaining by 1993. Later that year, PGV submitted 
an application to the Hawai i County Planning Department for a Geothermal Resource 
Permit (GRP). The 1983 law establishing Geothermal Resource Subzones required 
proposed geothermal projects in the Agricultural district to secure a land-use permit from 
the County (see Chapters 5 and 6). PGV notified the Department that they would
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completing an EIS on a voluntary basis because the County had told them that and one 
was not required (Puna Geothermal Venture 1989).
A year later they submitted their EIS, but less than six months after that. Thermal Power 
and Amfac sold PGV to subsidiaries o f Ormat Energy Systems, Inc. (OESI or "Ormat"), 
an Israeli company with a U.S. office in Nevada (Puna Geothermal Venture 1989).
Ormat was incorporated in 1986 to develop energy projects using the "Ormat turbine." 
Constellation Energy, a subsidary of Baltimore Gas and Electric (EG &E), joined PGV as 
a minority partner (49%). A Philadelphia company, called LFC Financial Corporation, 
holds financial interests in Ormat. EG &E is a major utility company with fossil fuel and 
nuclear power plants in throughout Maryland and Pennsylvania.
Although Ormat’s President, Hezy Ram, boasted "zero discharge" o f pollutants, he also 
acknowledged that it was expensive (Gipe 1989). Ormat, which was known as a 
developer o f low temperature geodiermal resources, re-designed PGV's proposed power 
plant to include different turbines and a different cooling system. This system claimed to 
have a technical advantage in the utilization o f low to moderate temperature resources. 
PGV's consultants and engineers (not to mention HELCO, the County and the State) 
apparently ignored the fact that this specialty was useless and potentially dangerous at the 
proposed PGV site. The geothermal reservoir at the site was well documented as being 
one of the hottest and most corrosive in the world.
Ormat submitted a new GRP application the County but concluded that a revised EIS was 
not necessary since they were using "the same geothermal wellpads, and the same power 
plant location as the previously proposed PGV project" (Puna Geothermal Venture 1989). 
PGV claimed that the new cooling system would reduce the amount o f fugitive air 
emissions from the plant, but neglected to adequately disclose the added noise problems 
associated with their air-cooling design. Instead o f analyzing this situation in a revised 
EIS, PGV assured the County Planning Department that the "worst case" drilling noise 
pollution at the nearest residences would only reach 55 dEA (Ormat/PGV August 7,
42
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1989). PGV also assured the community that the noise levels from the power plant 
would meet the County’s guidelines o f 45 dBA at night (see Chapter 6).
Two months prior to the submittal o f PGVs amended application, an Ormat geothermal 
well in Nevada experienced the "largest blowout o f its kind in U.S. history." On January 
12,1989, well drillers at Ormat’s Stillwater, Nevada project were drilling an injection 
well and ran into problems. The well casing collapsed and the ground subsided blowing 
steam and liquid out o f the well and directly out o f the ground as far as 100 feet away 
from the wellhead. Geothermal fluids (at 350® F) also dispersed undei^ound at 5,000 
gallons per minute (Adams 1989 and Zvulun 1989). The steam shot into the sky as high 
as 2,000 feet. A huge crater formed -  100 feet in diameter and 55 feet deep. Within 90 
minutes the drilled rig toppled. It took Ormat 26 days to kill the well by pumping mud 
from another well that was drilled diagonally to intersect the uncontrolled well. The 
blowout caused massive soil and water contamination of a nearby wetlanck in the 
Stillwater Wildlife Management Area. Over 18 million gallons o f contaminated (boron 
and arsenic) water spilled into the wetlands {Reno Gazette-Journal January 26,1989). 
Ormat claimed that the "drilling process met the production zone at a shallower depth 
than anticipated" (Zvulun 1989). The company's public relations response in Hawai i 
claimed that it was a "freak o f nature" and that Puna residents have no need to worry 
because the PGV project involves drilling on much more stable land. Ormat boasted that 
they "believe that with the knowledge, experience and safety precautions which they take 
with every project, and especially the Hawaiian project, it is highly unlikely this situation 
would ever occur again" {Honolulu Advertiser January 1,1990). PGV’s EIS also 
declared that the potential for a well blowout was "extremely small" (Thermal Power 
1987).
In m id-1989, at the same time that the HGP-A facility was experiencing some o f its worst 
problems, PGV was engaged with the County and community in an attempt to finalize 
their Geothermal Resource Permit. This process involved mediation sessions between 
PGV, the County and concerned residents. The Planning Commission held numerous
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public hearings, in large part in an attempt to resolve the land-use conflict that had been 
evolving since HGP-A was first drilled in 1975. PGV had a problem with fast-tracking 
their permits due to the general proximity o f their proposed facility to three major 
subdivisions and the immediate (within 3500 feet) proximity o f numerous residents who 
had already been impacted by HGP-A (see Chapter 6). PGV assured the Commission 
that the plant would "operate without environmental impact" (Ormat 1990). In the end, 
PGV gained the governor's support and succeeded in convincing the Planning 
Department and key commissioners that community demands for a buffer zone were 
unnecessary and unreasonable. In September o f 1989, the Planning Commission voted 
six to three in favor of PGV's request for a GRP.
The county issued the permit in spite o f numerous unresolved problems that were 
identified by community groups and PGV's closest neighbors. These included (Chapter 6 
addresses numbers 1-3):
1. PGV would be allowed to clean out their wells by unabated venting.
2. There was no effective provision for the permanent relocation o f residents.
3. The noise emission limits were not protective o f residents.
4. H2 S emissions were not adequately regulated (see Chapter 5).
6. The complete geochemistry o f the steam and brine and potential for emissions of 
pollutants other than H2 S was not addressed.
Within days after GRP's approval, the Island's utility company, Hawaiian Electric Lights 
Company (HELCO), requested a $4.38 million rate increase (part o f an overall 16.9% 
increase) to pay for the power it agreed to buy from PGV. The increase was allegedly a 
"straight pass-through," which means that HELCO would charge its customers what PGV 
charged HELCO {Hawaii Tribune-Herald September 29,1989). Also following the 
permit issuance, Hawaiian Electric Industries (HEI), the parent company o f HELCO 
made an announcement that they had signed a Memorandum o f Understanding with PGV 
to develop their facility in partnership. Ormat would sell 50 percent o f PGV to another 
HEI subsidiaiy, but continue to act as the managing partner o f facility (California
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Division o f Oil and Gas 1989). Two Big Island lawmakers quickly raised the issue o f 
"potential impropriety" and serious ethical questions because these negotiations had been 
underway for months before the permit was issued. Nothing had been disclosed prior to 
the issuance o f the County permit. Nor was there any disclosure o f HELCO's subsequent 
request for a rate increase specifically to cover the costs o f geothermal energy. HELCO 
testified in strong support o f PGV's permit but apparently they were lobbying directly for 
their own project (Levin and Chang 1989). By December 1989, the potential partnership 
had ended.
Development Phase
During the development o f PGV's production wells and power plant, a major theme of 
incompetence and irresponsibility developed. This incompetence occurred at both at the 
managerial and operating levels. Although there have been many problems including 
accidents and equipment failures over the past eleven years, only a handful o f incidents 
will be discussed in detail. These include a blowout in February o f 1991, a  planned 
venting in March o f 1991, a major blowout in June o f 1991, a series of problems 
associated with a damaged well in 1992, and various accidents in 1993. Most o f the 
details from PGV's major incidents (also known as "upset conditions") focus on the air 
emission impacts from H^S exposure. However, PGV's noise emissions have also been a 
serious problem for the community both on a chronic (during "normal" operations) and 
acute (during drilling activities and major accidents) basis (see Chapter 6).
On February 21,1991, PGV was drilling well KS-7 (which was intended to be an 
injection well) down around 1,600 feet. The well blew out, releasing steam and hot 
water. The steam shot up over 100 feet propelling debris that hit a worker, sending him 
to the hospital with serious injuries. Hawai i County Civil Defense declared it as an 
"uncontrolled blowout" Fortunately, the minimal blowout prevention equipment (used at 
that depth) was successful and the well was secured within an hour. Despite a test of 
PGV's internal alarm system the previous week, the alarm did not trigger when the
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incident occurred. PGV personnel working away from the drilling rig relied on the steam 
plume as their emergency notification (West Hawaii Today February 2,1991).
After hearing the loud explosion, nearby residents -  not PGV personnel -  notified 
emergency officials. Although the KS-7 well was only 1500 feet from the nearest 
residence, PGV and state regulators claimed that amount o f HzS that reached the adjacent 
community in the "huge cloud of steam" was relatively low. A couple, living in Leilani 
Estates, called Civil Defense two hours after the accident and complained o f vomiting, 
wateiy eyes, and aching jaws. They were advised to seek medical assistance at the Pahoa 
Fire Station (Civil Defense Agency Incident Report February 21,1991). Other residents 
living in Lani Puna Gardens subdivision, also adjacent to PGV's boundary, became ill as 
well. They reported similar symptoms including nausea and vomiting (Hawaii Tribune- 
Herald March 4,1991). The neighbors who became ill and wanted temporary relocation 
compensation discovered that PGV was only required, by the County, to compensate 
residents for leaving their homes during planned venting or during routine drilling 
activities. Compensation for emergency evacuation and health impacts could only be 
sought from the PGV by filing a personal damage lawsuit. An "asset fund" was required 
as a condition to PGV's permit to mitigate these types o f impacts. This fund was not 
available until 1995, and even then, it was almost impossible for the impacted community 
to access this money (see Chapter 6).
PGV decided to permanently close the well within four days o f the blowout. This 
decision came after receiving recommendations to do so from civil defense officials and 
company consultants brought to Puna to evaluate the well (Mayor's Office 1991). As was 
the case in the Stillwater, Nevada accident, this blowout occurred because the drill hit an 
unexpected area of fractures and high temperature during the drilling o f an injection well. 
The well's temperature at 1,650 feet was 500® F, which is around the temperature that 
drillers would have expected four times deeper. This experience was significantly 
different from \^diat was predicted by PGV's hydrological model o f the area, which 
served as the basis o f its drilling program (Thomas et al 1991). PGV assured the public
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that there would be no further drilling or venting o f PGV's other wells, until KS-7 was 
"sealed, stabilized and evaluated, which will take approximately two weeks" (Mayor's 
Office 1991).
This incident was one o f the single most important indicators o f how the developer and 
the government regulators approached the issue o f impacts on the health and safety o f the 
community. Civil Defense administrator, Harry Kim concluded that this was a major 
incident because it compromised PGV's "credibility and what we're trying to do as far as 
insuring the safety o f the public. We damn well better learn from this" (Hawaii Tribune- 
/fera/rf February 22,1991).
At the tim e of the KS-7 blowout, PGV was preparing to "open vent" their first production 
well, KS-3. Unabated or "vertical venting" of a well during initial clean-out is a planned 
release o f steam and brine into the air without the benefit o f scrubbers or chemical 
treatment to reduce the hazards o f hydrogen sulfide and other toxins in the brine and 
steam. After KS-7 was plugged, the Mayor o f Hawai'i County requested that PGV delay 
the plaimed well cleanout for a minimum o f one month. This was requested in order to 
"give County and state ^encies time to better acquaint residents with venting {procedures 
and the effects of venting" (Hawaii County Mayor's Office 1991). In PGV's 1989 GRP 
application amendment, they claimed that "vertical venting is necessary for effective 
cleanout" (Puna Geothermal Venture 1989). The day before the actual venting, the 
County Planning De{)artment defended PGV's planned emissions by stating that 
abatement equipment (such as that used in California) cannot be used in Hawai'i due to 
the "nature o f the resource" (Hawaii Tribune-Herald March 2,1991).
On March 25, 1991, PGV vented their KS-3 well for four hours with the full support o f 
both the State and County. Blasting upward with the sound o f a je t takeoff, the dirty 
plume sjjewed mud around the neighborhood and caused a downwind air monitor to 
document a HzS "spike" o f 88 ppb (Hawaii Tribune-Herald yLarch 29,1999). 
Coincidentally, a  noise measurement o f 88 dBA (a level that can cause hearing damage)
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was also recorded off-site during the venting {Hawaii Tribune-Herald Maxch. 26,1991). 
After the open venting, which PGV claimed was a big success, an abated flow-test o f the 
well continued for ten days. A local community group circulated an informal health 
survey after the venting. A summary o f health effects from 90 people reported headaches 
(51 people), eye irritation (31 people), dizziness (18 people), upset stomach (23 people), 
and burning eyes, nose and throat (5 people). Other symptoms were reported along with 
an accounting o f how many respondents were disturbed by the noise (60%) and the 
"rotten egg" smell o f HjS (80%),
In April o f 1991, PGV reported to the Governor's Advisory Board on the 
Geothermal/Cable Project. Maurice Richard, PGV's regional development manager 
stated that everything was in place to transmit up to 10 megawatts o f power to HELCO's 
grid, except energy from a production well. He said, "PGV is behind schedule, 
consuming time and money, PGV is still learning about the resource." Soon, it became 
clear that this was a huge understatement.
Three months after the KS-7 blowout, PGV began to drill a new well, KS-8 (1400 feet 
from the nearest residences). This well was directionally drilled towards KS-7 using the 
same drilling procedures that had resulted in KS-7's blowout and subsequent demise. By 
this time, the facility was over a year behind schedule. The project's investors and the 
utility company were beginning to get very concerned. PGV had drilled a total o f five 
wells over the previous ten years, yet they still did not have an adequate production well 
to supply their completed power plant. Credit Suisse, PGV's main financier, hired an 
independent geothermal consultant to evaluate the viability o f the geothermal reservoir in 
Puna (Gardner 2001).
In early June, PGV ran into problems that were described later by the state's consultants 
as "red flags" and should have alerted PGV to the possibility o f another blowout. These 
included indications that the well casing was compromised, irregular flows o f drilling 
mud, and the presence o f "gas entries" (Thomas et al 1991). At 7:00 p.m. on June 12,
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1991 several o f PGV's closest neighbors called the facility and the police to inquire about 
the clearly visible steam coming from the base o f the drill rig at KS-8. At that time, the 
drilling had hit a "large fracture" at a depth o f 3476 feet. The presence o f a fracture at 
this depth was not unusual, but the drill operators were using heavy mud that seeped into 
the fracture leaving a void in the well bore. This void filled with steam and gases from 
the fracture. A steam release occurred carrying an estimated HgS concentration of
186,000 ppb (Reynolds 1991). PGV's response to the neighbor's phone call indicated that 
there were no problems and said that any smoke that might have been seen "was not from 
the well" (Martinovich 1991). The police, \\fro were called to the scene by other 
residents, also reported that PGV told them that nothing was wrong {Hawaii Tribune- 
Herald Jvaa& 23 1991).
Earlier in the day, a meeting in PGV’s office resulted in a fateful decision to continue 
drilling despite the problems over the previous days. The decision meant that the 
installation o f a well casing that was sufficient to anchor appropriate blowout prevention 
equipment would not happen until the well was drilled another 500 feet At 11:00pm 
there was a shift change on the drill rig and only one driller was left on the rig when, at 
11:06 p.m. the drill encountered a large fracture (containing fluids o f high temperature 
and pressure), the well "kicked" and then the heat and pressure o f the steam in the well 
"unloaded" with two or three releases (Thomas et al 1991). The explosion damaged 
critical drilling equipment and shook the windows o f nearby residences. Nine minutes 
later, a nearby resident notified the Fire Department. Nineteen minutes later, PGV made 
their first phone call to emergency responders at the Civil Defense Agency. The drill rig 
was abandoned until morning and left to vent uncontrollably with no HzS abatement or 
noise control.
Meanwhile, the steam was blowing to the southeast into the Lani Puna Gardens 
subdivision. PGV advised emergency responders that residents should be evacuated 
immediately. A plant engineer told a nearby resident to evacuate because "we have a 
major blowout and we don't know what to do" {Hawaii Tribune-Herald^ June 19,1991).
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Noise and H^S levels were not available for two hours. PGV finally reported their 
readings o f HgS at 22,000 to 29,000 ppb and noise levels at 100 dBA in the Lani Puna 
Gardens subdivision (Civil Defense Incident Notes June 12,1991). This entire 
subdivision was evacuated for the duration o f the blowout. Two employees at PGV were 
injured in the blast. One was treated at the site and the other was taken to Hilo Hospital 
with bums and bruises (Hawaii Tribune-Herald June 13, 1991).
The following morning, on June 13,1991, work was done at the wellhead resulting in the 
plume directed horizontally with "considerable momentum towards residential areas" 
(Reynolds 1991). That day, the wind shifted and over 250 households in another 
subdivision were put on "high alert" for evacuation. Civil Defense Administrator, Harry 
Kim urged the elderly, those with illnesses and children to evacuate voluntarily. The 
uncontrolled venting of above ground continued for 31 hours while workers pumped cool 
water into the well (below ground, the well continued to vent for four months). The 
duration o f the venting resulted in the release o f an estimated 2,247 pounds on hydrogen 
sulfide (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1994). On June 14, Civil Defense 
announced that the well had been closed but did not lift the evacuation alert until the 
following day when PGV assured Civil Defense that the well was secured and there 
would be "ne further emissions o f H2 S" (Emergency Operations Center Board June 15, 
1991).
State and County agencies and community groups compiled reports o f health effects, 
including some fiom up to ten miles away. The symptoms reported by residents living in 
the subdivisions surrounding PGV were consistent with the estimated level o f H2 S 
exposure.
While the exposure time was short for individuals and no long term 
adverse health effects are foreseen, the high levels o f gaseous toxic air 
concentrations added to other heavy metals aerosols, particulates and H2 S 
are estimated to have given rise to the reported adverse health complaints 
(Goddard & Goddard 1991).
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Health problems reported included eye, throat and nose untation, trouble breathing, 
coughing and wheezing, nausea, and vomiting. One nearby resident, who was eight 
weeks pregnant at the time, reported the onset o f severe abdominal pain during the 
blowout and suffered a miscarriage a few days later (Kong 1992).
In the m idst o f the blowout, while the well was still venting, PGV assured the media that 
this was only a "well-flow event" and that they would be starting up the power plant in 
one month as planned {Hawaii Tribune-Herald June 13,1991), After the State and 
County declared a moratorium on drilling, PGV assured the public that the blowout is 
"good news" for the company. Maurice Richard, a company spokesman, said that the 
project would only be idle for 10 days and tibiat the well itself was not damaged. Richard 
Matsuura, a State Senator from Hilo was quoted as saying that "accidents will happen" 
but this one was a positive event because it proved that there was a viable resource that 
can now be tapped into at much more shallow depth {Hawaii Tribune-Herald June 13, 
1991).
Later that week, PGV's field manager, William Teplow, accused nearby residents o f lying 
when they said they had observed problems at the wellhead hours before the blow out 
The implication of these statements (that were confirmed months later by independent 
consultants) was that PGV could have prevented the blowout due to early warning signs. 
Teplow once again claimed that the drilling operations before the blowout were normal 
and that the residents' statements were "totally irreqx)nsible" {Hawaii Tribune-Herald 
June 6, 1991).
In late June, independent drilling and geothermal regulatory experts fi*om the mainland 
where hired by the State and County to report on the blowout and help develop criteria 
for lifting the drilling ban. The consultants not only confirmed the presence o f "red 
flags" before tiie well blew, but they concluded that the well was still out o f control 
underground (in part due to inadequate and compromised well casir%) and it needed to be 
"killed" and secured. This "kill" operation (lowering its temperature and pressure)
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required the drilling o f a water well on site to be used to cool KS-8 and make it safe for 
the surrounding community. Hawai'i County Mayor, Lorraine Inouye, declared a "State 
o f Emergency" in order to expedite this process.
On October 2,1991, Mayor Inouye received formal notification from the Department o f 
Land and Natural Resources that PGV's KS-8 well had finally been controlled and 
secured. The Mayor ended the two-month "state of emergency" and lifted the suspension 
of non-drilling activities by PGV. The drilling ban would remain in effect until PGV 
satisfied all o f the requirements o f the newly developed "Geothermal Management Plan." 
Despite the drilling ban, PGV had problems with one o f the other wells. In September o f 
1991, KS-3 sprung a leak, which inundated some of the households in the community 
with HzS. PGV agreed to stop the leak by "killing" the well, but not plugging it.
Four months after the June blowout, PGV announced that they had "agreed" with the 
state (following the recommendations by the post-blowout consultants) that open venting 
was not necessary and would be prohibited in the future. PGV agreed to install a 
scrubber to remove HgS and use a muffler to deaden the "ear-splitting" venting noise. 
PGV cited the availability o f new equipment as the reason that they could abide by this 
new requirement {Honolulu Star-Bulletin October 24,1991). Evidently, a few months 
prior to the blowout, this equipment to abate noise and air pollution was not available or 
it was too expensive for PGV, but afterwards it suddenly became available and 
affordable.
For the next four months, PGV made numerous complaints to public offlcials that each 
day, the shutdown was costing the company $60,000 (including $25,00 for interest on 
their construction loan) {Honolulu Advertiser August 10,1991). Ormat's subcontractor 
placed liens for $1.46 million against the Project for unpaid bills. The company 
attempted to use an "act o f God" defense for their financial and power production failures 
(Witty 1991). PGV claimed that controlling the blowout cost them $5 million. In 
November of 1991, Ormat's (OESI) stock price dropped by 33%, reportedly due to cost
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overruns at their PGV facility. H ie project reported a $24 million overrun, primarily due 
to the blowout at KS-8 (PR Newswire November 22,1991).
In late February 1992, PGV was given permission to continue working on their wellfield 
only to have another "kick" (small blowout) at KS-8 a month later when a steam "bubble" 
was encountered at 1385 feet. The incident caused a "loud roaring noise and steam 
release" (Civil Defense Agency Media Advisory March 21,1992). Two weeks later, a 
Circuit Court Judge was forced by a State Supreme Court decision to issue a temporary 
restraining order on PGV until such time as the State promulgated ambient air quality 
standards (see Chapter 5). PGV was not able to work on KS-8 again until July o f 1992. 
More releases o f smelly H^S resulted in more health complaints soon after the re-start of 
work on the well.
In August, five days into a 10-day flow test. Civil Defense was called to check on leaks 
reported by residents. PGV admitted that they had valves that have been leaking for 
several days, but that it was not a problem. The leaks required some o f the steam to be 
diverted to a "rock muffler" in \^hich sodium hydroxide (caustic soda) neutralizes HaS 
emissions. Despite this abatement attempt, HaS levels were recorded as high as 80 ppb 
and caustic soda sprayed into the community burning ftie eyes and skin o f nearby 
residents. Concerned neighbors, experiencing sore throats and smelly gas, called PGV 
and the State Department o f Health and were told that there were no problems at the 
plant. PGV did not contact state and County officials to report elevated HaS levels or the 
caustic soda emissions. Nonetheless, residents firom as far away as OpUiikao (over 3 
miles away) called Civil Defense to complain about the leak.
When conftonted about the complaints and the air emissions, PGV confirmed that on-site 
workers were also sprayed with caustic soda, but then made conflicting statements by 
claiming first that there was possibly too much caustic soda used in the rock muffler, and 
that combined with abnormal weather conditions caused this chemical to drift into the 
community. They also claimed that HiS was not adequately abated because not enough
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caustic soda was used {Hawaii Tribune-Herald August 18,1992). Civil Defense 
informed PGV that if  they were not able to stop the "smell" from their leaking valves, 
then they would be ordered to shut down (Civil Defense Log August 17,1992). PGV 
agreed to shut down the KS-8 flow test but only after holding a press conference at which 
the general manager reported that the flow-test had been a success and the well 
performed better than expected. During this flow test, the H^S abatement system was not 
functioning on "automatic" as required by the air pollution control permit. Instead, 
attempts were made to manually add the appropriate amounts of sodium hydroxide to 
avoid H2 S emissions. Also, the incident involving the emissions o f sodium hydroxide, a 
hazardous substance, was not addressed in PGV's Emergency Response Plan, and 
consequently, emergency responders were unable to develop appropriate response plans 
(Civil Defense Agency 1992).
The KS-8 well got one more, almost catastrophic, chance in late October o f 1992 after 
receiving final permits from the Department o f Health to produce power for the idle 
power plant. In celebration o f the much anticipated (after a two year delay) power 
production, geothermal advocates (organized as the "Hawaii Island Geothermal 
Alliance") proclaimed the plant start-up as a "historic moment which will mark the 
beginning of a brighter environmental and economic future" {Hawaii Tribune-Herald 
October 22, 1992). The State Department o f Economic Development issued a press 
release stating that the facility had satisfied the new regulatory requirements, and that the 
chemical abatement system has been improved to "ensure that the system is effective in 
reducing H:S emissions."
During the first four days o f production, PGV released small amounts of H2 S, then on the 
fifth day a PGV employee was sent to the hospital for acute H2 S poisoning from 
inhalation. ITiat same day. Department o f Health monitors off-site recorded level as high 
as 140 ppb, but PGV's monitors recorded maximum levels below 25 ppb. Once again, 
Civil Defense officials arranged for the voluntary evacuation and temporary relocation of 
affected residents. TTiis was the fifth time in 18 months that evacuation had been
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necessary for some of the closest neighbors, especially families with children and elderly. 
According to one nearby mother, the relocation arrangements during this leak came after 
families experienced nights o f waking to the stench o f rotten eggs, followed by diarrhea, 
vomiting, and burning in the eyes and noses. It finally had become obvious (except 
p e rh ^ s  to PGV) that when emergency response personnel have to wadt until notified by 
the community or the Department o f Health (via the off-site monitors), the impact on the 
residents has already occurred.
A few days later, on November 1, lightening struck, literally. The power plant and the 
wells were shutdown due to lightening hitting a power line coming out of the plant. 
Consequently, steam pressure in the KS-8 well increased forcing the wellhead to expand. 
After the cement bond (holding the well in the ground) broke, the wellhead started to rise 
under the level of pressure and temperature that was present at the June 1991 blowout 
By the following day, when PGV decided to "kill” the well, the wellhead had risen a total 
o f 28 inches. The outer casing o f the well had also moved out o f the ground and the well 
integrity was severely compromised. A ir emissions persisted and families continued to 
evacuate. Jim Moulds, Hawaii Cotmty Geothermal Compliance Officer, was present 
during the final hours o f KS-8 and reported the following scene to one of the geothermal 
consultants.
PGV had placed large I-beams across the well cellar with two I-beams 
straddling the master valve. Heavy angle iron was welded firom those I- 
beams over the master valve. On each end o f those I-beams outside the 
well cellar was a D-9 Caterpillar tractor. In the cross direction they had 1 
1/4 inch cable across the master valve tied to two other giant pieces o f earth 
moving equipment. The fear was, apparently, that when cold water was 
pumped down the well, the well would move and perhaps "rocket" out o f 
tiie ground (Goddard 1992).
After the well was finally cooled with water, concrete was pumped down to 3,700 feet.
At the suggestion o f the Department o f Land and Natural Resources (the % ency that 
oversees well drilling), PGV agreed that KS-8 should be permanently plugged and laid to 
rest. There was no public investigation o f the well’s problems and the only statement that
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PGV made about its condition in the end was "we don't know exactly what is wrong with 
the well" {Hawaii November 5,1992).
After a January 1993 accident (involving HzS) that sent one worker to the hospital in an 
ambulance, PGV experienced another serious problem. In February o f 1993, PGV was 
shut down again as they renewed attempts at securing their first production well. On 
February 8, a blast o f pressurized gas, strong enough to knock two workers off their feet 
was released at the start o f a well cleanout for KS-9. PGV's on-site H^S monitor recorded
250,000 ppb (a level that can be life threatening), and off-site DOH monitor recorded 
over 600 ppb. Despite having immediate access to these numbers, the flow test continued 
for 30 minutes before the well was closed. According to PGV, the release only occurred 
for a few minutes, yet the concentration o f H2 S was so great, it resulted in a violation of 
the ambient air quality limits in their air pollution control permit (Puna Geothermal 
Venture 1993). A total o f 160 pounds o f H2 S was released during this incident. In 
addition to the injured workers, five police officers on the property ("guarding" PGV 
fi-om protesters) were gassed with H2 S and experienced typical symptoms such as throat 
and eye irritation and difficulty with breathing. The Police Department later insisted that 
their officers would no longer risk their health by assisting PGV with community 
protesters. Nearby residents, sickened again from the fumes in their homes, called Civil 
Defense immediately. Once again, it was the residents, instead o f PGV or the 
Department of Health (which had personnel on-site and was still unaware o f the gas 
leak), who notified emergency responders.
Also in Februaiy, the Big Island conununity learned o f PGV's financial problems. OESI 
Power Corporation, PGV's parent company with controlling interests, reported bad news 
in its quarterly SEC report. The report stated that the company was in default on loans 
totaling $107.5 million due to problems at the PGV facility. As a result of these debts, 
OESI lost controlling interest in PGV to Constellation Energy (CE Puna) {Hawaii 
Tribune-Herald Februaiy 21,1993). Constellation Energy became the managing partner 
and shared the Project with Ormat with a 50%-50% split o f financial ownership (Mizuno
56
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2001). The main result of this transfer of power was that Constellation Energy (through a 
subsidiary Constellation Operating Systems "COSI") was the new operator of PGV.
Three more reported incidents at PGV occurred in 1993. In late February, an equipment 
failure caused a break in the seal o f the well. State and County regulators ordered PGV 
to shutdown and stop trying to retrieve a large instrument that had been dropped down 
their KS-9 production well {Hawaii Tribune-Herald March 1,1993). During the 
subsequent months, PGV was able to start producing power, but there were more 
problems resulting in HzS emissions. In September, the Civü Defense Agency responded 
to leaks at both wells, KS-9 and KS-10, which caused a series o f HaS "fugitive” 
emissions. Off-site monitors a recorded a level o f 33 ppb HaS, and residents reported 
nausea and vomiting. On this occasion o f a plaimed plant shutdown, PGV had assured 
the Department o f Health that there would be no emissions. They also assured the media 
that they did not need to fix leaks during the shutdown (despite the fact that there had 
been detectable leaks earlier in the week) {Tribune-Herald September 29,1993).
Workers were injured again due to caustic soda exposure and were taken by paramedics 
to the Hilo hospital (Honolulu Advertiser September 28, 1993). In November, PGV 
"tripped the power plant" in a mishap while attempting to reconnect KS-9. The steam 
turbines were shut down, power was cut to 6,800 HELCO customers and HzS was 
released into the community. Peak levels reached 72 ppb on a portable monitor located 
in the adjacent Lani Puna Gardens subdivision (7>i6w«e-i7em/c/November 10,1993).
In May o f 1994, EPA issued an administrative complaint to PGV for violations o f 
environmental laws relating to the use, storage and release o f hazardous chemicals. The 
violations involved inadequate reporting o f HaS releases (in June 1991 and February 
1993) and lack of inventory reporting for the regular use o f a hazardous chemical, 
pentane, EPA assessed a penalty o f $94,000 to PGV for these environmental offenses 
(Environmental Protection Agency 1994). A few months later, EPA and PGV agreed to a 
settlement that lowered the fine to $79,625 (Volpini 1994).
57
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In 1995, PGV began supplying HELCO with 30 megawatts instead o f the contracted and 
permitted maximum output o f 25 megawatts. State and County agencies issued informal 
administrative approvals for this change {Hcxwaii Tribune-Herald March 21,1996 and 
Mizuno 2001), Although PGV did make some modifications to the facility's operations 
there were no revisions or amendments required for any o f PGV’s permits, nor was there 
an opportunity for public comment.
More incidents involving the release o f HzS occurred in June and October o f 1996. In 
June, the plant experienced equipment problems that resulted in three separate gas 
releases in one week. On October 26, a valve malfunction caused the discharge o f brine 
and steam at the power plant. PGV's monitor (station A, which is adjacent to residences 
in Lani Puna Gardens subdivision) recorded a maximum of 301 ppb at their property 
boundary (Puna Geothermal Venture 1996 and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
2000).
In 1998, PGV was inspected by Hawaii Occupational Safety & Health Administration 
(OSHA) and consequently cited for three "serious" employee safety violations. The 
problems were related to the use o f H2 S, pentane, and the lack o f adequate hazardous 
operation protocol, emergency response and fire prevention at the job site (OSHA 1999). 
PGV contested the citations and made some corrective actions. In 1999, the appeal's 
board dismissed the violations and the assessed penalty o f $875.
Expansion Phase
In 1999, power production at the plant fell from 30 to 24 megawatts due to the falling 
capacity o f PGV's production wells. PGV announced that it was investing $9.3 million 
into their facility to bring it back to maximum production. The company purchased a 
drill rig with the intent to drill a new well. Before drilling well KS-11, the drill rig was 
used to replace the damaged casing liner in KS-3, one o f their injection wells (Puna 
Geothermal Ventore 1999). PGV also began to invest more money in corrosion-resistant
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equipment that could be maintained regularly instead of waiting for vulnerable parts to 
fail and cause steam leakage problems (Jones 2001).
In the fall o f 1999, PGV drilled its first new well in over five years. Fortunately, PGV 
had few problems during the drilling and start-up o f well KS-11. Subsequently, PGV 
announced their intent to double the power output (from 30 to 60 megawatts) o f their 
facility without notable public opposition. On average, H2 S emissions had become less 
o f a problem for residents in the late 1990's. The facility continued to experience 
equipment failures and leaks, but early detection and response had improved. 
Consequently Üie duration o f H2 S emissions were reduced. But noise pollution firom the 
power plant had worsened. Interestingly, these different types o f pollution affect 
different residents. H2 S is heavier than air and is more o f a problem for households in 
low-lying areas. Noise pollution, on the other hand, is worse for residents living m 
higher areas. It is the houses on small hills around the plant that have a direct line o f 
sight and consequently are impacted with more noise and light pollution fi-om the facility.
In July o f2000, PGV submitted an application to the County Planning Department to 
amend their existing GRP to accommodate their interest in expanding their plant and 
loosen some o f tiie environmental and compensatoiy responsibilities pursuant to tiiat 
permit. In the application, PGV did not adequately disclose their poor operating history 
and consequently did not "demonstrate", as the County law requires, that adequate 
mitigation o f pc^ntial impacts fi*om an expanded facility would be achieved. 
Nevertheless, in January o f2001, the Planning Commission approved PGV’s request for 
an amendment to their GRP with less permit conditions tiian the orgianal 1989 perm it 
Months prior to this decision, a small group o f residents bolstered enough energy (after 
years o f burnout) to participate in mediation sessions in an attempt to improve some of 
the problems with regulatory oversight Most o f the discussion centered on mr 
monitoring problems, noise pollution, and the need for a "tree barrier" to help abate all 
types o f pollution. This mediation attempt was completely futile because the Planning 
Department supported PGV's application and the Commission indicated that the permit
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amendment would be approved before mediation was even requested by the public (see 
Appendix A).
January o f2001 also brought a new series o f leaks at the facility. During the few days 
prior to the final Planning Commission hearing, there were minor incidents at PGV 
resulting in H2 S emissions. The levels resulted in an odor nuisance and some nearby 
residents were concerned that they were not notified in a timely manner. PGV had 
agreed to call a couple residents who wanted the option o f leaving their homes until the 
leak was controlled. In Februaiy, HgS leaks were again followed by lack of notification 
to residents. On February 26, a serious leak in one of the injection line valves resulted in 
the release o f H%S at peak levels o f 98.5 ppb at the nearest residence (Puna Geothermal 
Venture 2001). Once again, an irritated resident notified Civil Defense to report the odor 
and high H2 S levels. PGV refused to provide Civil Defense with any information for two 
hours. By that time, PGV's monitors were only recording 23 ppb (Civil Defense 2001). 
This release resulted in a violation o f the maximum H2 S level because the hourly average 
was over 30 ppb for two hours.
Also in Februaiy, one of the injection wells (KS-1 A) was closed due to a leak in its well 
liner (a protective layer on top o f the well casing). This was a similar problem to what 
happened in KS-3 in 1999. Special equipment and a work crew brought from the 
mainland were needed to replace the liner. Before the well could be fixed, PGV 
requested permission fi-om the EPA and the State Department o f Health, pursuant to their 
Underground Injection Control permits, to use the injection well despite the fact that it 
did not have "mechanical integrity." The two other injection wells at the facility needed 
to be shut-in in order to repair some above-ground pipes and a well was needed to 
dispose of some steam and fluid firom the production wells (which were also closed 
during a week of complete plant shut-down) (Puna Geothermal Venture 2001).
The State Department o f Health and EPA approved the use o f KS-1 A with the assurances 
that the actual casing o f the well was not damaged and consequently there could be no
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movement o f geothermal fluid into or between groundwater (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 2001). Soon after the repairs and maintenance had been completed on 
the injection system, PGV stopped using one o f their production wells, KS-10, and began 
testing it for use as a new injection well. PGV has also expressed interest in using an 
open well off-site for injection, after the State made overtones to have it plugged. The 
well, Lani Puna 6, was drilled in 1984 by Barnwell and is located adjacent to Lani Puna 
Gardens subdivision (see Figure 2 ).
The history o f PGV is valuable as a tool to evaluate the practices o f a company that is 
promoted as a solution to environmental and economic problems associated with the 
State's reliance on fossil fuel energy sources. It is clear that the business decisions at 
PGV have not adequately taken into account the environmental and social impacts of 
geothermal development. This is compounded by the fact that the involvement of the 
State and County governments facilitated the poor operating history o f both HGP-A and 
PGV.
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CHAPTER 5 
State Involvement
As the previous chapters indicate, government regulators have approached geothermal 
with a "wait and see" policy. Environmental problems have been addressed after 
accidents occurred and after citizen lawsuits forced them to be addressed. But the 
government’s involvement in promotional activities has been proactive in accommodating 
the demands o f the geothermal developers. The promotional activities that both levels o f 
government have been involved with include direct and indirect subsidies, public 
relations, lobbying and streamlming o f permitting processes.
The State government has been the primary vehicle for geothermal development in 
Hawai'i. Geothermal scientists and developers primarily used State funding and support 
to leverage federal and private investment. The State's interest in geothermal, which was 
pursued by the Department o f Planning and Economic Development (later became the 
Department o f Business, Economic Development (DBED) and then added "Tourism" and 
became "DBEDT" in 1991), wanted geothermal to provide energy for an interisland cable 
and to entice industry and tourism growth. DBED also used geothermal as a magnet to 
funnel millions o f dollars into their own budget as well as to energy consultants, planners, 
scientists, and cable developers. Between 1973 and 1993, over $64 million was spent on 
geothermal/cable development by the federal government, the State and Hawaii County 
(Bell 1993 and Environment Hawai’i 1991). Private investment for all geothermal 
activities during that time is estimated to be over $200 million^
Rodriguez and Juvik (1992) argue that the State's role in geothermal development in 
Hawai'i has caused a loss o f government "legitimacy." They concluded, however, that
* This is a conservative estimate based on $37 million for cable research and over $125 million for PGVs 
project. Also added are HECO and HELCO contributions to HGP-A and the cable project, and the 
permitting, public relations and exploratory activities of Campbell Estate/True GeoÜiermal, 
Bamwell/GEDCO and the Kapoho Land and Development Co.
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"of all the issues, it was the state's failure to act as public advocate in its regulatory role as 
guardian o f public health, safety and welfare that created a crisis o f trust." This failure to 
fulrill the role o f public advocate is pervasive in both the promotional and regulatoiy 
activities o f the State government (Appendix B provides a "who's who" in the arena o f 
political conflicts and "coincidences" related to Hawai i's geothermal history.)
Geothermal Promoter
The State legislature, the Governor’s Office, DBED, Department o f Land and Natural 
Resources (DLNR) and the Department o f Health (DOH) have all been involved with 
creating and perpetuating a geothermal ideology for the entire state. This ideology was 
developed in the 1980's and involved the following principles:
1. Geothermal is necessary because it will lessen Hawai i's dependence on imported oil.
2. Geothermal development is a state priority because an interisland cable facilitates
sufficient energy demand to make geothermal profitable.
3. Public funding for planning, promoting, research and development of geothermal
resources and the cable technology is necessary to stimulate private investment.
4. Laws and adniinistrative procedures should be created and/or amended in order to
facilitate large-scale geothermal development.
5. Adverse impacts from geothermal development are insignificant compared to the
problems associated with the importation and use o f oil and coal in power plants.
In 1975, Robert Kamins, the economics professor involved with the Hawaii Geothermal
Project, analyzed the potential levels o f State support for geothermal development. He
listed a course of action that would maximize geothermal production, minimize State
control and also meet State objectives. His suggestions for government involvement
included various direct and indirect subsidies. He also advised:
Expediting drilling by cutting all comers in granting access to public lands 
(and helping to get access to private lands, if  necessary using its power to 
compel entry), minimizing environmental impact statements, and giving
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all assurances possible under the law that successful drillers would have 
production rights for long periods o f time (Kamins 1975).
This advice was readily accepted and carried out by the legislature and the 
administrations o f Governors John Bums (1962-1973), George Ariyoshi (1974-1986) and 
John Waihee (1986-1994).
Further motivation for government support o f geothermal came in 1983. Forbes 
magazine published an article that accused Hawai'i o f being "anti-business.” The 
implication to local lawmakers was that mainland businesses viewed Hawai'i as a "closet 
socialist state run by unions and an autocratic government so concerned with its own 
perpetuation that it rides roughshod over the needs o f free enterprise" (Honolulu 
Advertiser April 6, 1983). This is a theme that is recycled by the business community 
every year at the legislature. The crux o f the criticism was (and continues to be) centered 
around land use restrictions. But that year. Governor Ariyoshi, who was until that time 
was perceived as a "slow growth" advocate, made a state-of-the-State speech that focused 
on "pro-business" legislation. He felt compelled to seek the approval o f those who make 
basic business decisions about economic growth in the islands. Number one on his list 
was a proposal to streamline geothermal development approvals (Honolulu Advertiser 
April 6, 1983).
Enabling Legislation
Since 1971, the State legislature has passed several major pieces of legislation and 
appropriated many millions o f dollars for research, development and promotion to 
facilitate and streamline geothermal development. One o f the earliest laws defined the 
property rights associated with the resource. In 1974, after the HGP-A developers 
completed a legal analysis, the State changed the definition o f a "mineral" to include 
geothermal resources. This essentially gave the State title to this resource under all lands
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due to an earlier law that reserved mineral rights to the S tate/ A system for issuing 
geothermal mining leases (that included royalty payments to the State) and drilling 
permits was established in the late 1970's, after HGP-A was developed.
By 1983, HGP-A had become a major nuisance, and DLNR was embroiled in a dispute 
with the Volcano village community in upper Puna over the issuance of a conservation 
district use permit for a 250 megawatt geothermal project in the Kahauale'a rainforest 
adjacent to Hawaii Volcanoes National Park. This geothermal land-use dispute served as 
the main motivating force behind significant legislative initiatives that assisted 
geothermal development in the 1980's.
Geothermal energy production is not considered an allowable use on land designated as 
conservation or agricultural in Hawai'i. In order for developers to explore or develop 
geothermal, they should be required to obtain a reclassification o f the land-use district of 
their property to urban, by the State Land Use Commission. Otherwise, a state 
conservation district use permit (in the case of conservation lands) or a county special use 
permit (in the case o f agricultural lands) must be secured.^
Campbell Estate obtained the necessary geothermal mining lease for their project, but 
refused to petition for a land-use reclassification for their conservation-designated land. 
Despite fids attempt to bypass the intent of the land-use law, the task o f obtaining a 
conservation district use permit (CDUP) was formidable (due to public opposition) and 
was compounded by the fact that Kilauea erupted near Kahauale'a and began sending 
lava flowing over their proposed development site. DLNR and Campbell Estate quickly 
began to consider a land exchange in order for development to occur downhill in the 
"Middle East Rift Zone." This area was comprised o f State lands: the Puna Forest 
Reserve and the Wao Kele O Puna Natural Area Reserve (see Figure 1).
 ̂In the 1950's there was political interest in a belief that tire mining of bauxite and titanium were possible 
in Hawai'i. The interest was short-lived but the mining laws remained.
 ̂Except in the case of geothermal wells drilled prior to 1980. There were no permits required for wells 
such as HGP-A (1975) and the Kilauea Crater well (1972).
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As a result o f this experience and the anticipation o f more land-use disputes, the State 
was motivated to overcome major obstacles to large-scale geothermal development. The 
prospect of the land exchange between the State and the developers was only favorable if  
the deal included some assurances that geothermal development would be permitted. The 
impending land exchange was helpful motivation for the State to eliminate four main 
obstacles for geothermal development in Puna. These included:
1. Existing land-use in Puna was not compatible with industrial development
2. The public could effectively challenge geothermal development because o f this
incompatibility.
3. The interisland geothermal/cable project was not economically viable.
4. The existence and location o f a geothennal resource to support large-scale
development was basically unknown.
Governor Ariyoshi's "pro-business” agenda in 1983 resulted in proposed legislaticm that 
attempted to clarify the importance of geothermal development on any land-use 
designation. In just a few months, a new land-use designation was created for geothermal 
developers, called Geothermal Resource Subzones. DLNR was charged with designating 
the Subzones that could encompass any land-use district. The intent o f the law was to 
make geothermal development an allowable use on lands that have been designated for 
non-industrial uses. One o f the legislators involved with the drafting o f the law, reported 
that it was also specifically aimed at relieving Campbell Estate from ongoing litigation 
and contested case proceedings with the Volcano Community (Edmunds 1986). The 
legislature attempted to obscure this intent by stating that the purpose o f Act 296 was to 
"provide a policy that will assist in the location o f geothermal resource development in 
areas o f the lowest potential environmental impact."
The legislative process that resulted in the Geothermal Subzone Act was quite messy and 
lasted through the final hours o f the 1983 session. Representative Richard Matsuura 
drafted the original version o f the bill, but it was substantially changed during initial
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reviews in the House and Senate. A House-Senate conference committee created a final 
draft o f the bill. Although many o f the ten members o f the committee assisted with the 
final version of the bill, Matsuura spent the final evening o f the committee's session 
overseeing the writing o f the committee report. His legislative aide, a consultant for 
Campbell Estate's geothermal project, wrote tiie report with the assistance o f two 
Campbell Estate attorneys {Honolulu Star-Bulletin May 16,1983). Matsuura's report 
made substantial changes to the bill because the committee report carried significant legal 
weight as the Acfs "legislative intent."
Matsuura was proud o f his accomplishment and reported that he "was just tiying to be 
fair." He was paranoid about some o f the moderate language in the bill and the fact that 
one o f the Volcano community members had contributed to the final version. "We can't 
have one person use the laws to stop development in the state" he said {Honolulu Star- 
Bulletin May 16,1983). The Report was attached to the bill and rushed to the floor of 
both houses for a final vote before the committee members had a chance to review it 
(Hawaii State House o f Representatives 1983). In the hours prior to the traditional 
joining o f hands and singing "Hawaii Aloha, " the House was engaged in a heated floor 
debate over the process and content o f the bill. Numerous House members who spoke 
against the legislation raised three major issues.
1. The process of assessing and designating Geothermal Resource Subzones is exempt 
from the state's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) requirements (under chapter 
343 Hawaii Revised Statutes). Specific projects proposed for conservation land within 
the Subzone will still be subject to the CDUP process (which triggers an EIS 
requirement), but the EIS will be prepared after the "suitability" o f the area for 
geothermal has already been determined. Geothermal development in the agricultural 
district would not be subject to EIS req u h ^ n ^ ts .
2. The bill completely bypasses the State Land Use Commission. It places DLNR in 
charge of changing allowable land-uses in all o f the districts to accommodate
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geothermal development. Additionally, the Counties are ordered to issue permits for 
geothermal projects on agricultural lands in the state-designated subzones.
3. The conference committee report added language to the bill relating to criteria for 
designating a Subzone. The Report instructs DLNR to "give higher priority to 
designate areas as Subzones, which have a high likelihood of development by the 
landowner." It also adds a definition for the use o f the term "compatible" in the bill. 
The concept of compatibility o f geothermal with surrounding uses (especially in the 
conservation district) is to be "examined in the form o f finding an acceptable 
relationship." Therefore, a Subzone can be created "where it is found that it is 
important to develop the geothermal energy o f the area." This value judgement is 
found nowhere in the bill. It contradicts an attempt to create a meaningful assessment 
o f each potential Subzone area using factors such as geologic hazards and social and 
environmental impacts.
In the end, the House barely passed the bill by a vote o f27-23. The Senate approved the 
final version 15-4, but six dissenting senators were absent for the vote due to political 
turmoil. This group included Ben Cayetano, who was responsible for the original Senate 
version o f the bill. His version included stronger provisions for protecting conservation 
lands. Cayetano lost his chairmanship of his Senate committee during that year, but he 
later became Lieutenant Governor in 1986 and Governor in 1994. Representative 
Matsuura was able to use his pro-geothermal political agenda to move into the Senate in 
1984, when Dante Carpenter resigned to run for Hawaii County Mayor (see Chapter 6).
Four major amendments have been made to the Subzone law. In 1984, one year after the 
law was created, the legislature decided to designate some o f the subzones by statute, 
instead o f waiting for DLNR to finish the suitability assessment for existing development 
areas. The bill, introduced by the Ariyoshi administration, automatically created a 
Subzone in the current and proposed development areas o f PGV (including all o f the land 
encompassed in their mining leases), Barnwell and HGP-A. A last-minute amendment to
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the bill attempted to also "grandfather" Campbell Estate’s project into a Subzone as well. 
This proposal failed primarily because legislators were hesitant about circumventing the 
ongoing litigation over Campbell's permit and angry that the proposed amendment was 
added after public hearings and "decision-making" by subcommittee members (Hawaii 
State Senate 1984 and Hawaii State House of Representatives 1984). Legislators were 
not concerned about the fact that the entire concept o f "grandfathering" existing 
geothermal mining leaseholds was contrary to the original Subzone bill. The final bill 
did direct DLNR to expeditiously designate a Subzone on Campbell Estate’s project site..
In 1985, the State Senate passed a resolution "requesting the Department of Planning and 
Economic Development to expedite geothermal development" (State o f Hawaii 
Thirteenth Legislature 1985). The Senate wanted an in-depth study that would justify the 
need for further permit streamlining efforts and direct and indirect subsidies of the 
industry. The Report was premised on die assumption that State and private developers 
needed to accelerate development o f die large-scale inter-island geothermal/cable project. 
It concluded that the highest priority for improving "regulatory/permitting programs" was 
the elimination o f the contested case hearing provision fi-om the Subzone designation, 
CDUA permit and County geothermal resource permit processes. The advice centered on 
eliminating public participation during the decision-making processes of geothermal 
permitting, and instead promoting "education programs" (i.e., "roundtables") as a way to 
increase opportunities for "participatory dialogues" (Department o f Planning and 
Economic Development 1985).
A contested case proceeding enables the general public to participate in government 
decision-making. It is a quasi-judicial proceeding at which citizens can introduce the 
testimony o f expert witnesses and cross-examine the applicant's witnesses. The agency 
decision in contested cases must be based on the record from the proceedings as wells as 
the "findings o f fact and conclusions o f law" that accompany the hearing report. In 1982, 
the first contested case hearing ever to be held in Hawai'i challenged a Conservation 
District Use Permit for Campbell Estate's proposed 250 megawatt geothermal project in
69
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Kahauale'a rainforest During those hearings, Campbell's geologist testified that the 
chance o f lava inundation of the project was one in one hundred. U.S. Geological Survey 
witnesses, called by the community groups, asserted that the probability of eruption 
activity was a much higher risk (Pele Defense Fund 1987). Within 24 hours o f the end o f 
the proceedings, Kilauea's Pu u O 'o erupted and, by 1984, the proposed project site was 
under 60 feet of lava.
Subsequent contested case proceedings relating to geothermal development challenged 
the Subzone designations on conservation land at Campbell's original Kahauale'a site and 
the Wao Kele O Puna site (after the land exchange with the State). A contested case 
hearing was also held in 1986 on Campbell's request for a permit for a 100 megawatt 
project at the Wao Kele site.
By 1987, all o f the proposed Subzones in Puna were approved (see Figure 3) and
Campbell's project received their land-use permit (CDUP). Nevertheless, the geothermal
industry viewed public participation, as opposed to the actual environmental and social
impacts o f development, as the troublesome aspect o f the permitting process. Puna
Geothermal Venture claimed that they were the victims o f this excessive involvement.
The Puna District o f the Island of Hawaii has one o f the highest 
temperature geothermal resources in the world. The district also has a 
number o f features that constrain geothermal development, including high 
hydrogen sulfide concentrations, stringent land use planning, nearby 
scattered residences, a local population with deeply held feeling about 
economic development in their area, and an active volcano. Over the past 
decade, this combination has produced a number o f high temperature 
public meetings, legal action that has been heard by the State and U.S.
Supreme Courts, and a geothermal development program held hostage by 
divided public opinion (Richard et al 1989).
Consequently, the 1987 legislative session acted on the advice fi'om the State's 
consultants and Puna Geothermal Venture and voted to "unlock the large geothermal 
resources on the Big Island" (Richard et al 1989). An amendment was passed in the 
Subzone law in order to prohibit all opportunities for contested case proceedings at the
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State and County levels. Voluntary mediation between the developer and the concerned 
public replaced contested case provisions related to the issuance o f geothermal resource 
permits. Mediation was not included as an option for challenging the actual designation 
o f the Subzones.
The removal o f contested case hearings meant that the administrative record, related to 
the permitting o f specific geothermal projects, would be limited to testimony presented at 
the public hearings and the mediator's report, which is limited to a list o f final 
agreements. All other supporting documentation is considered confidential. There is no 
information put into evidence and no opportunity for expert testimony or cross- 
examination (see Appendix A).
For some members o f the public, particularly Native Hawaiians, the contested case
hearing was the only opportunity for meaningful participation in decisions relating to
geothermal development.
Pele Defense Fund cannot negotiate Hawaiian religious and cultural rights, 
beliefs and practices. The contested case hearing process remains the best 
and in some cases the only avenue o f recourse for substantiating Native 
Hawaiian religious and cultural rights and practices before the development 
in question irreparably alters or destroys Hawai i's land, ocean, forest, lava 
and/or water resources that are the fundamental bases o f Hawaiian religion 
and culture (Pele Defense Fund 1987).
Also in 1987, the legislature amended the Subzone Act by adding a sneaky little 
provision that exempted all direct-use applications (non-electrical generation) from 
confinement to tiie subzones. Direct-heat enterprises also became exempted from 
requiring a geothermal resource permit. A special use permit (which does allow for 
contested case hearings) from the County may still be required, depending on the location 
and type o f direct-use process and product.
In 1990, a bill introduced by Senator Matsuura was passed that further eroded the entire 
concept o f a Geothermal Resource Subzone. The concept o f restricting development to
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Subzones was made moot by an amendment to the law that allowed exploratory wells to 
be drilled outside the Subzone, regardless o f the land use classification. The amendment 
states that the activity must be limited to exploration only. But what happens when the 
well, which costs over $1 million to drill, is a good production well? The State has 
demonstrated that Subzone designations can easily change and permits can be issued 
based on the interests o f the developer, not on the concept o f predetermined areas with 
"minimal environmental impacts."^ This amendment clarified the law's true intent to 
facilitate development despite the environmental and social impacts.
Another major piece o f geothermal legislation was passed in 1988. The "Geothermal and 
Cable System Development Permitting Act" marked the "point o f no return" for the State. 
The State was committed to supporting existing and potential geothermal developers and 
the swift development o f a  500 megawatt/cable project. The commitment to pay for this 
project relied upon a growing level o f electricity consumption.
This law consolidated all o f the potential permits and necessary approvals for both the 
large-scale geothermal development and the interisland cable. It also required the 
establishment o f an interagency group to coordinate regulatory functions and resolve 
potential conflicts between agencies. DLNR is required to submit a report to the 
legislature every year that details activities and events pursuant to this Act.
This legislation was the product o f Governor Waihee's legislative agenda. It was the 
primary recommendation o f the Governor's Advisory Board on the Underwater Cable 
Transmission Project as well as a series o f legal analyses conducted in 1984 and 1985 for
* The best example of this relates to Campbell Estate's land swq* with the State. In 1984, Campbell's 
development site at Kahauale'a was designated as a Subzone with a buffer zone in order to protect the 
biological resources in the nearby Natural Area Reserve called Wao Kele O Puna. In 1985, Kahauale'a's 
designation was removed and the Wao Kele O Puna rainforest was designated as a Subzone with a buffer 
zone to protect the valuable biological resources in the nearby Kahauale'a forest.
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the Department o f Planning and Economic Development by attorneys at Carlsmith, 
Carlsmilh, Wichman and C ase/
The Advisory Board was chaired by former Governor William Quipn, and included other 
politicians and labor union representatives. This Board had no technical knowledge of 
the geothermal industry or o f the economics or feasibility o f the interisland cable 
development. It was a purely a political and public relations show to entice further public 
funding, potential cable manufacturers, and international geothermal development 
consortia. Nevertheless, the Board issued a report in early 1988 that made the following 
conclusions:
1. Geothermal development and underwater cable transmission are technically,
economically, financially and socially feasible.
2. The geothermal development and cable development are so inter-dependent, that they
should be undertaken (financed, permitted etc.) as a single enterprise.
3. The geothermal/cable project should progress very quickly (i.e. 500 megawatts by
1995) in order to meet O 'ahu’s energy needs before the Hawaiian Electric Company 
(HECO) negotiates power purchase contracts with coal-fired power facilities 
(Governor's Advisory Board 1988).
These conclusions were made as a result o f the Board's realization that there was a "catch 
22" with large-scale geothermal development in Hawai i. This existed because the cable 
could only be built if  there was sufficient power to be transferred to O ahu. But 
sufficient power could only be explored and developed if  there was a cable to transfer the 
power. The Board and DBED hoped to successfully rally both projects as a unit in order 
to prevent either of them from failing. The State ignored two very important problems in 
its rush to promote a project that was defined as the "largest and most complex 
development ever undertaken in the State" (Hawaii Revised Statutes §196D-2 (12)).
 ̂This law firm continued to provide consulting services to DBED into the early 1990's. This firm, 
including the Study's principal author, Gerald Sumida, also represented Puna Geothermal Venture.
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The first one related to inadequate energy estimates from the East Rift Zone. The Board 
had consulted with foreign companies interested in the cable project but failed to analyze 
the real energy potential of the geothermal resource. By 1987, only one successful 
production well had been drilled in the entire state. That well, HGP-A, was producing 
less than three megawatts o f electricity and it was causing a large disturbance in the 
adjacent community. Despite a complete lack o f data to substantiate the cable project, 
the State "assumed that 500 megawatts o f (net) geothermal energy can be sustained for 
30 years for commercial development purposes" (Ono 1990). The State became fully 
committed to a multi-billion dollar cable project before an independent assessment of the 
geothermal resource was conducted.® It was clearly a case o f putting the cart miles in 
front o f the horse.
The second problem involved cost estimates. The Board based its decision about the 
financial feasibility o f the cable project on an inaccurate economic study by Decision 
Analysts Hawaii. This study concluded that the economic feasibility o f the 
geothermal/cable project was based, in part, on the estimated future "avoided costs" of 
the utility company. These costs would dictate how much the energy provider would be 
paid for the electricity. HECO notified the Board about a major flaw o f the analysis. The 
Study neglected to include projections for coal prices. HECO estimated future coal 
prices to be 60% lower than the comparable projected cost o f oil. In fact, HECO had 
informed the Board that they were already committed to purchase 300 megawatts o f 
electricity from two firms interested in coal-fired plants on O ahu (Quinn 1988 and 
Williamson 1987).
The State relied on this flawed economic study by Decision Analysts Hawaii to assure 
private developers and the public that the geothermal/cable project was feasible. The 
analysis concluded that the cost estimate for the entire project was $1.7 billion (Decision
® It wasn't until the early 1990’s that the State hired consultants to conduct a geothermal reservoir 
assessment using well data and geological information from the East Rift Zone and the entire state. A 1992 
report by GeothermEx concluded that the probability of the East Rift Zone producing the necessary 600 
megawatts for a cable project was less than 40%.
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Analysts Hawaii 1988). Prior to the release o f that study, the Northwest Economic 
Associates (NEA) in Vancouver, Washington published an independent economic study. 
This study concluded that development costs would exceed $4 billion. This meant that 
over a 40-year period, ratepayers (who already paid the highest rates in the Country) 
would have to pay between 17% and 33% more per kilowatt hour per year for electricity 
produced by geothermal than they would otherwise (even with oil prices as high as $45 
per barrel) (Northwest Economic Associates 1987).
The State did not formally respond to the NEA study. The author, Robert McKusick, 
believed that the State was trying to bury it and avoid any objective assessment o f the 
possible drawbacks o f geothermal. "It looks to me as if  in Hawaii, the developers are in 
the driver's seat, and State approval processes are in place to assist them -  to the point 
that information that might question some of the feasibility o f geothermal development is 
not coming forth," he said in a 1990 interview (Hooper 1990). However, in 1989, a 
memo was circulated by DBEDT regarding the possibilities for State financial support for 
the Project. It included a notation that claimed that the cost estimate o f $1.5 billion was a 
1986 figure and even at that amount the "economics will, at best be marginal." There 
was also a note on the memo stated that the current (1989) figure was more like $4.2 
billion (Ulveling 1989).
The Geothermal "Hard Sell"
In the late 1970’s a consultant for the Department of Energy (DOE) wrote a short report 
entitled The Legal and Institutional Problems with Geothermal Development in Hawaii. 
It included a chapter on Native Hawaiian concerns because Hawaiian activists had 
confronted DOE officials at a 1978 geothermal conference in Hilo. The Hawaiiens 
voiced strong concerns that Kilauea was Pele's domain and it was therefore considered 
sacred land.
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The report described the issue o f geothermal and Pele as the "tip o f an emotional iceberg" 
and encouraged DOE's Regional Team involved with oversight of the HGP-A to "deal 
with these local groups" (U.S. Department of Energy 1978). But the assumption was that 
the Hawaiians could be "educated about the possible benefits o f geothermal 
development" and bought off with proposals for "institutional vehicles" to insure that the 
benefits would actually be available to Hawaiians. Soon afterwards, DOE allocated 
funds to Puna Hui Ghana to conduct their own social impact assessment. Years later, the 
State allocated 20% of the geothermal royalties to the Office o f Hawaiian Affairs in order 
to assure Hawaiians that they would get a portion o f the State's income from the 
geothermal leases.
In the mid-1980 s, Hawaiian Electric Company ran television commercials in which a 
man plugs a huge electrici^ cord into a steaming landscape, and then the scene cuts to 
the skyline of Honolulu lighting up in the dusk. In 1990, newspaper ads by the 
geothermal industry claimed that "geothermal power could provide half the electricity for 
Hawaii" (ProGeothermal Alliance 1990).
From the moment that HGP-A's temperature was taken, the geothermal promoters 
(government officials, developers and scientists) developed a kind o f religious conviction 
that geothermal energy was the only chance Hawai i had to be "saved" from oil 
dependency and economic ruin. This belief needed to be advertised aggressively — 
because surely the only real problem vsdth geothermal was a lack of public support? An 
editorial in a 1992 issue o f Environment H aw aii observed that the State government has 
heated geothermal development "more as though it were a candidate running for office 
than a geological process whose outcome is far from a foregone conclusion"
(Environment H aw aii 1992).
In the 1970's and early 1980's, education and outreach for geothermal was primarily done 
to facilitate further funding and permit approvals. Nevertheless, a public relations 
consultant to Campbell Estate's early geothermal project noticed that it was the
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consultants who were "the only folks really making out in this geothermal controversy" 
(Honolulu Advertiser i\x\y 7,1982).
Numerous committees and boards were established as a way to entice funding as well as 
to publicize and legitimize geothermal research and development. Some of the groups 
over the years included participation from regulatory agencies and citizen groups (see 
Table 4). During the early period o f the HGP-A project, the development team hosted 
the Hawaii Advisory Committee. Initially, this group was made up exclusively o f 
developers and regulators interested in facilitating development. In the mid-1980's, 
public pressure forced the inclusion of a representative from the Puna community, which 
in turn prompted the HGP-A developers to remove the "advisory" function of the 
committee and attempt to use it as an educational forum (Edmunds 1986).
By the end o f the 1980's geothermal development in Puna, including plans for the 500 
megawatt project, had progressed and consequently public opposition had grown 
substantially. This opposition included environmental, Native Hawaiian and community 
groups. An internal briefing memo was circulated at DBED in order to proliferate a 
"profile" o f the opposition. This opposition was categorized as the following:
1. A small but dedicated active group o f Native Hawaiians, who consider drilling a
desecration o f Pele.
2. A large, noisy, active group o f  environmentalists, who object on a variety o f pollution
and land-use concerns.
3. NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) landowners who do not want their quiet, unspoiled area
disturbed by construction and smelly geothermal power plants.
4. Marijuana growers, who "probably bankroll most of the legal battles and
demonstration costs" and do not want development to disrupt their seclusion in Puna 
(Department of Business and Economic Development 1990).
The inclusion o f marijuana growers in this list was akin to redbaiting. This issue was 
manufactured by the State and developers in the early 1980's in order to discredit the
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valid concerns of the Puna community. In 1989, one leader o f a community association 
in Kapoho was warned by her County Councilmember, who attended a meeting at the 
State Attorney General's office, that the State was pursuing a campaign to discredit Puna 
residents who opposed geothermal by arresting them for possession or cultivation of 
marijuana -  even if  there was no evidence to support a conviction (Hedtke 2001). The 
focus on pot-growers in the conununity was a convenient distraction, given the fact that 
little else was know around the State about this rural district.
Puna was also the state's main supplier of papaya and tropical flowers. Nevertheless, the 
image o f a "pot-smoking hippie from the mainland" as the typical anti-geothermal activist 
was too good to pass up, and it spread easily through State and industry propaganda. In 
1990, Patti Cook, who was a public relations/advertising consultant for the geothermal 
developers, wrote a press release to discredit a major protest at the rainforest site. Her 
headline boldly declared that "wealthy outsiders and marijuana supporters may break the 
law to force the Big Island to bum more oil" (Cook 1990).
The head of the DLNR defended the State's facilitation of developing geothermal in a 
Natural Area Reserve by stating that marijuana cultivation does more damage to high 
quality "Class I" native rainforest than geothermal development will do in lower quality 
"Class II" forest, such as Wao Kele. This statement was used to accuse local Puna 
rainforest supporters o f being concerned for "their" illegal crops (which were growing in 
the forest) instead o f the protection o f the forest itself.
This "list" o f geothermal opponents increased dramatically in 1989 when national 
environmental organizations, including the Rainforest Action Network and Greenpeace 
were invited by the Pele Defense Fund to get involved with the issue primarily becaiKe of 
the threat to native forest and Native Hawaiian culture, from Campbell Estate's project. 
These national groups also rallied a coalition of Washington D C. based environmental 
lobbying organizations to help stop federal funding for geothermal in Hawai i.
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Fortunately for the developers, DBED was one step ahead o f the opposition in the arena 
o f public relations. Communications Pacific, which later merged with Hill & Knowlton,^ 
was already working for the State to coordinate and conduct public relations and local 
lobbying efforts on behalf of the geothermal program. Additionally, DBED hired a team 
of Washington D C. lobbyists, headed by Vincent Versage from Cassidy and Associates 
to represent the State's interest in geothermal development. This two-year contract, 
starting in January 1989 cost taxpayers over $225,000, but it was unsuccessful in 
securing the full $15 million appropriation that was requested (this was in addition to 
federal funding of $28 million for cable research and over $8 million for HGP-A) for 
geothermal development in Hawaii. Appendix C contains a letter from Vincent Versage 
to Roger Ulveling at DBED that summarizes the firm's lobbying approach and close 
relationship with Senator Inouye, DBED's D C. office (Rick Spreyer) and Hill & 
Knowlton.
H&K developed "communications strategies," and a "Geothermal Communications Task 
Force" along with the typical media training sessions, speech writing and press releases. 
The consultants worked closely with the DBED office in Washington, D C. and the 
Governor's office to conduct research and counter all media work and other activities of 
the national environmental organizations (primarily the Rainforest Action Network) that 
were campaigning against geothermal in Hawaii. The Task Force also included 
representatives from PGV, Campbell Estate, DLNR, DOH, and Hawaiian Electric 
Company, as well as the top three officials at DBED.
Interestingly, DBED considered the participation of the directors of DOH and DLNR 
(departments that are normally burdened with regulatory duties) as a crucial component 
of the PR effort. In fact. Bill Paty (DLNR Director), John Lewin (DOH Director) and 
Bruce Anderson (DOH Deputy Director) were on the circulation lists for all PR
’ At the time. Hill & Knowlton was tfie nation’s largest public relations firm. H&K has represented Exxon, 
the government of Kuwait, Catholic Bishops' anti-abortion campaign and several tobacco and liquor 
companies. The company regularly supported anti-environmental clients by tracking the work of 
environmental organizations and producing a newsletter called Hews Alert.
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correspondence including background research and monitoring information on opposition 
groups, communications strategies and campaign briefing materials. Furthermore, this 
group was strongly encouraged to join top DBED officials in a "planning session" held 
by the PR consultants in 1990. The DBED memorandum (written by H&K) requested 
attendance:
As part of the State's ongoing efforts to promote the development of 
geothermal resources, now is a good time to review and assess how the 
situation has changed over the past year and what, if any, changes the 
State should make in its communications program. As part of this effort, I 
am requesting you to participate in a planning session. Participants will be 
presented with an overview o f the current situation and asked to provide 
their own perspective and ideas. Strategic options will also be presented 
for review and comment (Ulveling 1990).
By that time, two of the major pillars o f the State's PR messages had already begun to 
crumble. The first one related to the illusion that a well-designed energy policy was the 
driving force behind the State's push for geothermal development. The second was 
closely related but more specific to the great oil myth that was created to support 
geothermal development.
In 1989, the PR consultants began to pressure DBED to "clarify" certain policy issues 
related to how tibe public perceives the "master plan" for the geothermal/cable project. 
Public opposition to geothermal was challenging the credibility o f the State's energy plan 
because the costs and risks associated with geothermal development were inconsistent 
with priorities that allegedly promote "energy security " for the State, H&K advised 
DBED that the "master-planning process itself will be threatened if  it becomes the 
battleground for policy debate " (Matteson and Okino 1989). There was concern about 
ongoing public hearings on the Plan because "some parts o f the community might 
perceive the master plan as a 'fixant' because the decision to develop has already been 
made." H&K "clarified" the State's policy by canceling the remaining public hearings. 
Instead they conducted "focus group" discussions in order to include participation by the 
"silent majority" of people who support geothermal but had not yet been "mobilized" 
(Kingery and Okino 1989).
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The second PR problem involved the debunking of a myth that geothermal would reduce 
Hawai i's dependence on oil (and related environmental and economic risks associated 
with oil shipments). The earliest documents (starting in the mid-1970 s) relating to the 
need for geothermal in Hawaii emphasize two primary reasons: economic considerations 
and energy security. According to DBED, H aw aii was 89% dependent on oil in 1974 
and 92% dependent in 1990. Scientists, land developers, and business supporters in 
government apparently believed that geothermal would facilitate increased development 
and economic growth throughout the state because it was a local resource. But, after the 
Arab oil embargo in the 1970's, the concept of "oil dependency" became a much more 
useful battle cry. Almost eveiy study, proposed legislation, or static report related to 
geothermal energy (including some critical analyses) includes a statement about how 
"Hawai i is over 90 % dependent on imported o il . . .  .geothermal is the only near-term 
source o f economical baseload power that can significantly reduce Hawai i's dangerous 
dependence on o il.. .  .it will reduce oil imports and reduce the risks of oil sp ill.. . .
geothermal represents the State's effort to displace imported oil Hawaii is on the
threshold of energy independence as well as a major gain in environmental quality."
In April of 1990, an energy analyst at DBED circulated an internal memo that clearly 
posed a problem to the State's position on oil savings. It stated that the level of crude oil 
imports would not change as a result o f 500 megawatts of additional power on O ahu 
from geothermal plants on the Big Island. Furthermore, the exact response by the 
refineries to geothermal production (regarding a decrease in "low sulfur" fuel oil demand) 
would be dictated by market forces and economic conditions existing at that time 
(Department o f Business, Economic Development and Tourism 1990). This meant that 
the refineries would do whatever brought them the most money, not necessarily what 
contributed to the State's geothermal agenda.
The public was able to learn the truth about oil use in Hawai i Ûirough a process of 
discovery that included correspondence between Big Island Senator, Andy Levin and
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DBED, the publication of an independent analysis of oil use in Haw aii, and finally by a 
statement from one o f the oil companies. These documents validated the arguments used 
by environmentalists and community groups to challenge the State's geothermal 
promotion.
The real story is that the amount of oil imported by the refineries in Hawai i is 
completely dictated by transportation fuel needs. In Hawai i, oil used in electricity 
production comprises only 27% of the total use in the state. Fuel oil could be considered 
a "local resource" because it is a by-product of a local refining process that favors (on 
account o f  the "grade" of crude oil imported and refining technique) the production of 
aviation fuel (which comprises 41% of total oil use). The Big Island's oil-fired power 
plants use "high sulfur" residual oil. There is a surplus o f this oil produced at refineries 
on O ahu and a low demand in foreign markets (combined with high delivery costs to get 
it there). O ahu's oil plants use "low sulfur" residual oil. The refineries produce this oil, 
but not enough to fully meet the demand on O'ahu. Nevertheless, the demand for 
transportation fuels has increased and is expected to continue to increase (DBEDT 
2000).* The bottom line: until there is a decrease in tranqx>rtation fuel demand, the 
overall quantity of oil imported into Hawai i will not decrease (Yamaguchi and Isaak 
1990, Levin 1990, Levin 1991, Pacific Resources/BHP Petroleum 1992, Honolulu 
Advertiser October 27,1991).
DBEDTs energy division was aware o f Hawai'i's oil importation statistics long before 
Senator Levin caught them in a lie in 1991. The oil myth of geothermal energy continues 
ten years later -  with some slight changes in order to avoid direct references to "oil 
imports." The misleading message that geothermal helps Hawai i kick the oil habit 
remains the same. Essentially, it's like being told by the geothermal promoters that "the 
boat is blue" but in reality it is 98% red and only 2% blue.
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For over ten years, the State was in the business o f supporting geothermal developers 
with legislation, indirect funding and strategic promotional campaigns. The State 
conducted media campaigns to proselytize misinformation about geothermal's benefits 
and engaged in mudslinging directed at public interest organizations concerned about its 
use in Hawai i. This has all been done at the taxpayers expense to directly benefit private 
companies. Similarly, DBED used at least $300,000 of public funds to directly lobby 
Congress for federal funds and lobby the State legislature for additional state funds to 
benefit the private geothermal industry.
Geothermal Regulator
"We are speaking as a single voice for the state" said the deputy director of DBED, 
regarding the formal announcement that DBED was the "coordinator" of geothermal 
regulation for DOH and DLNR. DBED declared that there was no conflict with this role 
as coordinator despite the fact that DOH and DLNR are the "regulators" and DBED is the 
"advocate" of geothermal development (Hawaii Tribune-Herald Augvist 28, 1992). The 
announcement disclosed the true regulatory mentally of the State towards geothermal. It 
also meant that the industry was doing so poorly that DOH and DLNR would no longer 
issue their own press statements about regulatory oversight of PGV.
It is common in the geothermal industry for regulatory permits to be issued in a phased 
approach as individual projects are developed from the exploratory to the developmental 
stages. But in Hawai i, the applicable regulations that govern the issuance of permits 
were developed and/or enforced as projects were negotiated, explored and developed. 
More importantly, these regulations and relevant laws were made pursuant to the needs of 
the industry instead o f the needs of the community.
* Ground transportation fuel use increased from 1990 to 1997 by 6.7% despite the fact that there were less 
vehicles on die road. The average foel efficiency of Hawai'i's vehicles declined by 7.8%, from 20 mpg in
1990 to 18.4 mpg in 1997.
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On one level, this sounds like typical environmental rhetoric about government and 
industry. But consider an analogy that might seem more outrageous. What if a non­
profit organization wanted to conduct fundraising in a small rural neighborhood by 
canvassing residences with a bullhorn in the middle of the night and robbing local 
convenience stores on a daily basis? What if  the government sat at the table with this 
organization and negotiated a deal whereby each hoi^ehold could only be solicited every 
other night, each store would turn over half of its cash every day and a fleet of 
government vehicles would be used to conduct this fundraising? Then, a couple of years 
later, the organization begins to canvass every night and rob stores of all their cash. The 
government's response is to convene a roundtable discussion to educate the public about 
need for this non-profit The organization justifies its actions because it continues to 
have insufficient funds to do the important non-profit work. It complains of lawsuits 
brought by community members and permitting delays for the use of the government 
vehicles. The government responds by initiating legislation and administrative charges 
to accommodate this request.
There are numerous examples o f the State's failure to adequately regulate the geothermal 
industry in Hawai i. The State has avoided Environmental Impact Statements for 
geothermal development and consequently one of the nation's most fundamental 
environmental laws. The State has also demonstrated the lack of interest and ability in 
protecting groundwater from geothermal contamination. But the most egregious 
oversight has been the failure to protect the public from HzS pollution at HGP-A and 
PGV.
Arbitrary Air Pollution Regulation
HzS is easily identified by its distinctive "rotten egg" odor. HzS emissions are the most 
serious air pollution problem at geothermal facilities. Besides geothermal, there are at 
least 72 industry categories that routinely emit this pollutant The petroleum industry is
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responsible for most causes o f H2 S pollution in the U.S. In 1975, hydrogen sulfide 
corroded enough metal in an ARCO gas-injection well in a small western Texas town to 
cause a major crack and failure of the pressure control valve. A deadly cloud of H2 S was 
released before dawn, killing eight people in a nearby home. Their bodies were found on 
the lawn and in their car because they had died while trying to escape the fumes (ARCO 
1988 and Houston Chronicle November 9,1997). This was allegedly the worst H2 S 
accident in Texas history, but many deaths occur in the U.S. each year from this air toxin. 
Acute and chronic illnesses from H2 S exposure are a serious problem for communities 
around "sour gas" wells and some refineries in other parts of Texas, Alberta Canada, 
Mexico and a few Midwestern states in the U.S.
H2 S or "poison gas" is more toxic (i.e. deadly at lower concentrations) than carbon 
monoxide and chlorine. It can be considered as lethal as cyanide due to the fact that it is 
heavier than air and consequently less easily dispersed (ARCO 1988). Increased 
humidity (which occurs year-round in Puna) exasperates the toxic effects of H2 S 
(Department o f Health Epidemiology Staff 1983). It is also a highly corrosive and 
flammable gas. H2 S is commonly referred to as an "odor nuisance" at ambient 
concentration levels below 100 ppb. But recent studies on chronic exposure to low levels 
of H2 S (around 10 ppb) and lasting effects o f acute exposure to higher levels have shown 
that the pollutant is a "potent neurotoxin" that has lasting effects in humans (Legator et al 
2001, Kilbum and Warsdbaw 1995). The central nervous system impairment found in 
individuals near sources o f H2 S has been characterized to include attention deficits and an 
inability to process information quickly. One doctor describes it as a "condition 
analogous to an outdated computer program: It runs, but it is maddeningly slow and 
inefficient" {Houston Chronicle November 12,1997).
The federal government does not regulate H2 S as a "hazardous air pollutant" under the 
Clean Air Act.’ Consequently, EPA cannot establish federal emission standards.
* Section 112 (b) of the federal Clean Air Act regulates industrial sources of hazardous air pollutants. H2 S 
has been excluded from this list due to intense lobbying from the oil and gas industry.
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maximum control technology or compliance assurance for monitoring requirements 
relevant to H2 S. This pollutant is, however, regulated by the federal government as an 
"extremely hazardous substance" pursuant to laws relevant to accidental releases. 
Additionally, many states have established ambient air quality standards to better regulate 
this pollution.
In Hawai i, the regulation of H2 S pollution from geothermal development has not come 
easily. In a nutshell, DOH has essentially failed at the task because it approached the 
matter accordingly:
1. IX)H refused to regulate air pollution from the HGP-A facility, in part because there
were not yet any state ambient air quality standards for H2 S.
2. DOH refused to finalize air standards for H2 S, in part because the HGP-A facility
could not comply with the proposed standards. Eventually, DOH attempted to set 
standards on a "case-by-case" basis for PGV and Campbell Estate/True.
3. After a successful lawsuit filed by citizens to force the State to establish H2 S standards
(prior to the issuance of air control permits), DOH attempted to by-pass the State 
Supreme Court decision with legislative action that would exempt H2 S standards 
from the rulemaking requirement.
4. DOH finally established H2 S standards (sixteen years after the first geothermal well
was flow-tested) but the allowable levels are not adequate to protect the public from 
health impacts or odor nuisances.
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, DOH and the geothermal developers involved with 
HGP-A and private exploratory drilling claimed that the H2 S emissions were safe because 
the ambient levels in the community did not exceed federal Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) standards for exposure to H2 S at the worksite (HGP-A 
Development Group 1982 and Thomas 1983). In 1977, DOH refused to get involved 
with the HGP-A "experiment" despite the fact that health officials were aware that the
This standard allows for exposure ofH^S to workers to reach 10,000 ppb during an eight-hour day.
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well tests were proditcing H2 S levels between 50 and 3500 ppb in a one-mile diameter 
around the wellhead {Honolulu Advertiser April 12,1977).
In 1981 DOH formed an Air Advisory Committee to review the State's existing air 
quality standards and air pollution control rules. Also in 1981, the State legislature and 
DLNR established laws and regulations for the leasing and drilling o f geothermal 
resources. The regulations required compliance with regulations for air, water and noise 
pollution -  none o f which had been created yet. This inconsistency, as well as concerns 
about air emissions from the proposed 250 megawatt Campbell Estate/True geothermal 
project created pressure on DOH staff and the Advisory Committee to develop H2 S 
standards. In February o f 1982, the Advisoiy Committee recommended an ambient air 
quality standard o f 5 ppb averaged over one hour. This was intended to represent the 
median threshold for odor detection and consequently protect the public from nuisance 
levels. DOH's air permits staff incorporated this recommendation into a July 1982 report 
that made recommendations about a pollution control strategy for geothermal wells. The 
report stated that "once an ambient standard is established, it provides a basis to develop 
an abatement and control strategy to attain this goal" (Department of Health 1982).
In September o f 1982, the Department o f Planning and Economic Development (DPED) 
intervened in the proposed rulemaking. At the time, the director of DPED chaired the 
Geothermal Advisoiy Committee and DBED's energy coordinator headed the HGP-A 
development group. DPED, with the support o f Hawaiian Electric Company and the 
American Lung Association convinced the Air Advisoiy Committee to rescind its 
previous recommendation for an H2 S standard (Edmunds 1986). DPED informed the 
Committee that the proposed standard would be violated eveiy time geothermal wells 
would be vented or times when HGP-A had to be shut down for maintenance. The 
Geothermal Advisory Committee suggested that California's standard of 30 ppb on a one- 
hour average be adopted "until more knowledge was available about Hawaii's geothermal 
resources" (Flachsbart and Morrow 1988). The Air Advisoiy Committee also heard 
testimony from DOH's Mental Health Division that H2 S odors could cause transient
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disorientation and confusion in humans. One o f the Committee members introduced a 
California Energy Commission report that found incidences of blurred vision, dizziness 
and mental depression were associated with H2 S levels as low as 80 ppb (Flachsbart and 
Morrow 1988).
In 1983, DOH's Epidemiology staff made a recommendation to the Advisory Committee 
that specifically excluded odor nuisance level considerations and was less restrictive than 
the advice o f the Geothermal Advisory Committee. Bruce Anderson, who was an 
Epidemiology consultant for DOH at the time, co-authored the H2 S report. Although he 
admitted that the "Epidemiology Branch has no real expertise in H2 S toxicity" he 
recommended a standard o f 100 ppb averaged over 30 minutes (Department of Health 
Epidemiology Staff 1983). The report admitted that the proposed standard excluded all 
consideration of the impact of odor nuisance on overall health.”  A subsequent 
memorandum from one of the medical doctors, who was also a co-author o f the report, 
qualified the recommendation by stating that "it is not known whether this level will 
protect against early lung damage" (Bomgaars 1993). The report itself mentioned that a 
number o f community complaints would result from H2 S levels below 100 ppb. A 1985 
report on the perception of H2 S odor in relation to California’s ambient standard 
supported this caveat about complaints. This report reviewed studies that addressed the 
amount of annoyance that H2 S odor caused and concluded that at least 40% of the 
exposed population would experience annoyance from H2 S levels around 30 ppb (with no 
time-average) (Amoore 1985).
Soon after the epidemiologists made their recommendations, the State Legislature passed 
a resolution requesting DOH to conduct a long-term study of the effects of H2 S on human 
health. Bruce Anderson chaired the committee to oversee the "collaborative study" by 
DOH and DPED. Not surprisingly, the study's conclusions supported his previous 
recommendations about the H2 S air quality standard. The research involved a health
"  The World Health Organization defines "healtii" as "a state of physical, mental and social well-being, not 
just the absence of disease.”
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survey conducted in February of 1984 in, Leilani Estates, a subdivision adjacent to the
HGP-A facility and a reference community to the north. The survey concluded that there
was "no direct relationship between the levels o f HaS in the ambient air in various
locations in Puna and reported acute or chronic respiratory conditions" (Anderson and
Oyama 1987). But the study's preliminary report stated that:
The objective o f the study was not to show a direct cause-and-effect 
relationship between exposure to H2 S and reported illness but rather to 
generate data that will be useful in determining whether or not a 
community exposed to low levels o f H2 S (and other effluents) is 
experiencing an unusual amount of illness.
Anderson's conclusion contradicted this purpose and he chose to exclude his own data 
that showed that Leilani residents reported higher rates o f "other iqjper respiratory 
conditions, common colds, digestive system disorders, diseases o f the eye and ear, 
nervousness, depression, and undue fatigue" than the reference population." These are all 
symptoms that are commonly attributable to chronic H2 S exposure. The survey's attempt 
to debunk community complaints o f respiratory symptoms, related to acute H2 S 
poisoning, was irrelevant because there were no serious accidents or ventings at the 
facility prior to or during the surveying period. Although there were other healtii studies 
related to potential impacts from geothermal development conducted in the 1980's and 
early 1990's, this DOH/DPED analysis established a mentality at DOH that the potential 
health impacts from geothermal were minimal and complaints from the residents should 
not be taken seriously.
The Air Advisory Committee revised its previous recommendation based on the 1983 
epidemiologists' report (and even loosened it to average the H2 S level over an hour 
instead of 30 minutes). The Committee was persuaded to provide "some flexibility for 
developers who face considerable uncertainties regarding the chemistry of Hawaii's 
geothermal resources" (Flachsbart and Morrow 1988). By 1985, DOH had still not 
finalized the ambient air quality standards. The Committee was reconvened to further 
accommodate the geothermal industry by addressing specific emission standards. 
PGV/Thermal Power presented a case to the Committee for elimination of any emission
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limits in favor of a general reliance on the developers to use the "Best Available Control 
Technology" (Flachsbart and Morrow 1988). Tbe developer argued that the ambient air 
quality standards should be used as "guidelines" to direct the choice of pollution 
abatement technology. Geothermal developers sought loopholes in regulations because 
by the mid-1980 s, the price of oil was dropping and geothermal was becoming less 
economically feasible.
In general, ambient air quality standards are necessary to determine the quantity o f HzS 
pollution allowable in the outdoor atmosphere available to the general public. This 
policy must be promulgated as a health-based standard. The economic considerations of 
the industry do not affect the physical response of a child, asthmatic or healthy adult to 
specific levels of HaS. Yet, the Air Advisory Committee was persuaded to change their 
recommendation based on economic considerations. Air quality standards are also 
needed in order to establish emergency response "action levels" for warning and 
evacuation o f residents during an accident. Emergency responders in Puna were unable 
to fully assess the danger o f HaS exposure during accidental releases from HGP-A 
throughout the 1980's. On numerous occasions, Harry Kim, the Hawaii County Civil 
Defense Administrator, urged DOH to clarify response protocol by establishing threshold 
limits for warning and evacuation.
In 1987, a report was issued from the Legislative Auditor on DOH's environmental 
protection programs. The report criticized DOH's air program for inadequate regulatory 
oversight.
In the area of standard setting . . .  the department and division have been 
wavering and inconsistent in their actions, have shunned their roles as 
public health protectors, have abdicated decision making to an advisory 
committee which is unbalanced in its representation of affected interests . .
. As a consequence, these standards can shift in an apparent response to 
pressures from affected interests (State Legislative Auditor 1987).
The Air Advisory Committee had become a promoter o f geothermal development 
(especially since business representatives constituted a majority on the Committee).
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Consequently, a proposal to relax emission limits was finalized and was included in a 
complete package of recommended ambient mr quality standards and geothermal 
regulations. In 1987, DOH held public hearings on the 100 ppb-one hour limit and 
received substantial opposition to the proposed limit. The entire rulemaking process was 
then put on hold even though HGP-A continued to cause pollution problems in the 
community and planning for private geothermal projects continued. By this time. 
Governor Waihee had appointed John Lewin as the new Director o f DOH. Dr. Lewin 
refused to adopt the proposed standard because it was not reasonable (Center for 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 1990). But Lewin also promoted Bruce Anderson to the 
position of Deputy Director o f Environmental Health. Consequently, DOH was unable to 
proceed with a revised air standard.
In early 1989, DOH assured the public that the "long overdue geothermal rules" would be 
established (Lewin 1989). But exactly one year later, Bruce Anderson testified under 
oath that DOH deliberately decided not to promulgate HzS air quality rules that had been 
pending since 1982. Instead, DOH planned to set geothermal pollution limits on a case- 
by-case basis in order to give regulators greater flexibility (Honolulu Star-BuUetin 
February 7,1990). Anderson's testimony during a trial came as a result of a lawsuit filed 
against the State by two physicians, community members and the Pele Defense Fund. 
DOH had issued air pollution control permits to both Campbell Estate/True Geothermal 
and PGV. The air permits allowed the developers to "open vent" the wells (see Chapter 
6) and contained various emission limits for different types o f activities. The two 
developers were subject to two different sets o f emission limits without consideration of 
the resulting cumulative air quality.
DOH held a public informational meeting on PGV's proposed permit in mid 1989. An 
announcement for the meeting disclosed the Department's approach to air pollution 
control at PGV. Wilfred Nagamine, head o f the Air Permits Division, indicated that the 
numerical H^S standards were intended as "guidelines" and the Department's "hope" was 
that the industry would use best available control technology to minimize the impact of
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the PGV project (Hawaii Tribune-Herald June 11, 1989). During the meeting Bruce 
Anderson defended DOH's role in regulating PGV by stating that "this is a new issue.
We need to take the problems as they come" (Honolulu Advertiser June 17,1989). But 
State law required emission limits in air pollution permits to comply with the relevant 
ambient air quality standard by limiting HgS emissions accordingly. Consequently, DOH 
ended up in court.
Shunichi Kimura was the trial judge in Hilo for the case. Kimura was a former Mayor of 
Hawaii County where he promoted geothermal development. He ruled in favor of DOH 
after hearing two weeks o f testimony related to emission limits in the permit. The State 
Supreme Court overturned his decision two years later. The Court ordered an injunction 
on geothermal development and instructed DOH to promulgate ambient air quality 
standards for HzS. The Justices also scolded Judge Kimura for erring in a similar manner 
as DOH.
The circuit court in this case, sitting as the trier o f fact, listened to the 
litigants' evidence of what effect various amounts of HzS would have on 
air quality. It then determined that the amounts established by the 
conditional permit issued to True were sufficiently protective o f the 
environment. In doing this, the trial judge imposed his personal standards 
of what air quality should be. This is not the role o f the trial court (Aluli 
V. Lewin 73 Haw. 56, 828 P.2d 802 (1992)).
After the Supreme Court ruling, DOH still refused to begin the process of rulemaking for 
HaS standards. Instead, DOH attempted to change the State's air pollution laws to 
remove ftie requirement that ambient air quality standards be established through a 
rulemaking process. DOH wanted to continue setting standards on a permit-by-permit 
basis. DOH and geothermal developers teamed up with Senator Matsuura to amend 
various bills relating to air pollution laws already under review during the 1992 
legislative session. The proposed amendment prompted intense opposition from 
community groups who were appalled at the arrogance o f DOH. Although the measure 
did not gamer a lot o f  support from other legislators, it took round-the-clock monitoring, 
pressure from the media, and last minute lobbying by Puna supporters, in order to keep
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Senator Matsuura from inserting relevant language into the air pollution bill during the 
final conference committee hearings.
In mid-1992, DOH finally established state ambient air quality standard for geothermal's 
most serious pollutant. The new administrative rule was proposed and finalized within a 
few months. Public comment was limited and opportunities for expert testimony and 
scientific review were not accommodated. The final rule set the maximum level for HaS 
in the ambient air at 25 ppb on an hourly average.
DOH claimed that this level was adopted in order to minimize an odor nuisance. 
However, DOH received many public comments that criticized the rule. This limit is 
well above the median level o f odor detection (5 ppb). In fact, the geothermal regulators 
from California who testified against the State's proposed standard, observed that ambient 
concentrations from 5 to 10 ppb are reasonable levels to expect public complaints. The 
standard also does not protect the public from acute health impacts due to the time- 
averaging over an hour. This allows for large increases in the ambient levels. If the H^S 
level stayed at 5 ppb for 55 minutes, it could then exceed 200 ppb for five minutes and 
still maintain an average of 25 ppb. Community groups pointed out that although the air 
monitors are able to average the levels over time, the human body cannot. Effective 
abatement technology, which prevents levels from exceeding 10 ppb, is available for 
industries that produce HiS pollution. Also, a lower standard for HgS is not 
unprecedented in other states, even those with a strong oil and gas lobby. The State o f 
Kentucky and Province of Alberta Canada have a 10 ppb hourly average standard, and 
Montana's is 25 ppb, but it is averaged over 30 minutes (instead of one hour).
DOH also ignored the comments o f one o f its own toxicologists. More than a year prior 
to the State Supreme Court decision, an internal memorandum, relating to the ambient 
H2 S standard, was circulated between a staff toxicologist, the Clean Air Branch and 
Bruce Anderson's office. The toxicologist had reviewed a recent EPA "reference 
concentration" limit for H2 S that considered 0.6 ppb as an "acceptable daily concentration
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in air over a chronic, long-term exposure period and intended to protect the most 
sensitive adults from inflammation of the nasal lining" (Aki 1990). The head o f the 
Clean Air Branch suggested that the Department consider reducing the HaS limits 
(contained in True and PGV's permits) to reflect this lower limit.
This recommendation for a more protective standard was inconsistent with the apparent 
philosophy o f geothermal regulation at DOH -  a philosophy that was shared between 
various State agencies. The basis o f this was the identification o f the problem 
surrounding geothermal development. State regulators, both at DOH and DLNR were 
entrenched with the belief that it was the public's perception of geothermal that was the 
problem, not the facilities themselves. This perspective was part o f the State's overall 
geothermal agenda and consequently it was consistent with DBED's promotional 
campaign for this industry.
At DOH, this philosophy was manifested in the common response to complaints about 
health impacts from HgS releases. DOH in general, and Bruce Anderson specifically, 
often cited reports o f illness from geothermal as "psychogenic in nature." The most 
shameful example of this propaganda occurred after a major HzS release at PGV on 
February 8,1993. The air monitor in the nearby Lani Puna Gardens subdivision detected 
levels ofHzS that exceeded the calibration o f the monitor for at least nine minutes. The 
monitor was pegged at 672 ppb of HzS, but the actual concentration was unknown 
because of the limits o f the monitor. One o f the protesters, who smelled the HzS and 
saw the steam plume moving into the community, climbed over a fence to notify 
Department of Health air monitoring personnel who were taking a break inside a nearby 
building.
Without knowing the accurate ambient HzS levels in the community, Bruce Anderson 
immediately attributed health complaints from residents as psychological problems and
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further stated that "at this point in time, with the heightened community concern, any 
illnesses will be attributable to geothermal" (Hawaii Tribune-Herald Fébnmry 9,1993). 
Several months later in September o f 1993, more leaks at PGV prompted one nearby 
resident to request temporary relocation for her family, including her four-year old child 
who had suddenly become ill. The newspaper report from this event claimed that it was 
the Health Department's "position" that the illnesses reported were "psychogenic in 
nature" (Hawaii Tribune-Herald September 29,1993).
This attitude was a  culmination o f epidemiological work that Dr. Anderson began ten 
years earlier. The 1984 health study that was used to help justify the proposed H2 S air 
quality standard of 100 ppb, was also used to establish the "psychogenic" excuse for any 
future correlation between health problems and geothermal development. The survey 
used in the study included a set of questions about impacts from geothermal development 
in a "supplemental survey form" that was only used with the Leilani Estates residents and 
not the reference community. The authors o f the preliminary and final report neglected 
to disclose and discuss the results o f one o f the questions related to geothermal 
development. Residents were asked, "how would you classify your general feeling 
toward geothermal development in the State o f  Hawaii?" (Department of Health and 
Department of Planning and Economic Development 1984). In a memorandum to a UH 
scientist involved with HGP-A, Anderson reported that only 32% of the residents 
responded in favor of geothermal development in Puna on the basis of answers to the 
above question. The information gathered from the supplemental survey was aimed at 
quantifying the "extent of bias that may have been introduced into the study" (Anderson 
1986).
^  The emergency level for H2 S is 1,000 ppb but none of the off-site air monitors have been calibrated to 
record levels that high. Although the technology exists to record levels as low as 5 ppb and as high as 
1,000 ppb, DOH and PGV have not updated their monitors to address this problem.
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Armed with this statistic and numerous examples of public concern about HGP-A,
Anderson concluded that:
Most residents in Puna perceive very little immediate benefit from the 
development of geothermal resources in the area; consequently, they are 
less likely to ignore or tolerate odor nuisance and other adverse health 
impacts associated with geothermal emissions (Anderson 1985).
This conclusion affected the interpretation o f all future health reports, assessments and 
surveys that have been conducted to investigate the connection between geothermal 
pollution and health impacts in the community. DOH conducted a follow-up study of 
Leilani residents in 1990. Although the results showed increases in reported health 
ailments, DOH researchers stated that "geothermal is a politically explosive issue" and 
the results were biased because of over-reporting. Therefore, DOH claimed that the 
results couldn't show a direct correlation between the levels of HgS and the reported 
respiratory conditions {Hawaii Trihune-Herald July 24,1991). In 1993, a public health 
doctor on the Big Island, Sam Ruben, proposed a health study on the impacts of 
geothermal emissions that would include the effects o f stress on residents living near 
PGV. Bruce Anderson claimed it would be too difficult because o f geothermal 
opposition and the resulting bias about PGV in the community {Hawaii Trihune-Herald 
October 21, 1993).
In 1997, a team of toxicologists from Texas released the preliminary results of an 
independent "symptom survey" health study conducted in lower Puna. The findings o f 
the survey, which indicated that the Puna community suffers from chronic ill effects from 
HzS exposure, sparked an expected reaction from DOH and PGV. Amidst the typical 
comments about the bias in the Puna community, the State (via Senator Inouye's office) 
pressured the National Institutes o f Health to question funding for the study. Also, PGV 
lobbied EPA to convene a panel o f scientists to criticize the health survey (Puna 
Geothermal Venture 1997). After the final paper was peer reviewed and accepted for 
publication in 1999, additional political pressure from Hawai i forced the journal to 
rescind publication (Singleton 2000). The study documented similar health problems
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associated with HgS exposure for residents in Puna and residents in Odessa Texas, who 
have been exposed to H2 S from industrial wastewater ponds (Legator et al 2001). It 
wasn't until the spring o f2001 that the study was finally published in the Archives o f  
Environmental Health.
Unfortunately, the examples of regulatory problems at DOH are endless because the 
potential impacts continue as PGV makes plans for expansion. DLNR and DOH's 
regulatory problems and DBED's promotional activities are by no means limited to 
oversight of geothermal development projects. However, geothermal promotion and the 
corresponding lack o f adequate regulation was compounded by the participation of 
Hawaii County.
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CHAPTER 6 
County Involvement
TTie County of Hawaii includes the entire Big Island. The Mayor and his/her Managing 
Director head the executive branch of the County government. This branch includes 
offices such as the Department o f Research and Development, the Planning Department 
and "citizen" boards such as the Planning Commission. The County's legislative branch 
includes the County Council and its affiliated committees and offices. With a few 
exceptions, the County Council has had a very limited role in geothermal development. 
The promotional and regulatory activities at the County level have been primarily 
conducted by the Mayor's office, the Department o f Research and Development, the 
Office of Corporation Counsel, the Civil Defense Agency, the Planning Department and 
the Planning Commission. The Fire and Police Departments have also been involved in 
numerous hazardous emergencies and other law enforcement responsibilities at the HGP- 
A and PGV facilities.
In general, the County has had a large regulatoiy role in the development of the HGP-A 
and PGV projects primarily because both were developed on land designated as 
"agricultural" and therefore primarily controlled by the County. The County has also had 
a large promotional role in geothermal because of its assumption, through the years, that 
geothermal development would create economic development for the island as a whole. 
The County has also facilitated geothermal in accordance with the dictates of the State 
government.
The political scene in the County government resembles the stereotypical "small town" 
with development interests overlapping with political power. Hawai i in general, and the 
Big Island particularly, epitomize the power structure of "an old-boy network." Many of 
the people involved with geothermal promotion and regulation at the County level have 
created the appearance o f a political and/or financial confiict of interest due to their
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allegiances to the geothermal industry. Appendix B is an important reference for this 
chapter because it lists some o f the key players who have been in this "revolving door" 
between government and the geothermal industry.
Geothermal Promoter
Eitrfy Years
In the early 1970's, Mayor Shunichi Kimura, and his Director of Research and 
Development, John Farias, began the County's formal involvement in geothermal 
promotions. They lobbied the federal government for geothermal research funds and 
declared that geothermal was going to be a major player for die island and the state 
{Honolulu Advertiser September 24 1989).
In 1972, the County matched the State's initial contribution o f $100,000 for initial 
research activities o f the Hawaii Geothermal Project (Goodman and Love 1980). Years 
later, after the County became an officid partner in the development of the HGP-A 
power facility, funds were allocated for the construction o f the visitor's center adjacent to 
the plant. In 1974, Herbert Matayoshi became mayor and hired Jack Keppeler, from 
Amfac's Puna Sugar Company, as the County's managing director. Keppeler developed 
the County's geothermal program and was active in the planning and development of the 
HGP-A facility (Garcia 1977). In 1977, Matayoshi's administration organized a 
Geothermal Seminar in Hilo where developers, lawyers and government officials 
discussed financial, legal and regulatory aspects o f potential development in Hawai'i.
The trustees o f Bishop Estate (headed by Richard Lyman) provided funding for the event 
and consequently became co-sponsors.
In 1982, Jack Keppeler left the Mayor’s office to work as an alternative energy consultant 
for Campbell Estate's geothermal project in the Kahauale'a rainforest. He subsequently 
was hired to facilitate the exploits o f a private rocket launching company that planned to 
build a commercial launching facility in Ka'u (the soudiem part o f the Big Island)
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(Schmicker 1992). He was later hired by the Department of Land and Natural Resources 
as a geothermal industry liaison and eventually became a deputy director of that 
Department
Mayor Matayoshi pursued geothermal because he believed that it was the government's 
responsibility to demonstrate feasibility in order for private industry to fully develop the 
resource. The Mayor planned for the Big Island to supply the energy needs of the entire 
state but also develop local manganese and aluminum processing plants as well as 
electronics and food processing industries. "Energy is the crux of it," he said about 
geothermal, "we pushed it and pushed it hard" (Honolulu Advertiser July 7,1982). The 
chairman o f the County Council at the time, Steve Yamashiro argued that the County 
should actually go into the geothermal business of producing and selling power in order 
to "retain control to insure that development occurs at the speed and direction which will 
benefit the island" (Hawaii Business 1981). Yamashiro did not want large-scale 
geothermal electricity to be exported to O ahu. Instead, he planned to entice industry to 
the Big Island with surplus electricity for local consumption.
During the 1980's, both Mayor Matayoshi and Mayor Dante Carpenter (1984-1988) 
strongly urged HELCO to refrain from building or improving oil-fired plants in order to 
create more political and economic pressure to develop geothermal energy (Honolulu 
Advertiser August 22,1992). HELCO's compliance with this request made them rely on 
a mere two megawatts (enough to supply only 2,000 homes) from the troublesome HGP- 
A facility in the late 1980's. It also created an electricity shortage resulting in numerous 
rolling blackouts in the early 1990's because PGV did not have a viable production well 
until 1993.
In 1984, Mayor Carpenter appointed Albert Lono Lyman, a business partner in the 
Lyman family companies involved with geothermal development, as the County's 
Planning Director. The Lymans owned the land where Thermal Power/PGV was drilling 
and part o f the land used by the HGP-A facility (they had donated most of the land under
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for acquiring private land that lies within the established buffer zone (Shioji and 
Ramos 1982).
2. The public should be able to participate more substantively in the planning and 
permitting o f geothermal projects.
3. Specific standards governing H2 S, mercury and noise emissions should be 
promulgated.
4. Geothermal development should not be allowed in all land-use classifications (i.e. not 
on conservation lands). It should be restricted to a "geothermal zone" under the guise 
o f a Specific County plan.
In 1983, the State legislature passed the Geothermal Resource Subzone Law. Pursuant to 
this new law, the County was required to facilitate geothermal development by either 
amending the county general plan and zoning ordinances to allow geothermal as a 
permitted use, or follow the permitting procedure established in the state statute on lands 
that were designated as geothermal resources subzones by the state. The law (Hawaii 
Revised Statutes 205-5.1 (e)) required the County to issue a geothermal resource permits 
if  the applicant demonstrated that the project met the following criteria:
1. The activity would not have unreasonable adverse health.
Environmental, or socio-economic effects on residents or surrounding 
property;
2. The activity would not unreasonably burden public agencies to provide 
roads and streets, sewers, water, drainage, school improvements, and 
police and fire protection;
3. There are reasonable measures available to mitigate the unreasonable 
adverse effects or burdens.
The following year, the County Planning Department, under the command o f Albert 
Lyman, began drafting rules pursuant to these permitting requirements. In 1986, the 
Planning Commission finalized "Rule 12, relating to Geothermal Resource Permits." 
During the final Planning Commission hearing. Mayor Dante Carpenter testified that the
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amount o f tax revenue compared to its paltry investment in infrastructure and services
throughout Puna.
Saving PGV
There are two issues related to the County's role in the PGV project that should be 
considered as blatant promotional activities. The first involves unabated "vertical" 
venting o f the well and the second involves the County's role in the continuation o f well 
drilling after the June 1991 blowout o f KS-8.
PGV's 1989 revised application for a geothermal resource permit claimed that each 
production well could only be cleaned out by venting the entire contents of the well 
straight into the air without using any pollution abatement or sound muffler. PGV 
alleged that the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) for well clean-out consists 
o f limiting the duration o f the event and scheduling venting for periods when the 
meteorological conditions are favorable (Puna Geothermal Venture 1989).
The County accepted this analysis despite the research and documentation from 
community groups that unabated venting was not considered BACT. The Kapoho 
Community Association hired a mainland geothermal consultant to comment on the 
necessity and availability o f appropriate abatement technology for PGV. The consultant 
reminded the County that the hydrogen sulfide concentration o f PGV's resource was 
between 1,000,000-1,300,000 ppb. This was six times higher than the average at the 
Geysers area in northern California where abatement equipment is required during well 
clean-out (Goddard 1989). The particulate pollution from the fallout o f mud and debris 
was also mentioned as a potential problem during vertical venting. Despite this 
testimony at die public hearings and discussions in mediation sessions, the County permit 
only required PGV to "mitigate" impacts du rii^  any planned venting by notifying 
residents, who live within 3500 feet o f the well, at least 24 hours prior to the venting. 
Those residents could be compensated for evacuating their homes and abandoning their 
employment responsibilities for the duration o f the release (Mizuno 1989).
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Commission should remove various environmental protection provisions that had been 
approved during a previous hearing (Edmunds 1986). In 1987, PGV had a pending 
Geothermal Resource Permit application with the Planning Comission. PGV requested 
an amendment to Rule 12 in order to remove the public's right to a contested case hearing 
(consistent with State legislation passed earlier in the year) on proposed County permits 
(see Chapter 5). Within a few months, this request was approved by the Planning 
Commission with the ftdl support o f the Planning Director, Albert Lyman.
By 1989, the year PGV was issued a Geothermal Resource Permit, none o f the earlier 
suggestions (from 1982) were addressed in the Commission's rules or in any other State 
or County legislation or administrative ru les.. There were no noise, HzS, or groundwater 
protection standards (such as a requirement for reinjection o f wastes). These issues 
would ostensibly be dealt with on a permit-by-permit basis depending on the applicant's 
ability to negotiate conditions.
Interestingly, the State created a 2,000-foot buffer zone between the Subzone boundaries 
and Natural Area Reserves, Forest Reserves, and the National Park, but instructed the 
County that the Planning Commission had the responsibility to do so in the agricultural, 
urban and rural districts (Ono 1984). Since then, the County never amended its general 
plan and zoning ordinances (the County's primary regulatory tool) to create an industrial 
zone for geothermal development This could have included a mandate for an 
appropriate buffer area to protect residents in adjacent subdivisions.
Consequently, the County maintains two conflicting land-use designations in the 
geothermal subzones, which encompasses most o f the area o f lower Puna (See Figure 3). 
The County continues to permit rural residential development and agricultural activities 
in the agricultural district, yet it is also required to issue permits for geothermal activities 
on the same lands. The district o f Puna is one o f the fastest growing districts in the state 
due to its relatively low-priced real estate. The County earns a proportionately high
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amount o f tax revenue compared to its paltiy investment in infrastructure and services
throughout Puna.
Saving PGV
There are two issues related to the County's role in the PGV project that should be 
considered as blatant promotional activities. The first involves unabated "vertical" 
venting of the well and the second involves the County's role in die continuation o f well 
drillii^  after the June 1991 blowout o f KS-8.
PGV's 1989 revised application for a geothermal resource permit claimed that each 
production well could only be cleaned out by venting the entire contents o f the well 
straight into the air without using any pollution abatement or sound muffler. PGV 
alleged that tiie Best Available Control Technology (BACT) for well clean-out consists 
o f limiting the duration of the event and scheduling venting for periods when the 
meteorological conditions are favorable (Puna Geothermal Venture 1989).
The County accepted this analysis despite the research and documentation from 
community groups that unabated venting was not considered BACT. The Kapoho 
Community Association hired a mainland geothermal consultant to comment on the 
necessity and availability of appropriate abatement technology for PGV. The consultant 
reminded the County that the hydrogen sulfide concentration o f PGV's resource was 
between 1,000,000-1,300,000 ppb. This was six times higher than the average at the 
Geysers area in northern California where abatement equipment is required during well 
clean-out (Goddard 1989). The particulate pollution from the fallout o f mud and debris 
was also mentioned as a potential problem during vertical venting. Despite this 
testimony at the public hearings and discussions in mediation sessions, the County permit 
only required PGV to "mitigate" impacts during any planned venting by notifying 
residents, who live within 3500 feet o f the well, at least 24 hours prior to the venting. 
Those residents could be compensated for evacuating their homes and abandoning their 
employment responsibilities for the duration o f the release (Mizuno 1989).
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In 1991, the first planned venting was scheduled for late February; a week after another 
o f PGV's wells experienced a blowout. The day after the accident at KS-7, Hawaii 
County Mayor, Lorraine Inouye requested that PGV postpone the venting, but not 
because o f the blowout. Instead, PGV was asked to delay venting for one month in order 
to give the County and State "adequate time for public education and awareness of the 
venting" (Hawaii County Mayor's Office 1991). The County not only permitted this 
questionable practice, they promoted it through paid advertising and public service 
announcements. Episodes of planned and accidental unabated ventings at the HGP-A 
facility were the chief cause o f many health and nuisance impacts for nearly fourteen 
years. Neverüieless, the Mayor's Office tried to convince the public that the loud large 
plume o f steam coming &om the well for hours would not be like HGP-A -  it would be 
perfectly safe because there would be State and County monitoring to assure compliance 
with permit conditions (County o f Hawaii 1991). Barry Miz^uno, who was the County's 
Managing Director at the time, was the main coordinator o f a multi-agency public 
relations campaign to "avoid unnecessary anxiety and reaction by educating residents 
who live nearby the PGV project" (Mizuno 1991). Hairy Kim, from the County Civil 
Defense Agency, was also involved with reviewing documents and planning for this 
"event"
The "Master Public Information Plan" was planned and executed in less than two weeks. 
The theme o f the information campaign was that venting is "normal and necessary" 
(County o f Hawaii 1991). It included the production and disbursement of PGV 
propaganda under the auspices o f official County information. The message was spread 
in a direct mailing to 4000 Pahoa residents with a flyer entitled The ABC's o f Geothermal 
Well Venting. Also, the State and County produced two half-page newspaper ads to run 
in the local newspaper, the circulation o f 100,11 x 17-inch posters, numerous public 
service announcements for radio and press releases for the newspaper and television. The 
total cost o f this public relations effort, including the staff time o f State and County 
employees, was paid by the State and County (Mizuno 1991). The State's energy
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division in the Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism was also 
interested in producing a 10-15 minute video documentary which would have cost $2000- 
$2500 (New Generations Productions 1991).
The public information repeatedly stated that the venting would not be a health hazard 
and that there would be a "minimum of disruption to the surrounding community" 
(County o f Hawaii 1991). When the venting actually occurred on March 25,1991 there 
was a significant amount o f disruption from the mud falling from the sky and the loud 
roar. Harry Kim was outside o f PGV's property that day recommending that nearby 
residents evacuate their children from the downwind direction o f the gases released from 
the well {Hawaii Tribune-Herald March 29,1991).
As was mentioned in chapter four, for many years the County and PGV were able to 
exercise a kind o f "plausible denial" about the necessity and availability of noise and air 
pollution abatement equipment. During the June 1991 blowout o f KS-8, and the 
subsequent consultants' reports, it became clear to some regulators and the public that 
PGV was cutting too many comers. The investment in appropriate abatement equipment 
became a political necessity because the new muffler and scrubber could be used during 
accidental blowouts as well as during planned well clean-outs.
The aftermath o f the June 1991 blowout was the biggest regulatory test, relating to 
geothermal, that the County has experienced to date. The decisions that lead to the 
approval for PGV to resume drilling activities in February o f 1992 provide the best 
example of how the County's role as geothermal promoter interfered with its regulatory 
responsibilities. The conflict, relating to when and how PGV could resume work on their 
damaged well, centered around the company’s financial needs, HELCO's power needs, 
and the public's need for a safe facility -  which was something that many believed was 
not possible given the history o f PGV and HGP-A.
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After the June blowout, the State and County hired consultants to review the causes and 
consequences o f the accident, and to make recommendations about how PGV could 
improve drilling operations. They were also asked to review monitoring procedures and 
related regulations. These reports prompted Harry Kim, as the County's Civil Defense 
Administrator, to rescind his approval o f PGVs Emergency Response Plan and 
recommend that the Mayor declare a "state o f emergency" for the County (Kim, July 25, 
1991). Harry knew this would help expedite efforts to control the underground venting 
of the well, but he also urged the Mayor to publicly declare that the blowout has affected 
the "health, welfare, and safety o f the community" and that the "independent studies have 
shown the existence o f a potentially dangerous condition at well KS-8" (Kim July 29,
1991).
The Civil Defense Agency was in charge o f responding to emergencies at PGV. Harry 
Kim was personally responsible for die oversight and approval o f PGVs emergency 
response plan. By his own admission, Kim has been one o f the few regulatory officials in 
Hawai'i who has not been interested in geothermal promotion (compared to government 
officials in Mayor's office and State Department o f Health). He has realized that 
promoting geothermal conflicts with the more important duty o f government to protect 
citizens (Keyser 1999). In 1982, he began his involvement with geothermal when his 
agency starting responding to emergencies at HGP-A and PGV's (Thermal Power) early 
exploratory wells. After those experiences, Harry became an advocate for effective 
regulatory oversight and protection o f the community from geothermal impacts -  but not 
because he was some sort of rogue civil servant activist. He simply stated that he was 
trying to do his job (Keyser 1999).
A State and County Task Force was convened in order to produce and implement a 
"Geothermal Management Plan." This document, issued in October 1991, was basically 
a compilation o f the recommendations from the blowout investigation. Harry Kim had 
problems with the Task Force because the State and County's objective of getting PGV 
back in business took priority over the health and welfare o f the people. Kim resigned
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from the group claiming that the focus o f discussion was on "how fast can we approve
this goddamn thing and how fast can we instruct them to go back on line" (Keyser 1999).
From his perspective, PGV was not competent enough to continue, the government was
paying to clean things up and the citizens were demonized for voicing legitimate
concerns. In a  1993 interview, Harry bluntly stated:
All Ormat [PGV] had to do was develop this industry. They had nothing 
else they had to do. They are the ones through their incompetence, their 
lack o f foresight, their lack o f expertise as frr as the commitment of the 
best available control technology . . . .  If you are using the best available 
there is nothing to improve. Now all o f a sudden we have a blowout and 
everybody within government, everybody within the industry say 'we 
should have done this.' Now how can you put any blame, any goddam 
blame to the people? That they caused the delay o f geothermal? That to 
me is mind boggling. To tell you the truth, if  I could vomit all over them 
[government and industry]. I'd vomit all over them, but it wouldn't do any 
damn good (Keyser 1999).
In the months following the June blowout. Mayor Inouye made public statements that 
geothermal would not proceed until the health, welfare and safety of the community is 
assured and that this included the relocation o f residents (Kim December 9,1991, 
Honolulu Advertiser July 6, 1991, Hawaii Tribune-Herald July 7,1991). In September, 
PGV claimed that their "profits have ultimately evaporated" but that was not fatal unless 
there were additional delays incurred in reinstating their permits in order to complete 
their first production well (Richard 1991).
Harry Kim did not receive a copy o f the revised Emergency Response Plan until mid- 
December. He informed the Mayor's office that there were some outstanding questions 
that were not addressed in the Plan but that the review process (which includes review 
and comments from consultants and state departments) had just begun. A revised Plan 
was submitted by PGV on February 7,1992 and Harry Kim set a date for finalizing his 
comments and conditions on February 29. On February 28, he submitted a memorandum 
to the Planning Director outlining five conditions that needed to be met in order to 
approve the Plan. Two of those conditions, related to evacuation scenarios, were required 
to be addressed before commencing further drilling (Kim February 28,1992).
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But the Mayor's office had been making other plans. In mid-January of 1992, Barry 
Mizuno circulated a memorandum to staff people within the Mayor's office. He was 
establishing a "standard operating procedure" for handling the media in anticipation of 
things getth^  "hectic." He proclaimed that "the State and County are in this together. 
Especially in the coming weeks, it will be important that we all stick together and avoid 
any type o f finger-pointing" (Mizuno 1992). He was anticipating even more uproar from 
residents and community groups than had already been heard with protests and pubic 
demands to revoke PGV's permit entirely. Many people in Puna were upset that 
community groups and residents were completely excluded from the regulatory review 
process. This exclusion was contrary to the consultants' recommendations and was 
clearly part o f the reason that the State and County needed to overhaul their regulations.
Months earlier, Barry Mizuno had become the central point o f communications between 
the various government interests involved with the future o f PGV. Mizuno sought the 
advice o f the County's Corporation Counsel about how to handle the concerns o f 
community groups and Puna residents relating to the County’s role in regulatory 
oversight o f PGV. Corporation Counsel, Michael Matsukawa, responded that the "main 
problem " was the following:
A. Citizens did not hire professionals to represent them. They naively felt 
government had to represent them. Government's role is to represent 
the entire range o f interests.
B. These people are naïve to think government represents them personally.
The constitution does not say that. To the contrary, government is 
only an insfrument of the people -  all people, including developers. 
Government balances the differing interests. Each interest must 
advocate their own positions. Government's role is to provide a forum.
The people here knew that but went along with the process established 
by the state. They cannot complain now (Matsukawa 1991).
The County did appear to respond to citizens who were hired by industry, such as the 
Hawaii Island Geothermal Alliance (HIGA). Bill and Patty Cook, who were public 
relations and advertising consultants for the True Geothermal/Campbell Estate venture,
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formed this industry front group. In 1990, after Puna community groups and Native 
Hawaiians staged a two-week sit-in at the State building in order to get a meeting with 
the Governor, Bill Cook organized his promotional efforts as a "grassroots coalition" on 
behalf o f the developers. The group was funded by PGV and held private "invitation 
only" meetings (Cook 1991). In addition to membership/guest participation by PGV 
officials, HIGA's meeting invitation lists regularly included the local representative from 
Senator Inouye’s office, State Senator Dick Matsuura, Councilmembers James Arakaki 
and Brian DeLima, Barry Mizuno from the Mayor's office and Jim Moulds, the County's 
geothermal compliance officer (Hawaii Island Geothermal Alliance 1992).
In anticipation o f lifting the drilling ban, the State and County jointly drafted an 
"Information Bulletin" entitled "D rillii^ Resumption at Puna Geothermal Venture" in 
January of 1992. This propaganda piece was chock full o f endorsements of PGV from 
Governor Waihee and Bruce Anderson o f the Department of Health. The Bulletin stated 
that further plans for relocating residents were being "worked on" and the Health 
Department had already formed a community "advisory committee." This was an 
overstatement because neither was given serious consideration by the State and County 
and consequently they were dropped.
In February, Hawai i's U.S. Senator, Daniel Inouye, weighed in with a plea for PGV in a 
letter to the Mayor urging her to quickly let geothermal help take care of the "difficulties 
and hardships of homes left in darkness" from lack o f reliable power at HELCO (Inouye
1992). Subsequently there was a meeting with PGV and the State and County agencies 
where Harry Kira informed everyone that his review o f the Emergency Response Plan 
was finalized and that there would be conditions imposed before final approval would be 
granted (Keyser 1999).
Days later, on the morning o f February 28, a press statement was released with the 
announcement by Governor Waihee and Mayor Inouye that PGV's drilling suspension 
was lifted. In a last-ditch effort to cover-up the Mayor's deception, it was quickly
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withdrawn when someone discovered that the final Civil Defense report had not yet been 
submitted. Later in the day, Harry Kim formally submitted his conditions on the 
Emergency Response Plan to the Planning Department, and subsequently the same press 
release and PGVs written notification were re-circulated. The Mayor and Planning 
Director, togetiier with the Governor and his cabinet, had conspired to lift the suspension 
prior to receiving the final review of the Emergency Response Plan because they never 
intended to include its recommendations. Mayor Inouye had planned and executed the 
removal o f the authority (granted by PGV's Geothermal Resource Permit) o f the Civil 
Defense Administrator.
Harry Kim was obviously not informed that this maneuver was planned (he found out
afterwards through the media) and furthermore he believed that the substance and process
of the Mayor's action violated Condition 26 PGV's Geothermal Resource Permit. Months
later, he informed the Mayor that he did not agree with her approval o f tiie Plan.
It is my firm belief that the present ERP (6.1) . . .  does not contain nor 
meet the elements required to deal with the emergency situation which 
may threaten the health, safety, and welfare o f people in the vicinity of the 
p ro jec t. .  .The responsibility and authority to review and approve the 
ERP was instructed to be that o f the civil defense administrator. The past 
mayor, managing director, planning director and planning commission 
members directed this (Kim April 6,1992).
In July o f 1992, the Mayor articulated her motivation and disclosed her ignorance o f the 
subject during a  speech at a  pro-geothermal rally in Hilo. "It's time we give geothermal a 
chance to succeed" she said, along with Governor Waihee and Lieutenant Governor Ben 
Cayetano (Environment Hawai'i 1992). This high-level political statement reinforced the 
industry's claims that it was a couple o f vocal pot-smoking hippies ^ o  were holding the 
whole thing up. It bolstered the view that what geothermal really needed was a bigger 
and brighter red carpet fî om the government.
Harry Kim wrote to the Mayor again in August o f 1992, after more accidents at KS-8 
occurred. He informed her o f permit violations and inadequacies in the Emergency
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Response Plan that jeopardized his agency's ability to respond to specific accident 
scenarios. "This agency cannot assure that timely alerting, warning and evacuation of 
residents can be executed unless all o f the concerns listed in the previous 
correspondences are addressed" he stated (Kim A i^ust 20,1992). His memos and 
requests for a meeting with the Mayor were ignored (Keyser 1999).
The Mayor did, however, have to meet with angry citizens after the accident in August of 
1992. Over 50 people marched into the Coimty building and demanded an audience with 
Mayor Inouye. These Puna residents, some o f whom were evacuated during the recent 
mishap, reminded Inouye that she promised them that another major incident at PGV 
would result in the plant's permanent shutdown. One o f PGV's neighbors scolded the 
Mayor by stating that "all these people here voted for you not as PGV's business 
mangier, if  we wanted a business manager, we would have voted for Yamashiro"
{Hawaii Tribune-Herald August 2 0 ,1992).
One month later, Steve Yamashiro defeated Lorraine Inouye in a close three-way 
mayoral race in the Democratic primaiy. Many Puna residents believe that Inouye’s 
disrespect for Harry Kim (who was well liked throughout the County) was the reason for 
her loss. She apparently lost by having to split the progressive vote with Russell 
Kokubun, who was a councilmember from Puna and former anti-geothermal activist (and 
strangely he later became the Deputy Planning Director in Yamasfairo's administration). 
After the primaiy election in September, Mayor Inouye's managing director, Barry 
Mizuno accepted a job with PGV as its financial manager. Nevertheless, he continued to 
work on geothermal related matters for the County until leaving the Mayor's office in 
December o f 1992.
Geothermal Regulator
The County's failure to adequately regulate geothermal activities has exacerbated the 
land-use conflict that their promotional activities created. Specific examples o f this
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failure include the permitting blunders of the HGP-A well and power plant, the lack o f 
adequate and enforceable noise regulations and the absence o f an effective relocation 
program in lieu of a buffer zone around geothermal development.
Pernutting HGP-A
The County began its geothermal regulatory career with a grand flop. While the state and 
federal government neglected to conduct initial environmental reviews of the HGP-A 
project, the County erred in allowing the drilling and flow testing o f a 6,000 foot 
geothermal well in an agricultural area (with residential subdivisions) without any 
permits. The County was aware o f the Project -  they even contributed $100,000 in 1973. 
Yet, there was no special use permit (which was required for unusual activities in the 
agricultural district) or any other County approval, not even a grading permit. The 
consequence of this illegal oversight was tremendous for the farm lots and three 
residential subdivisions surrounding tiie HGP-A-PGV site.
In 1975, geothermal development in Puna became an "acceptable" activity despite the 
fact that it conflicted with the existing land-uses. This occurred without any County 
land-use planning, environmental review or public comment. This was a blatant violation 
of the designated uses o f the agricultural district -  as defined in the State's land-use law 
(Hawaii Revised Statutes § 205-4.5 and § 205-2(d)).
After the well was drilled and flow-tested, the County was able to issue three special use 
permits for additional geothermal activity in the general vicinity o f HGP-A by claiming 
that geothermal was already an "established" land use. Also, two years after the well was 
completed, the County used the presence o f the HGP-A well to justify the issuance of a 
special use permit for the power p lan t The Planning Commission concluded that the 
"proposed use will not substantially alter or change the essential character o f the land and 
its present use" (Mielcke 1978). Even with the presence o f one well, this analysis is a 
stretch given the fact that the power facility was funded and advertised as the "key that
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unlocks the door to a whole world o f industrial possibilities for Puna (Hawaii Business 
1982). The Planning Commission refused to adequately consider two major issues (in 
addition to those discussed in Chapter 3) that were raised in public testimony: economic 
impacts and Hawaiian land rights and cultural desecration.
In 1978, the Planning Commission heard testimony from a resident who wanted to see his 
electric rates decrease if  geothermal was going to be developed. The Chairman o f the 
Commission, after reading many pages o f testimony and listening to hours o f background 
presentations from the Project's developers regarding the need for economic 
development, rebuffed this concern.* Chairman Mielcke stated that "the cost of 
electricity is not something that the Commission is really going to concern itself with" 
(Planning Commission 1978). Two months later, Mielcke reported that the Commission 
voted in favor of the permit and based its decision on the potential economic benefits for 
the State and County. The decision addressed the goal o f reducing the "cost o f energy to 
aid existing industries as well as possibly attract new endeavors.. . .  New industries, such 
as the mining and processing o f manganese nodules, will be attracted into the area in the 
event that large amounts of power become available" (Mielcke 1978).
A majority of public comment at the Planning Commission's April 27 hearing was from 
Native Hawaiians who testified that there would be serious impacts from the proposed 
project on Hawaiians. These impacts were not acknowledged or addressed in the 
Environmental Impact Statement. These cultural issues were similar to those raised 
during the drilling o f the exploratory well at Kilauea's summit in the National Park. The 
Hawaiians who testified requested that the permit be denied because they had aboriginal 
rights to natural resources such as geothermal heat, and furthermore, geothermal 
development infringed on their right to practice their traditional religion.
* The utility companies were slow to disclose the fact that regardless of the quantity of geothermal energy 
in the grid, consumers would continue to pay a premium price for electricity in Hawai'i. Federal law 
requires utilities to pay projects such as HGP-A and PGV the "avoided cost" (the same amount that the 
utility would spend to produce the power itself with its fossil fuel plants).
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The energy, which the project proposes to tap and sell is a physical 
manifestation o f that religion. Our kupuna, our elders, refer to that
energy as Pele, the legendary fire-goddess [Djrilling and
selling this energy, to us is nothing short o f sacrilegious, at least to 
those of us who still believe in the traditional Hawaiian religion.
We would no more sell Tutu Pele than your would sell your Jesus 
Christ, your Buddha, or whatever, spiritual power that you place 
your utmost faith and belief in. (Planning Commission 1978).
The Commission refused to acknowledge the connection between Native Hawaiian rights 
and cultural impacts and the decision to issue the Permit. The Chairman stated that "we 
are not in a position to make any kind o f ruling on aboriginal rights whatsoever. It's not 
in our jurisdiction" (Plannii^ Commission 1978).
The potential air emissions, noise pollution, and waste disposal were three main 
environmental issues that were not adequately resolved in the permitting process. The 
HGP-A Development Group assured the County that the air and noise impacts would be 
insignificant for two main reasons. 1. Although the flow tests will emit unabated noise 
and air pollution into the surrounding area, there were only a dozen families who lived 
within a mile of the well. 2. Once the turbine generator and scrubber were in place, the 
noise would be muffled, and the hydrogen sulfide would be scrubbed from the 
geothermal fluids, so that the impact on the surrounding properties will be "minimal" 
(Planning Department 1978).
In regards to the first issue, the County apparently believed that the health impacts would 
not be a problem unless there was a "critical mass" o f residents willing to make it a 
political problem. The County failed to ask the developers how many close residents it 
would take before the same level o f nuisances and health impacts would become more 
significant. In 1978, the closest resident to the HGP-A well was 2500 feet away, but 
nearby lots kept selling and buyers kept building their houses over the next several years. 
The house lots closest to HGP-A and PGV are on land that has full services (electricity, 
water and phone) and were also close to a paved County road. These one-acre lots were
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relatively inexpensive and therefore highly attractive compared to other land (most o f 
which was and still is without some or all public utilities) in lower Puna.
In regards to the second excuse, the County ignored the fact that unabated venting would 
occur during the numerous additional flow tests and during times vriien the turbine was 
not working. The County did not question the reliability o f an unknown resource on a 
power system that had yet to be designed. The facility was experimental. It was 
designed and maintained on a relatively low budget and most importantly, it was intended 
to operate for only a short time.
HGP-A was closed in 1989 because it became a politically necessity for everyone -  
including Governor Waihee, State representatives. County Council rejMesentatives, and 
the Planning Department The closing o f the power plant was done under the assumption 
that the direct-heat experiments at the Puna Research Facility would continue and the 
well would provide a steam resource to PGV. The original timing o f the plant closure 
was set to coincide vrith the completion o f PGV's power plant in order to give "primary 
consideration to a smooth transition between HELCO's power needs " (Planning 
Department 1989). The plant was able to be shutdown before the end of 1989 only 
because HELCO believed that they would have sufficient power from a new oil-fired 
plant in Kona.
As far as the community was concerned, this regulatory action was "too little and too 
late." In the end, regulators were quick to attribute the plant's closure to the recurring 
incidents involving the venting o f noxious levels ofHzS into the community. But these 
incidents had occurred since the well was drilled in 1976. The Planning Director finally 
admitted that the HGP-A facility had been in violation o f their permit for many years 
because the requirement to minimize impacts to the surrounding community had "not 
been consistently applied " (Planning Department 1989). Nevertheless, the State and 
County made it clear that the polluting facility had become a public relations liability for 
future geothermal development (i.e. the permits pending at the time for PGV and the
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University’s Scientific Observation Hole project) {Hawaii Tribune-Herald October 24, 
October 27, December 12, December 26,1989).
In 1993, when Steve Yamashiro was the Hawaii County Mayor, his office began 
negotiations for the acquisition o f the HGP-A well in order for the County to sell steam 
energy to PGV (Yamashiro 1993). The Mayor's interest continued after the 1993 
superfund report by the EPA that documented contaminants at the site, a 1994 report 
from the State's consultant that described the well as unsafe for use and also after a 
temporary plug was installed in the well tirnt was to remain intact until the well was 
abandoned or converted to a monitoring well (Kihune 1995 and Department o f Land and 
Natural Resources 1994). The well was plugged in 1999, but up until late 1998, NELH 
was informed that "Mayor Yamashiro is still interested in the HGP-A site only if  the 
permits can be transferred/assigned to the County " (Unoki 1998).
As o f2001, tiie County has not required the HGP-A site including the closed power 
plant, plugged well, former brine ponds, and abandoned buildings to be cleared, 
dismantled and removed (as required by the Special Use Permit). During the eight years 
of the Yamashiro administration, it is evident that NELHA was not required to do this 
because the Maym* wanted the County to assume financial responsibility and liability for 
the remains o f the Hawaii Geothermal Project
Coniempiibie Relocation Efforts
In the early years o f HGP-A, there were only a handful o f homes within two miles of the 
facility. Even Jack Keppeler, (former managing director), acknowledged that there was 
an air quality problem and criticized the HGP-A developers for chiding the community. 
He advocated for permanent relocation for the "handful o f homes" that were in the area in 
1982 {Honolulu Advertiser July 7,1982). By 1989, there were over 60 owner-occupied 
houses and many more owners o f vacant lots within a 3500-foot radius of PGV's project
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boundaries (Moulds 1992). Realtors continued to sell nearby lots without adequate 
disclosure o f potential hazards and nuisances until the blowout and lawsuits filed by 
unhappy new homeowners in the early 1990's forced them to do otherwise. Some retirees 
moved into the area from the mainland with a vague concept that geothermal was "good" 
(Dettweiler 2000).
The County set an example o f how geothermal would be regulated during the years o f
HGP-A and PGV's early development. HGP-A was not cited for any violations or
penalized for causing health and nuisance problems to nearby residents. The community
was told that HGP-A could not be closed down because HELCO depended on its two
megawatts. During one o f the Planning Commission hearings for the approval of PGV's
County permit, a resident who lived close to HGP-A urged the permit to be denied based
on personal experience.
What can we expect to happen when Ormat, which will be producing 10 
times diat amount o f power, experiences problems? We believe that the 
County will be so dependent on the power generated that they will be 
unable to shut it down no matter what die cost to the community and the 
environment (Planning Commission September 19, 1989).
During mediation sessions over PGV’s original pennit, community representatives 
submitted a proposal for a buffer zone and relocation program as a major "community 
compromise." An acceptable buffer zone would include an area that would be subjected 
to nuisance and health hazard levels o f pollutants as well as a  5 dBA increase in noise 
over background levels (Perry 1989). This and other testimony persuaded the 
Commission's chairman, Gary Mizuno, during numerous hearings on the permit. The 
Chairman warned the applicant, that he would vote against the permit until certain 
regulatory issues were resolved. These included: relocation o f residents, promulgation o f 
noise and air standards, and a review o f Rule 12 (relating to Geothermal Resource 
Permits) with regards to reinstating contested case hearings (Planning Commission 
August 28,1989).
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Other commissioners were influenced by HELCO's demands for additional power 
generation and the State's demand that PGV's permit be issued in order to keep 
geothermal alive in Hawai'i. But, according to Section 6 of Rule 12, the Commission 
must find that PGV has demonstrated that there are reasonable measures available to 
mitigate unreasonable impacts in the community. The Chairman insisted that PGV and 
the State develop an additional condition that would address the need o f some households 
to move out o f the area either permanently or temporarily during well venting and other 
disruptive events.
Four days before the final Planning Commission hearing, PGV wrote to the Governor
asking for help and complaining about the Chairman's demands. PGV was refusing to
pay to relocate residents who live within 3500 feet o f the facility:
It is hard to believe that the logistics o f mitigating remedies for a few 
families can jeopardize not only the PGV project, but the entire 
geothermal industry in Hawai'i. Governor Waihee, I urge your to advise 
us on what action we can take to end fliis agonizing process and bring 
forth mutually beneficial results for the community, the State, and PGV 
(Ram 1989).
PGV was really asking the Governor to stop stalling and contribute State money to a 
relocation and compensation fund, called the "Geothermal Asset Fund." PGV believed 
they could secure enough votes on the Commission if  enough the State pledged some 
money for creation o f the Asset Fund. The Commission's decision had become centered 
around how much money the State and PGV could reliably deposit into a Fund fliat 
would be administered by the County. One day before the final hearing, (which took 
place m Kona, 100 miles away from lower Puna) PGV submitted their own draft 
language of the asset fund condition to the Planning Department and Planning 
Commission (Richard 1989). The Planning Department made a few changes and 
submitted it to the Commission the following day. The condition required PGV to 
contribute $50,000 per year, and the State to contribute revenues from the sale o f HGP- 
A's steam to PGV.
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There were 49 conditions agreed upon during mediation, but the terms of a relocation 
program was not one o f them. The Asset Fund condition, was introduced at the final 
hearing. No copies o f the proposed condition were available to the public and public 
testimony was not allowed on the proposed new condition. The financial commitment o f 
the State was ambiguous because the use of HGP-A at the PGV's future power plant was 
not assured (in fact it was never seriously pursued after the closure o f the power plant in 
late 1989). The creation o f rules and management o f the fund were not clear in the final 
language. Consequently, the Chairman and two other Commissioners voted against the 
perm it This Asset Fund condition contained two important requirements that the County 
found necessary to violate within a few months o f the permit issuance. The condition 
required the Asset Fund to be established prior to any construction of the facility and it 
also required that the County create rules for distribution o f money for temporary or 
permanent relocation. This rulemaking process was to include the participation of Puna 
residents.
Because the County did not adhere to either one o f these mandates, there were two 
lawsuits related to the Asset Fund, brought by citizens against the County. One 
challenged the commencement o f PGV's development activities without the ability for 
residents to access the Fund. The other was a suit against the County and the Mayor for 
refusing to allocate the designated $10,000 from the Fund (which PGV had contributed) 
to pay for the community to participate in the Asset Fund rulemaking. Despite the lack 
of funds, the community formed their own committee and drafted rules for the Planning 
Commission to consider. In 1994, five years after the permit had been issued, the 
Commission finally passed Rule 14, relating to the Geotiiermal Asset Fund. But the rules 
contained little o f what the community's Geothermal Asset Fund Rules Committee had 
spent over six months developing. During the final public hearing on the proposed rule, 
the Planning Department submitted a new draft (without consulting the Committee) to the 
Planning Commission. The Commission approved the revised draft, and again there was 
no opportunity for the affected residents or general public to review or comment on this 
last-minute switch by the Planning Department and the Office o f Corporation Counsel.
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The final version of the Rules stipulated that a Professional Claims Adjuster would be 
hired to review all claims for the release o f Asset Fund monies. The Adjuster would 
make a recommendation to the Planning Commission for review and approval. The 
community's draft specified that claims for compensation and a Geothermal Asset Fund 
Panel, comprised o f the seven residents from Puna and the Planning Director should 
review relocation. Also, Condition 51 explicitly states that the Asset Fund was intended 
to be used for temporary and  permanent relocation, but the final rules omitted any 
provision for permanent relocation. Before the rules were written, there were already 21 
claims filed for relocation and compensation for damages incurred by PGV on nearby 
residents from as early as 1990. The total amount of money requested was over $5 
million. As o f2001, the Planning Commission had rejected all claims except one for 
$1,800. As o f2001, the balance on the Fund is over $1 million.
In 2000, when PGV applied for a permit modification to increase power production, they 
insisted that contributions to the Fund should be capped at $1 million since no one had 
been using i t  The Planning Director, under Mayor Yamashiro, agreed with PGV and 
recommended that the Commission amend Condition 51 accordingly. The Asset Fund 
rules, and the (appointed) Planning Commission members who refused to disperse funds 
were both a product o f the Yamashiro administration.
Fortunately, before the permit amendment could be finalized by the Commission, the 
former Civil Defense Administrator, Harry Kim took office as tiie new Hawai'i County 
Mayor. His new Planning Director submitted a  revised recommendation to the 
Committee that did not support PGV's proposal to put a limit on the Fund.
Part of tiie problem with Asset Fund and its rules was the State and County's fear that this 
type o f impact mitigation would set a  bad precedent for other communities around the 
State that are situated in a land-use conflict with a development project. The other major 
problem was that the Fund was not sufficient to cover the costs of permanent relocation
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of affected residents. Ultimately, the Asset Fund failed because it was not designed to 
work from the beginning. It was designed to satisfy the concerns o f enough Planning 
Commission members to secure a favorable vote on PGVs original permit.
A different relocation effort by the County began after the death o f one of PGVs nearest 
neighbors. Bud Brees had tried unsuccessfully for years to get relocated away from PGV 
because geothermal fumes were exacerbating his poor health. He and his wife had 
applied and been rejected for relocation assistance from the Asset fund. The Planning 
Director, refused to use the Fund to help Brees, claiming that it was "never inteded to 
deal witii permanent relocation" (Goldstein June 24,1993). In 1993, two years before the 
Asset Fund rules were passed, Brees met with Mayor Yamashiro and wrote additional 
letters pleading for relief from the noise and air pollution impacts. He informed 
Yamashiro that no one would rent or buy their house, which was 1,500 feet from PGV.
He received a response from the Planning Department in a three-sentence letter. The 
County was "not able to assist with relocation at this time" (Goldstein August 31, 1993).
One night, in July o f 1994, Brees was unable to sleep due to loud noises from PGV. The 
following morning, this quiet bom-again Christian senior citizen, who had never spoken 
publicly against geothermal, protested by sitting in the Mayor's office and blasting loud 
music. He refused to let his wife post bail after his arrest because he preferred jail to 
returning home to the noise and HjS. The Mayor did not issue a statement, but PGV 
reported to the newspaper that there was "nothing unusual going on" at the facility and 
there had been no permit violations for noise or H2 S emissions during the previous three 
months {Hawaii Tribum-Herald July 14, 1994). Bud Brees died on September 29,1994 
-  a month before his frial for civil disobedience. His death came during a period when 
his neighboriiood had been experiencing a number o f bad days of HjS fumes. "All we 
wanted was a fair shake," said Brees' wife.
In 1995, die Geothermal Relocation Program was established by the County Council, but 
managed by the Planning Department (instead o f the Planning Commission). The
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program was funded with the County's share (30%) o f royalties from PGVs mining lease. 
This amounts to over $180,000 per year. The Program was intended to facilitate the 
relocation o f owner-occupied households by allowing the County to purchase the home 
from the affected resident and then re-seU it to someone else. The Royalty Fund would 
cover the County's any losses when the property was re-sold. Although this Program has 
allowed a couple o f residents to move away, it is seriously flawed for the following 
reasons:
1. The negotiated purchase price that the County must pay to the affected resident cannot 
exceed 130% of the assessed value, as determined by the County's Department o f 
Finance (Planning Department Rule 10)-4 (3)). The assessed values are notoriously 
lower than market value, especially in Puna where public services are limited. 
Residents are not able to purchase an equivalent property elsewhere with the limited 
amount o f money that the appraiser can authorize.
2. The re-selling of properties (at below-market prices) affected by air and noise pollution 
is contrary to the buffer zone concept. The County is enticing low-income families 
(many of whom are Native Hawaiian) to purchase houses on property that is exposed 
to noise and toxic air pollution. The County argues that people who claim that they 
are not affected by the fumes or the noise should have a chance to buy a cheaper home. 
This rationalization ignores the fact that infants, children and elderly members of 
families (who do not get to choose x̂ diiere they live) are more sensitive and vulnerable 
to environmental pollutants.
3. The Program's rules only allow residents who purchased or received building permits 
before October 1989 to qualify for the program (Planning Department Rule 10-3 (b)). 
The County Council intended for all residents who built after 1975 to be able to 
qualify for this Program (Hawaii County Council 1995).
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Back in 1989, during the County permitting process, PGV offered to buy-out one o f the 
close households along Pohoiki road. This family had endured many years o f health 
problems and emotional stress from the HGP-A facility and was very concerned about 
PGVs larger project. Nevertheless, the family declined the offer from PGV unless it was 
also offered to all o f their neighbors, which PGV refused to do (Jones 2000). Other 
families have refused to participate in a government program that encourages people to 
move next to PGV. This moral dilemma and loyalty o f residents towards the communia 
and their own property are other reasons that some o f the more vocal nearby residents 
have not been relocated yet.
As o f2001, the County has still not instituted a fair and equitable buy-out program for 
nearby residents and property owners. There is also no downzoning that would prohibit 
further residential development in the area. Like the Mayor's action to rescind the 
drilling ban in 1992, the impacted community believes that both the process and 
substance o f all relocation attempts have been offensive and ineffective.
The current focus o f advocacy for impact mitigation on the part o f some community 
groups and nearby residents, is to revive (from the 1989 mediation sessions) the concept 
of a vegetative buffer zone inside o f PGVs boundary. PGV sits on a 500-acre lot, but 
only about 25 acres are used for geothermal. The remaining land could be planted with 
fast-growing (and non-invasive) trees that would eventually serve as a substantial barrier 
to noise, HaS and light pollution. PGV, and the Lyman family (who owns the land) have 
so far refused this proposal. Instead, PGV is preparing to add new turbines to their 
facility in order to eventually double their power production -  an expansion that will 
likely increase noise pollution in the surrounding community.
Noise and More Noise
The regulation of noise pollution from geothermal operations began exclusively as a 
County endeavor through the land-use permitting process. Somewhat reluctantly, the
124
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
State Department o f Health also became involved soon after PGVs permits were issued. 
Nevertheless, County remained primarily responsible for this irritating public nuisance 
that persists in the community surrounding PGV.
In the 1970's, when the HGP-A well was drilled and the power plant was permitted and
designed, there were no general ambient noise standards or guidelines on the Big Island.
There were also no permits for the well-drilling or testing that might have required a
sound muffler. The Puna community, adjacent to the geothermal development, was
characterized as a very quiet rural residential area where the typical nighttime ambient
noise level outdoors was between 30-35 dBA (Planning Department 1981). The weU
drilling, venting and flow-tests that occurred before 1980 caused a significant amount o f
noise disturbances in the community. One Leilani Estate's resident testified about noise
polllution fi-om geothermal at a  U.S. Senate hearii^ on alternative energy development.
We were not prepared for the continuous drilling, round-the-clock hissing, 
and clanging of machinery that replaced fiie soothing hum of crickets and 
chirping o f birds which were nature's heait-beat. We tolerated this 
intrusion with the understanding that this could not last much longer. Oh,
what naïve fools we were we were blasted by the most bloodcurdling
banshee howl fi’om the well being opened. It sounded like a gigantic jet 
had been parked behind our homes with the throttle fiill on (U.S.
Congress, Senate 1978).
The HGP-A developers tried to assure the public that once the power plant was 
operational, the noise level would decrease. The "design requirement " for the power 
plant was 65 decibels at one-half mile fi-om the facility, but this level was planned to be 
further suppressed with special mufflers and a special control device that would abate the 
high-pitched noise fi-om the steam flow valves (Lopez 1980). In 1980, the Hawaii 
Geothermal Project published an environmental review o f the potential noise issues at 
HGP-A. The report described tentative conclusions about the expected levels of 
"annoyance" in the community fi-om three types o f normal operating procedures as well 
as from accidental venting directly into the air. Noise impacts could be expected to 
include the following:
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1. During normal operations, the plant would produce 74 to 84 dBA at 50 fee t Residents 
in areas proximate to HGP-A would be expected to be annoyed. During clear windless 
nights (vdiich occurs often in winter montiis) the range o f audibility for normal 
operations would likely to be about 10,000 feet in all directions. In the range o f4000 
to 5000 feet, 10% o f the residents were expected to be "highly annoyed" (i.e., 
sufficiently annoyed to complain vigorously, threaten legal action, or institute legal 
action). This percentage increased for residences closer to the plant.
2. In the case o f accidental venting, die noise level would be 125 dBA at 50 feet and it 
could be audible for over seven miles. The range at which 10% of the residents could 
be expected to be "highly annoyed" was three to five miles (Burgess 1980)..
The report acknowledged the fact that Hawaii County had the statutory authority to 
develop and enforce noise regulations. Consequently, the author o f the paper 
recommended that:
In the event that the HGP-A proves, as expected, the commercial viability o f 
the Kapoho Geothermal Field, both residents and developers would be 
protected from the effects o f excessive noise if  Hawaii County places 
appropriate noise regulations in effect prior to initiation o f design efforts 
(Burgess 1980).
The County did not create a noise ordinance, nor did it impose noise limits on HGP-A.
As mentioned in Chapter three, the voluntary noise reduction plans at HGP-A did not 
work as well as expected. Also, by 1981, two other geothermal projects, Barnwell and 
Thermal Power (PGV) had been permitted for the same general area in the 
Pohoiki/Kapoho area. These additional drilling activities, in addition to HGP-A's flow 
testing, caused an increase in noise complaints from the community and prompted the 
Planning Department to propose geothermal noise "guidelines" (Fuke 1981).
The County attempted to accommodate the geothermal industry and also set a level that 
"reasonably assured" that the federal standards for indoor noise levels o f 40 to 45 dBA 
during the day and 32 to 35 dBA at night, were met. The federal nighttime standard was
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set to provide acceptable sleeping conditions. The County recognized that the differential 
between outdoor and indoor noise levels o f local residences in Hawai i (single-wall 
construction, no insulation, and open windows at night are very common in rural areas) 
can be as low as 4 dBA. Nevertheless, the "guidelines ' for geothermal activities were set 
at 55 dBA during daytime and 45 dBA during nighttime (Planning Department 1981). 
These levels did not insure that federal guidelines were achieved and they allowed for the 
elimination o f the quiet environment that previously existed. The maximum noise levels 
were to be measured (outdoors) at the "affected residential receptors" because o f the 
relatively long distance between residents and the noise source. They were also intended 
to compensate for noise emissions that are affected by atmospheric conditions and 
acoustic phenomena.
The problem with using "existing" residences is obvious -  at what point in time is this 
established, and how does the developer and/or County regulators effectively measure the 
contribution o f geothermal noise to overall levels at any given "residential receptor"?
But, the major problem with the guidelines was that they were only guidelines. Instead 
o f establishing a noise standard, the planning director issued the guidelines in order to 
review noise impacts from each geothermal project on a case-by-case basis (Planning 
Department 1981). The enforcement was discretionary and non-binding because the 
early geothermal permits did not contain specific noise limitations.
HGP-A developers had declared that they had a self-imposed noise "limit" o f 65 dBA 
(day and night) at the project boundary (HGP-A Development Group 1982). The County 
did not require the Project to further limit noise pollution despite the inconsistency with 
limits in the noise guidelines. Consequently, the Planning Department was unable to 
issue any citations for violating this "voluntary" limit.
On September 18,1984, a  staffperson from the State Department of Land and Natural 
Resources (DLNR) observed a  scheduled venting episode at HGP-A and recorded the 
noise level at 90 dBA, at the property boundary. Noise readings at different locations in
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the community were between 37 and 77 dBA, depending on the distance and location 
relative to wind direction (Kubacki 1984), Around the same time, DLNR was 
establishing Geothermal Resource Subzones. The Environmental Impact Analysis 
prepared for this process stated that the subzones would be compatible with existing land 
uses if  the "County o f  Hawaii Noise Guidelines o f 45 decibels at night and 55 decibels by 
day will be complied with" (Department o f Land and Natural Resources 1994). Despite 
this conclusion, the area around HPG-A became part o f the Subzone.
Although the County was not regulating noise pollution at HGP-A, PGV was required to 
conform to the geothermal noise guidelines. In 1983, the special use permit for Thermal 
Power/PGV's exploratoiy drilling was amended to add numerous conditions that included 
the 45/55-night/day noise r e a c t io n  (Planning Department 1986), Then in 1989, noise 
pollution was a major issue during the permitting o f PGVs power plant. Initially, PGVs 
revised (application included noise level estimates that did not comply with the County's 
guidelines during well drilling. In May o f 1989, PGV wrote to nearby residents to assure 
them that "noise levels from the power plant can be controlled to meet the County 
geothermal guidelines o f 45 dBA for residential areas during the nighttime," but 
neglected to mention noise from drilling activities (Richard May 9,1989). During the 
subsequent mediation sessions with the County and residents, PGV was confronted with 
the potential for excessive drilling noise. In August of 1989, PGV submitted a revised 
noise analysis that claimed that previous community noise estimates were inaccurate and 
"more current information" showed that they "now predict that drilling operations at all 
the proposed well sites will be able to meet a 55 dBA daytime limit at the nearest 
residences" (Richard August 7,1989).
PGVs permit was (qyproved in 1989 with noise pollution limitations similar to the 
County's guidelines with the following exceptions:
1. New noise regulations established by the State or County would supersede the permit 
condition.
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2. Open venting, well drilling and testing jfrom the two well pads closest to residents, 
were waived from the 45/55 dBA night/day limit. PGV claimed they could not meet 
the nighttime limit of 45 dBA at those well pads. The Planning Commission allowed 
the nighttime noise levels from drilling at these well pads to be 50 dBA at the nearest 
residence, and no limit was placed on noise levels during open venting.
The permit was consistent with the guidelines as far as setting the allowable limits at 
"residential receptors" rather than PGVs boundary, which is \^4iere HzS emissions are 
regulated in the ambient air. Unfortunately, neither the permit nor the Planning Director 
(who approved PGVs Noise Monitoring Program) required PGV to establish noise 
monitors at the closest affected residences. Noise monitoring in the community was done 
for short periods on complaint-only basis. A PGV staff person would bring a portable 
noise monitor to someone's house some time after a noise complaint was made.
The permit also required PGV to use the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) to 
control noise emissions. The Planning Director was responsible for determining the 
technology and other mitigating devices that were necessary to comply with this 
requirement. Community groups urged the County to make the BACT determination 
based on a consultation with a noise specialist other than the one PGV had previously 
used. They recommended an independent consultant who was familiar with geothermal 
power projects. The Planning Director refused this request and determined that PGVs 
noise program complied with BACT because o f PGVs assurances that their noise would 
not exceed the permit limits. Consequently, no independent noise analysis was 
conducted.
DOH became involved with noise regulation within six months of the issuance of PGVs 
permit. In 1990, DOH reviewed PGVs Noise Monitoring Program and concluded Üiat 
the 45/55 dBA night/day limit was excessive.
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The specified allowable noise levels are well above the lower background 
noise level o f 32 dBA, and in order to minimize such impacts, noise limits 
should be developed which will be sensitive toward the low environmental 
ambient conditions (Anamizu 1990).
Although the County did not amend PGVs permit to lower the noise limits, DOH 
subsequently created their own, more restrictive noise standards. They were referred to 
as "allowable noise levels" for PGV and they included slightly different limits for 
different types of operations. Noise from drilling, well testing, and construction 
operations were not to exceed 45/55 dBA night/day, except at well pad E where it was 
increased to 47/55 dBA night/day. Noise from the power plant and steam field 
operations were limited to 44/53 dBA night/day. The allowable noise levels applied to 
any point along the project's boundary, except for noise from drilling at well pad E, 
which was measured at the nearest residence. These limits were completely waived in 
the event o f an "emergency" which included all accidents (Department of Health 1991). 
DOH's Noise and Radiation Branch was allocated responsibility for noise investigations, 
enforcement procedures and monitoring.
After the June 1991 blowout, the consultants hired to analyze State and County 
regulations and PGVs environmental monitoring reported problems with the noise- 
monitoring program. The Air and Noise Program Review, conducted by Robert 
Reynolds, recommended that the State or County install a fixed noise monitor with 
modem access in the community m order for data to be accessed by residents. Reynolds 
pointed out the BACT was not being applied to noise control and suggested that the 
County seek the advice from an independent noise consultant. Hie BACT requirement 
was the only way to address the fact that some sounds are more irritating than others are. 
The report clarified the concept o f what constitutes "noise" by stating that the quality of 
the noise is not reflected in sound levels measured m dBA. Reynolds also found that the 
noise standards were "deceitful" because the State and the County standards allow for the 
limit to be exceeded (by 10 dBA or more) for ten percent of the time in 20 minute 
intervals (Reynolds 1991).
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The post-blowout findings and recommendations listed above were not fully addressed in 
the Geothermal Management Plan developed by the State and County. Once again, the 
County did noüiing, but DOH did commence a noise monitoring protocol (using State 
money that was allocated to improve both noise and H2 S monitoring after the blowout). 
Also, DOH's noise standards were incorporated as a "Noise Addendum" into an amended 
Plan o f Operations pursuant to PGVs geothermal mining lease and drilling permits under 
the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) (Tagomori 1991).
In March o f 1992, PGV experienced another well-venting accident during the drilling of 
KS-8. This "steam kick," which occurred at 2:00 am, awakened residents with a loud 
blasting sound that was recorded at 92 dBA in the community. Although there was a 
large plume generated from the well, H2 S was not detected and the incident did not last 
long enough for the County (the State waived the noise limits during accidents) to cite 
PGV for a noise violation (Levin 1992).
A year later, in December of 1992, DOH was getting a dozen noise complaint calls per 
day fiom residents who were disturbed by PGVs 24-hour drilling racket. Bruce 
Anderson, the Deputy Director at DOH responded initially by indicating that they would 
impose more stringent noise control requirements on PGV (Hawaii Tribune-Herald 
December 13,1992). This did not happen, and consequently there was a significant and 
consistent increase in background noise levels even after the drilling ended and the start­
up o f the power plant began in April o f 1993 (Goldstein 1993).
Also in April o f  1993, DOH decided to rescind their noise control standards, and abandon 
all monitoring and enforcement of noise control at the facility (except during drilling 
activities). At the end o f the State's fiscal year, the Noise and Radiation Branch at DOH 
stopped accepting noise complaint calls and halted all routine and periodic noise 
monitoring (Ikeda 1993). Bruce Anderson requested that DLNR amend the Allowable 
Noise Levels in PGVs Plan o f  Operations. He wanted to delete the 44/53 dBA night/day
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limits because these levels were "inadvertently" inconsistent with the County's noise
limits for PGV. Anderson claimed.
Approval and implementation of the above request would clarify current 
confusion about who needs to monitor and enforce noise and air emissions 
from the PGV power plant, and would clear the way for the County o f 
Hawaii to enforce special condition #24 o f their Geothermal Resource 
Permit (Anderson August 10,1993).
Bruce Anderson then informed the County that the State was out of the noise control 
business at PGV. He stated that, "due to the lack o f enforcement authority, die Noise
Addendum was not established as a regulatory measure p]t appears that the only
existing enforceable document is the Geothermal Resource Permit" (Anderson August 
13,1993).
The County had never been actively involved with monitoring and enforcement o f noise 
from PGV and apparently, the State was only trying to appear tough with regulation of 
noise pollution after the blowout. Within a year after the drilling ban was lifted in 1992, 
DOH and DLNR eliminated the State’s more protective noise standards. DOH claimed 
that the standard was accidental and denied diat they had any enforcement authority over 
noise control to begin with. In a revealing letter to the County Planning Department,
Jack Lewin, the Director o f DOH, apologized for dumping their noise program by stating 
that "we realize that this places the County in tiie unenviable position of dealing with 
citizen complaints and demands for enforcing County permit conditions" (Lewin 1993).
For the following three years, the County Civil Defense Agency and Planning 
Department received "numerous" noise complaints from residents near PGV (Goldstein 
1997, Kim 1997). Residents Wio called the County agencies were told to call PGV to 
complain (Kim 1997). According to their own data, PGV often exceeded the nighttime 
noise limits (45 dBA) and occasionally exceeded the daytime limits (55 dBA). Each high 
recording was noted with an excuse. The excessive noise was always attributed to 
crickets, rain, traffic, or some source other than PGV. In order for PGV to be found in 
violation of any noise standards, during normal operating conditions, the facility would
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have to self-report a noise exceedance and admit that they caused the violation. There 
was no other regular noise monitoring that could document noise problems (Toma 2001).
In 1996, PGV was exempted from any possible noise violations when DOH promulgated 
Community Noise Conbol rules for the State (Hawaii Administrative Rules 11-46).
These rules, which allowed PGV to pollute the community with up to 70 dBA of noise 
day and night, superseded the much lower noise limits in PGVs County permit^. The 
State rule o f 70 dBA (which is similar to the sound of heavy freeway traffic) was applied 
to all facilities and other noise sources in the agricultural and industrial land-use districts. 
DOH claimed that industries in the agricultural district needed the "maximum permissible 
sound levels" and that any incompatible land uses, such as the PGV facility adjacent to 
rural subdivisions, "should be addressed by the counties" (Hanmo 1996).
Nevertheless, the "allowable noise levels" listed above, that DLNR adopted in 1991, 
should still be in effect for drilling and construction activities. DOH and DLNR have 
continued to accept responsibility for noise monitoring and enforcement during drilling 
activities. The noise levels established for those activities were not deleted from PGVs 
Plan of Operation pursuant to the Geothermal Management Plan and there is no 
stipulation that they could be superseded by less restrictive State noise standard.
The County did nothing in response to the State's new noise standard and corresponding 
increase in PGVs allowable noise emissions — except rejoice at the prospect of referring 
noise complaints back to the Department o f  Health, since the State now had "official" 
enforcement authority over noise pollution at PGV. In light o f the circumstances, the 
Planning Department could have asked the Planning Commission to review and amend 
PGVs permit to reinstate the original noise limits. The County could have also 
established its own noise standards ^]propriate to the rural character o f the island. 
Nothing was done, and consequently, the concept of utilizing BACT to further limit noise
 ̂There was a stipulation in PGVs Geothermal Resource Permit, which stated that the permitted limits were 
only valid until the State or County promulgated noise standards.
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emissions was meanin^ess. A noise violation under the State's regulations could only 
result when levels exceeded 70 dBA for more than ten percent of the time within twenty- 
minute periods. Fortunately for tiie community, PGVs emergency response Plan at least 
required an evacuation o f residents if  noise levels reached 85 dBA — which is the level of 
possible hearing damage.
In 1998, Big Island State Senator, Andy Levin, introduced legislation (SB 2056) that 
would require PGV to comply with the State's noise standards (45/55 dBA night/day) that 
are permissible in the residential, conservation and preservation-zoned lands. Hawaii 
County opposed the bill and DOH deferred to PGV and stated that the facility might not 
be able to comply. The State Senate passed the measure, but the House of 
Representatives completely deleted the substance of the measure and inserted the contents 
of another bill (that had been killed in the Senate) that would exempt all small 
construction projects in the State from noise permit requirements (State House o f 
Representatives 1998).
In 2000, PGV applied for an amendment to their County permit in order to expand power 
production from 30 to 60 megawatts. Neither PGV or the Planning Department, under the 
Yamashiro administration, recommended any changes to the 70 dBA limit -  yet they 
maintained that the unreasonable noise impacts from their additional turbines and future 
drilling activity would still somehow be mitigated per the requirements of the Planning 
Commission's Rule 12 (Planning Department October 16,2000). As mentioned above, 
Hany Kim became Mayor before the permit was approved. His new Planning Director, 
Chris Yuen, submitted a revised recommendation to the Commission. This proposal 
included a complicated set o f allowable noise level limits. They were roughly based on 
what the noise level at tiie facility had been for the previous few years (around 55 dBA on 
a 24-hour average). They were not based on Wiat was an acceptable living condition for 
the residents. The recommendation also eliminated the essence of the BACT requirement 
by forgoing the opportunity to require improved technology (every five years) that would
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reduce noise levels to below 45/55 dBA night/day (Planning Department January 12, 
2001).
The Planning Commission was not com fort^le with limiting PGV's noise emissions at 
all. In a  unanimous decision, they voted to accept noise level limits that PGV counter­
proposed. These new noise limits for PGV, which do not take effect until six months after 
the installation of new generating equipment, limit the average for any month to 54 dBA, 
for any day to 57 dBA, for any hour to 62 dBA, for any five-minute period to 68 dBA. 
These levels can be exceeded by 3 dBA for certain time periods. Drilling activities are 
completely exempt from these limits (Giffin 2001). It is not clear what will h^jpen with 
the noise regulation if  PGV decides to delay or cancel their plans to expand. As of mid- 
2001, PGV had not finalized plans for power expansion or commenced negotiations with 
HELCO for an amendment to their power purchase agreement.
To summarize the issue o f noise pollution limits at PGV:
1. In 1981, the Planning Department created Geothermal Noise Level Guidelines that 
established an "acceptable noise level" of 55 dBA during the day and 45 dBA at night. 
Due to the warm climate, this nighttime limit was not low enough to meet federal 
guidelines for acceptable noise during sleep.
2. In 1989, PGV's amended application for a County permit included strong assurances to 
the Department, the Commission and the community that this noise limitation could 
and would be achieved.
3. PGV was not able to comply with the nighttime noise limit but never requested an 
amendment to their permit to accommodate this problem. BACT and other noise 
mitigating measures were not fully analyzed or implemented and the County issued no 
violation citations or orders for corrective action.
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4. In 1996, DOH eliminated the noise limits in PGV’s County permit by promulgating 
very lenient statewide standards without reinstating their former "allowable noise 
levels" for PGV.
5. In 2001, the County decided that levels much higher than 45/55 dBA night/day were 
acceptable, despite years o f noise complaints, from residents, to the County, the State 
and PGV.
Hawaii County has welcomed the promises that geothermal will bring economic 
development and energy independence. But it has rejected the responsibilities that that 
geothermal requires. Fortunately, both the State and County have almost completely 
abandoned their promotional activities on behalf of geothermal development. 
Unfortunately, a legacy o f regulatory failure will continue unless serious legislative and 
administrative reforms are enacted.
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CHAPTER 7 
Proposals for Regulatory Reform
Geothermal development has a 25-year history in Hawai i. Many legislators and other 
government officials would like to believe that the problems with this industry are all in 
the past. They would like to believe that the developers and regulators are adequately 
protecting the health and safety of the community. But support for geothermal as a clean, 
economical, and socially acceptable alternative to oil or coal generation in Hawai i stands 
without sufficient foundation.
Neither the geothermal industry nor the State or County has solved the fundamental land- 
use conflict between this industrial development and the preexisting uses of the land -  
whether it is a conservation, residential or agricultural use. Any endorsement of 
geothermal as a current or potential energy alternative in Hawai i continues the tradition 
o f marginalizing the rural Puna community in favor of urban land developers and energy 
companies. This is particularly disturbing given the existence of better options for 
reducing oil consumption on the Big Island and the state as a whole.
The lack of public participation in energy production and consumption decisions has also 
been a fundamental problem that overshadows any potential benefits o f geothermal 
development in Hawai i. As early as the late 1970's, sociologists noted the lack of 
correlation between energy consumption and quality o f life (Nader and Beckerman 
1978). The State's geothermal program was created to benefit large landowners and 
energy developers in the hopes that the potential economic benefits for the developers, 
utilities, planners, builders, researchers, etc., would be appealing to the general public as 
well. This is one o f the main indications that geothermal has been — and continues to be 
-  a development policy instead o f an energy policy for the state.
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The State's approach to developing geothermal energy involved decision-making and 
land-use approval before the public was ever given an opportunity to comment The 
State and County conducted their business in promoting geothermal development 
according to the following strategy:
1. Dictate that geothermal should be pursued.
2. Fund research and exploration.
3. Facilitate (without the required permit) well-drilling exploration adjacent to residential
subdivisions.
4. Defend the development o f power generation facilities with inadequate pollution
controls.
5. Dictate a State policy for large-scale development with an inter-island cable.
6. Implement this policy through a series o f government actions and inactions including
legislation, permitting, public funding and regulation.
7. Maintain the promotional legacy geothermal development by leaving in place the laws
and regulatory attitude that facilitated the 500 megawatt geothermal project.
The larger context o f tiiis promotional legacy involves the government's overall
development agenda:
The state's ideological and practical commitment to the private 
appropriation o f geothermal development resulted in the promotion of the 
economic interests o f the private landowners and developers against the 
environmental and health interests o f the impacted community, and the 
cultural and fiscal interests o f the public. The state acted in the interest of 
capital accumulation in limiting environmental controls and using public 
funds to develop the infrastructure o f a private industry (Rodriguez and 
Juvik).
Recommendations
In theory, the only impact o f geothermal development in Puna that caimot be mitigated is 
the conflict between mining steam energy and the status, history, cultural practices, and
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religious beliefs o f Native Hawaiiens. This alone is sufficient reason to commence a 
process to shut down PGV and any future plans for the HGP-A facility.
The active pursuit of increased energy efficiency, solar, wind and biomass power for the
Big Island is important for ridding Hawai i o f its dangerous dependence on geothermal
energy. Geothermal continues to be unacceptable to those who are descended from Pele
and who continue to honor, respect, and worship her. According to a Native Hawaiian
ethnographic study conducted in Puna, Pele practitioners believe that geothermal energy
will have a fatal impact on the deity that they descend from. Pele is important to the
survival o f Hawaiian culture as a whole because she is the only Hawaiian deity to
continue to be honored and worshipped after 200 years o f assimilation of Hawaiians into
European culture.
In January 1983, Pele began to erupt in Kahauale'a. She built up Pu u 
'O 'o . The areas slated for geothermal well drilling were buried under 15 
feet o f newly erupted lava. The eruption continued through 1994, flowing 
out o f subterranean tubes from the Kupaianaha lava lake. Pele 
practitioners interpret the continuing eruption as a ho'ailona or 
supernatural sign o f defiance by the deity against geothermal energy. The 
active manifestation of the deity inspires them to be resolute and 
determined in their efforts to protect the deity and shut down geothermal 
energy development (Matsuoka et al 1996).
Short of an immediate end to geothermal energy in Hawai i, there are political and 
practical reforms necessary to correct some o f the environmental and social problems 
created by overzealous promotion and inadequate regulation of geothermal. These 
reforms are needed before any further approvals are given for PGV's proposed expansion 
and continued use of the HGP-A facility,
Hawai i's current governor, Ben Cayetano, gave conditional support for geothermal on 
the Big Island while campaigning for office in 1994. He promised that he would be the 
first one to shut down PGV if  it proved to be harmful to the community (Cayetano 1994). 
The Governor has obviously ignored the ongoing health and nuisance problems reported 
by the Puna community. He should be more convinced by the conclusions in recent
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studies relating to the health effects from chronic low-level (as low as 10 ppb) exposure 
to H2 S. One of these studies is a  recent health study conducted in lower Puna by 
toxicologists from the University of Texas (see Chapter 5). The study indicates that some 
Puna residents suffer from chronic adverse health impacts from HgS emissions at the 
geothermal facUi^.
The Governor should spend his last year in office promoting reform of some of the laws 
and regulations that have contributed to die health and social impacts experienced by the 
community. The State should correct some o f  its past promotional activities with the 
following actions:
1. Repeal the Geothermal Resource Subzone Act and abolish the subzones entirely. Any
future geothermal projects proposed on conservation or agricultural land would need 
to get the land-use designation changed by the Land Use Commission. The State 
should also assist the County in the creation of a sufficient buffer zone around the 
PGV plant.
2. Revise the State ambient air quality standard and relevant operating permits for PGV.
The State standard for H2 S should be revised to prohibit excedences of 10 ppb on a 
three-minute average. This is a level whereby odor nuisances and low-level chronic 
health impacts can truly be niiniimzed.
3. Repeal the Geothermal and Cable System Development Permitting Act due to the fact
that the cable project has been abandoned.
4. Permanently plug and abandon the three SOH wells, True's (KMERZ A-1) well and
Lani Puna 6. The State should use funds from PGV's royalty payments to finance this 
overdue step to secure the wells.
5. Terminate all of the geothermal mining leases not in use (i.e., all o f them except die
Kapoho Land Paitnership/PGV). These leases have expired due to non-activity and 
should be disposed of accordingly.
6. Prohibit any further geothermal-related uses o f the former HGP-A facility and
associated Puna Research Facility. This area is still in need of remediation as
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required by the County permit and could be used by local farmers for agricultural 
purposes without the potential impacts on the community from additional geothermal 
activities.
7. Complete the planned forest restoration at the former drill site in the Wao Kele O Puna
rainforest and restore the protected status o f this area. In 1985, Wao Kele O Puna 
was removed from designation as a Natural Area Reserve and given to Campbell 
Estate in a land exchange for geothermal development. In 1994, the Campbell 
Estate/True Geothermal project formally abandoned their development plans and in 
2001 die land was put up for sale.
8. Dedicate more funds for energy efficiency programs and efforts to reduce oil
consumption in the transportation sector. The State should assist the Big Island with 
programs that will eventually replace the need for PGV's current and future power 
production.
9. Support community development programs and create new parks and facilities in
lower Puna with the geothermal royalties allocated to DLNR.
In 2000, the former Civil Defense Administrator o f Hawaii County, Hany Kim, became 
mayor and stated that he believes that government has been totally derelict in its 
responsibilities to the community with respect to geothermal. He claims to support 
geothermal only if it is done right (Levin 2001). He is well aware of much of the history 
of geothermal development presented in this paper and consequentiy he should welcome 
and support the following reforms at the County level.
1. Immediately terminate the special use permit for the former HGP-A facility and
require NELHA to dismantle and dispose o f what remains of the former power plant.
2. Repeal the Planning Commission's Rule 12 governing the issuance of Geothermal
Resource Permits. Instead, geothermal development (including direct-heat 
applications) should only be allowed in industrial land-use zones with ̂ propriate 
bufTer zones for existii% residential areas. An Environmental Impact Statement 
should be required for all geothermal exploration or development activities.
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3. Adopt a county noise ordinance that limits noise pollution throughout the County to
45/55 dBA night/day.
4. Adopt a county odor ordinance that limits HaS pollution to 10 ppb on a three-minute
average.
5. Use royalty funds to establish a gepthermal compliance coordinator to oversee
regulatory activities and relocation efforts. This coordinator should facilitate 
communication between government agencies, PGV and the community.^
6. Require PGV to construct a vegetative buffer around their facility in order to reduce
noise, air and light pollution in the surrounding communities.
7. Revise the County's geothermal relocation programs. A true buffer zone is needed
(whereby houses are not re-sold) since the impacts from geothermal development 
have not been adequately mitigated.
* If the County does not create this position, community groups should apply for funds from the 
Geothermal Asset Fund to hire their own compliance ofiBcer to facilitate public involvement and better 
regulatory oversi^t of PGV.
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Year Name Drilled bv Location Depth tftl Temp rp y Status
1961 Geothermal 1 HI Thermal Power KMERZ 177 100 capped
1961 Geothermal 2 HI Thermal Power KMERZ 554 216 capped
1961 Geothermal 3 HI Thermal Power KLERZ 688 199 plugged
1961 Geothermal 4 HI Thermal Power KLERZ 289 109 plugged
1973 NSFKilauea Colo. School of Mines KC 4,140 279 plugged
1976 HGP-A Univ. of Hawai'i KLERZ 6,450 676 plugged
1980 Ashida 1 Barawell/GEDCO KLERZ 8, 000 620 plugged
1981 Lani Puna 1 Bamwell/GEDCO KLERZ 8,400 300 plugged
1981 K S l PGV/Theimal Power KLERZ 7,300 640 plugged
1982 KS2 PGV/Thermal Power KLERZ 8,000 650 plugged
1984 Lani Puna 6 Bamwell/GEDCO KLERZ 4,495 300 NOT plugged
1985 K Sl-A PGV/Thermal Power KLERZ 6,505 670 injection well
1990 KS3 PGV/Oimat KLERZ 7,406 664 injection well
1990 KMERZ A-1 True/Mid-Pacific KMERZ 8,741 635 NOT plugged
1990 SOH 4 HNELOJniv. of HI KMERZ 6,562 576 NOT plugged
1991 KS7 PGV/Ormat KLERZ 1,678 500+ blowout/plugged
1991 SOHl HNEI/Univ. of HI KLERZ 5,526 408 NOT plugged
1991 SOH 2 HNEI/Univ. of HI KLERZ 6,802 661 NOT plugged
1991 KS8 PGV/Ormat KLERZ 3,488 630+ blowout/plugged
1992 KS4 PGV/Ormat KLERZ 6,796 620 injection well
1993 KS9 PGV/Constellation KLERZ 4,564 647 production well
1993 KSIO PGV/Constellation KLERZ 5,083 635+ possible injection well
1999 KS 11 PGV/Constellation KLERZ 6,500 n/a production well




Sample List of Periods of Open Venting* 
From March 1982 to December 1989
Date Cause of Release
March 3, 1982 
July 25, 1982 
July 27, 1982 
August 1, 1982 
August 11, 1982 
August 13, 1982 
November 7, 1983 
March 20-21, 1984 
September 15-16, 1984 
February 5, 1985 
August 14-15, 1985 
September 10-11, 1985 
December 31, 1985 
January 1, 1986 
April 14, 1986 
October 28-29, 1986 
April 16, 1987 
November 5, 1987 
November 18, 1987 
November 24-25, 1987 
December 1, 1987 
December 8, 1987 
December 10, 1987 
September 4, 1988 
September 21-22, 1988 
February 10,1989 







Abatement system repair 






















*This is not a complete list of plaimed and unplanned maintenance and malfunctions. This includes 
reported events when there was no HgS abatement. This list does not include numerous well flow 
tests prior to 1982 that lasted from two to four months long. The duration of venting, for each day 
listed above, ranged from 1 to 24 hours. The severity of complaints from nearby residents has 
ranged from nuisance levels to serious health impacts requiring evacuation.
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TABLES
Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency 
Declared Emergencies 
At Puna Geothermal Venture* 
June 1991-August 1999
1. KS-8 Blowout June 12,1991
2. Flow Test Problem August 12, 1992
3. HzS Alert August 17, 1992
4. H2 S Emissions August 18, 1992
5. Caustic Soda Emissions August 15, 1992
6. HzS Leak October 22, 1992
7. KS-8 Shut-In November 2, 1992
8. KS-9 Cleanout Problem February 8, 1993
9. KS-9 & KS-10 leaks September 28, 1993
10. H2 S Leak May 14, 1993
11 H2 S Release November 9, 1993
12. H2 S Leak October 3, 1996
13. H2 S Leak October 4, 1996
14. H2 S Leak June 16, 1997
15. H2 S Leak June 17, 1997
16. H2SLeak October 31, 1997
17. H2 S Leak April 26, 1999
18. H2 S Leak August 30, 1999
* This is only a list of events determined to be emergencies by the Civil Defense
It is not a complete list of incidents at the facility.
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TABLE 4
Government Committees and Task Forces on 
Geothermal Development in Hawm'i
Year started Title and Function___________________________Aeencv Host
1. 1973 Hawaii Advisory Committee HGP-A Developers
Key people in the State were appointed to this group 
in order to promote additionalfundingfor HGP-A.
2. 1981 Air Advisory Committee * DOH
This group attempted to make recommendations, 
on a state ambient air quality standard for H2S
3. 1983 Geothermal Advisory Committee * DEED
This group included citizens but its purpose was more 
for public relations rather than for "advice. "
4. 1985 Energy Advisory Commission * Mayor's Office
This begem as cm advocacy group, but in 1992 it was 
re-bom to conduct a more critical review o f geothermal.
5. 1987 Governor's Advisory Board ("Quinn Panel") DEED
on the Geothermal/Cable Project
This was established to formally announce the
State's funding and promotion o f the cable project.
6. 1989 Interagency Group on Geothermal/Cable DLNR
Representatives from federal, state and local agencies 
attempted to streamline permitting efforts.
1. 1989 Geothermal/Transmission Line Roundtable * DEED
This was a failed attempt to involve the public.
8. 1991 Geothermal Technical Advisory Committee DEEDT/DLNR
This was organized to perpetuate research and assist developers 
with publicly fitruied studies related to geothermal.
9. 1991 Geothermal Task Force DEEDT and County
Directors o f State and County agencies coordinated efforts 
to restart development after the 1991 PGV blowout.
10. 1991 Relocation Task Force * Governor/Mayor's Offices
This was a failed attempt to provide assistance to residents near PGV.
* Citizen representatives were allowed on this committee, DOH=Department of Health
DLNR = Department of Land and Natural Resources, DEED = Department of Business Economic Development
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Regarding the Mediation of PGV's Proposed 
Geothermal Resource Permit Amendments
Community participation and our good faith efforts put forth in this mediation process 
should not be interpreted as an acceptance of geothermal development in our existing 
agricultural and residential community. It should be understood by regulating agencies 
that there continues to be no compatibility between previous and existing land uses in the 
geothermal resource subzones and geothermal development activities. Puna Geothermal 
Venture (PGV) is immediately adjacent to a residential community and the impacts have 
been tremendous over the past decade.
PGV has demonstrated two very different industrial "personalities" during the past eleven 
years since they received their Geothermal Resource Permit ("Permit") in 1989, (1) For 
the first five to six years, they demonstrated a negligent disregard for the community and 
refused to mitigate the health and environmental impacts caused by their facility. TTiis 
attitude was exemplified by their insistence on unabated open venting of wells during 
flow tests and their inability to prevent and control the 1991 blowout of KS-8. (2) After 
many years of being a bad neighbor, PGV has recently improved their operations (due in 
large part because of improved regulatory oversight from state and federal agencies) and 
has shown a wllingness to reduce their impact on the Puna community. This recent trend 
does not necessarily determine their future, especially given their past and the unknown 
ability of PGV to adequately mitigate future impacts on the community.
Before this mediation began, PGV proposed amendments to their Permit that did not meet 
the criteria for acceptable geothermal resource permits set forth in Rule 12 section 12-6. 
Specifically, PGV’s geothermal development activities have, and will continue to have, 
unreasonable adverse health and socio-economic effects on residents and surrounding 
property. These impacts and community burdens have not been mitigated in the past, and 
PGV has not proposed any amendments that would change this situation. In fact, these 
impacts will likely become more severe given the proposed expansion of PGV’s wellfield 
and power plant. In general, these impacts include, air and noise emissions, hazards to 
public health and safety, groundwater contamination and the socio-economic impacts of 
residents associated with psychological stress and loss of income from numerous 
accidents and emergencies at the facility.
PGV has attempted to hide their failure to mitigate the above impacts by denying their 
poor operating history. Their Permit amendment application includes a brief "chronology 
of significant events" (page 4) which conveniently excludes all major upset conditions, 
accidents and civil defense emergencies, permit and statute violations, fines imposed by
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HELCO for lack of power production, payment of damages in tort lawsuits filed by 
residents impacted by die facility, and any mention of the financial burden placed on the 
State, County and Federal government due to PGV’s poor operating history and land use 
conflict with the adjacent residential community.
Mediation and Lack of Due Process
In the 1989 Mediator's Report pursuant to PGVs Application for a Geothermal Resource 
Permit, there was a Community Statement (Section 6) and a memo from the Pele Defense 
Fun (Attachment #1) included. Many of the issues raised in those statements continue to 
be vafid today and are worth repeating.
The mediation process, as specified in Rule 12, corrupts the ability of the Planning 
Commission to determine whether a proposed geothermal development activity should be 
allowed. This responsibility is set forth in section 205-5.1, Hawaii Revised Statutes and is 
reiterated in the Planning Commission’s Rule 12. The mediation process in Rule 12 
denies everyone, including the Planning Commission, the opportunity to evaluate, through 
the full hearing process and development of a complete record, whether the proposed 
project actually satisfies the standards set out in Rule 12, Paragraph 12-6. Specifically, 
the full disclosure of PGVs project as it relates to mitigating unreasonable impacts on 
health, environmental, and socio-economics (including cultural impacts) is prohibited. 
This denial of due process via a contested case hearing is discriminatory towards a 
specific community with legitimate concerns about a County land use permit.
This mediation process, prior to a decision by the Commission and in lieu of a contested 
case hearing, assumes that any and all applications for a Permit will be granted. 
Furthermore, it requires the objectors of tiie application to do the work of the applicant to 
produce an acceptable project and to do the work of the Commission in deciding whether 
the application is acceptable. Consequently, concessions have been made by the 
Community in both the current and previous mediation processes under Rule 12 as a 
result of desperation to get some minimal improvement Concessions and compromises 
should arise only after there is full disclosure and analysis of the project's reasonable and 
unreasonable impacts.
PG V s Previous Agreements
In 1989, PGV agreed to many conditions to their Permit as a result of mediation with the 
community. Many of those agreements are now being ignored or discarded by PGV 
These agreements include, but are not limited to the following:
1. Air emission limits for hydrogen sulfide were agreed upon in mediation and reflected in 
Condition 19. The current limitation of 5ppb above background without an hourly 
average is more protective of the community than the State Department of Health's 
(DOH) air pollution permit. PGV proposes to delete this emission limit from the County 
permit and consequently break an agreement they made to keep emissions below nuisance
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levels. Their requirement to employ Best Available Control Technology (BACT) to meet 
the 5ppb limit was never enforced by the County.
2. PGV agreed to limit their noise impacts on the community to 45dBA at night and 
55dBA during the day. This condition was superseded by State regulations that now 
allow PGV to invade nearby homes with up to 70 dBA of noise day and night. In 1989, 
PGV assured nearby residents that they could meet the original noise limits and they were 
required to use BACT in order to abide by that agreement. Once again, the use of BACT 
to reduce noise pollution was not enforced and consequently PGV has never been able to 
meet the noise limitations that they agreed to in 1989.
3. In 1989, PGV agreed to a condition requiring landscaping and construction of berms in 
order to minimize light, air and noise pollution in the surrounding community. Condition 
34 of the Permit refers to this agreement. Any landscaping that has been done to date has 
not reduced these impacts on residents.
Federal Regulatory Involvement
PGV neglected to mention federal involvement in the regulation of their facility in their 
permit amendment application. Also, the Planning Department failed to consult with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (H*A) when reviewing PGV’s amendment application.
Recently, the EPA released a final copy of their Puna Emergency Response Report that 
documents numerous issues that must be fully addressed by PGV and the County. The 
Ground Water Office of the EPA Region 9 recently issued a final Underground Injection 
Control (UIC) permit in order to adequately oversee the protection of groundwater in 
lower Puna. EPA has also conducted a Superfund assessment of PGV’s facility and 
surrounding environment and has cited PGV for numerous violations of CERCLA and 
EPCRA during upset events resulting in accidental releases of hydrogen sulfide and other 
pollutants. The Environmental Justice program at Region 9 has assisted nearby residents 
by funding a community air and noise monitoring program in order to improve upon the 
inadequate monitoring efforts by PGV and DOH.
Premature Reliance on State Regulatory Authority
PGV proposes to remove numerous conditions relating to regulation, monitoring and 
reporting of air emissions and underground injection activities in order to avoid some 
duplication with DOH. This is premature given the fact that DOHs Air Branch has not 
approved (or received an application for) a permit modification to PGV’s air permit for an 
expansion to 60MW of power. Also, the State’s revised UIC permit to allow for 
additional UIC wells has not been finalized. The past political climate in the State 
government has essentially promoted geothermal instead o f regulate it as an industrial 
facility. The community cannot be assured that amendments to State permit conditions 
relating to air and water quality protection will not be weakened and consequently less 
protective of human health and the environment.
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Unresolved Issues
1. PGVs noise limits should be no higher than the original limits of 45 dBA at night and 
55 dBA during the day. For many residents this is still an unreasonable impact, given the 
location of their homes in relation to the power plant. A comprehensive analysis of the 
noise control problems and potential solutions is needed. The County must take the lead 
on noise control due to the unreasonable standard promulgated by the State. BACT for 
noise control must be used to the greatest extent possible and practicable regardless of the 
applicable noise limits. A revised noise monitoring program, one that allows both the 
residents and PGV to document noise levels at individual homes should be developed and 
implemented as well.
2. The community needs to be informed of and involved with air quality issues at PGV 
To date, neither ] ^ V  nor the State Department of Health has included the community in 
any meaningful way in developing and implementing air monitoring and air pollution 
prevention programs at PGV. The County might not be able to regulate air pollution at 
PGV, but they can provide leadership in creating and maintaining a working group on air 
quality that includes community members and consultations with air monitoring and 
regulatory experts. This group could address ongoing noise control issues as well.
3. The Geothermal Asset Fund has been the biggest regulatory failure on the part of the 
County with regards to PGV. It took over five years to establish procedures for 
distribution of funds and after that the recommendations from the community were 
ignored and the money became administratively inaccessible to impacted residents. The 
Fund should continue to increase and PGVs contribution should double if their power 
output is allowed to double. The County should address the need to revise the Planning 
Commission's Rule 14 and the rules governing the Royalty/Relocation fund as well.
4. A real buffer zone, above and beyond the concept of "landscaping", must be created in 
the 500-acre area around the power plant and wellfield prior to any increase of electricity 
production. This zone should include berms to control noise and air emissions and acres 
of fast-growing native (or non-invasive) trees to filter noise, air and light pollution.
5. Emergency response capabilities of both PGV and the County continue to be a serious 
concern in the community. The recent EPA Report on Puna Emergency Response is 
helpful, especially to the extent that it recommends community involvement in revising 
both the County's Emergency Response/Haz Mat Plan and PGVs emergency procedures. 
Emergency Response is the responsibility of the County. The fear that yet another major 
accident at PGV will occur, accompanied by inadequate warning and evacuation, is 
extremely stressful and more than just a nuisance for residents, even for those who live up 
to four miles from PGV.
6. Questions remain as to exactly what PGV plans to construct in order to produce up to 
60 megawatts. There are unforeseen impacts from this plant expansion that cannot be
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ignored in this current permitting process. Fcmt example, PGV has not disclosed a 
different version of their "Power Plant and Wellfield Location Layout" to the County. 
The June 28, 2000 map, which was submitted to the County Planning Department as 
Attachment B to their proposed GRP amendments, is not the same map that was 
submitted to EPA and DOH in 1997. The June 2000 map is missing the existence and 
location o f proposed wellpads (i.e. well pads G, H, J). The 1997 map is cleariy related to 
their future plans and it appears as though PGV intends to avoid any discussion or 
analysis of the impacts o f potential new well locations.
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APPENDIX B
Conflicts of Interests:
The Revolving Door of Geothermal Players
Steve Yamashiro
In the 1980’s he was the chainnan of County Council and an strong geothermal promoter 
while also serving as legal counsel to the Lyman family and subsequently PGV in 
negotiations with HELCO. In 1992, Yamashiro became Mayor and he continued to 
support and promote PGV and worked to acquire the HGP-A well for the County's use.
Barry Mizuno
He was Managing Director of County under Mayor Lorraine Inouye from 1990-1992. He 
was chief liaison with PGV and State agencies before and after the June 1991 blowout.
He then secured a managerial job at PGV immediately after Inouye lost the 1992 primary 
election -  which was many months before leaving office. Although it was a violation of 
the County’s ethics code, he represented PGV after leaving the Mayor’s office in ongoing 
administrative matters before the County. In 1993, he used his influence with the County 
to secure support for PGVs attempt to reduce their geothermal royalty payments to the 
State and County. He is also board member of the Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii 
Authority, which is the owner of the former HGP-A well, power plant and research 
center. N 5 IL A  recently solicited proposals to conduct further geothermal activities at 
the site.
Albert Lono Lyman
He is a member of Lyman family and co-owner of Kapoho Land and Development 
Company and the Kapoho Land Partnership. These family businesses are involved with 
geothermal development and own the property where Puna Geothermal Venture and part 
of the HGP-A facility are located. He was the Hawaii County Planning Director from 
1984-1988. In addition to overseeing the regulatory authority for HGP-A and PGV, his 
office drafted the County's administrative rules governing Geothermal Resource Permits, 
and facilitated discussions about further development on Lyman family land.
Richard Matsuura
He was an avid geothermal supporter and State legislator in the 1980's and 90's. He co­
authored key geothermal legislation with geothermal developers and his own legislative 
aides, which included representatives from HELCO and a consultant for Campbell 
Estate/True Geothermal. He is known for stating that "accidents will happen" and 
celebrating the discovery of gusher after the June 1991 well blowout at PGV. His 
brother, Harold Matsuura represented the Department of Health's Hilo office in 
geothermal matters.
Daniel Inouye
He has been a U.S. Senator from Hawai'i since statehood. During the time that he 
secured federal appropriations for geothermal development, he had financial ties to
155
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Sumitomo Corporation, one of the partners in a consortium negotiating the 500 megawatt 
geothermal cable project. He also received campaign contributions from Campbell Estate 
and Hawaiian Electric Company.
Shunichi Kimura
In the 1970’s he was the Mayor of Hawaii County. He, along with John Farias, the 
County's Director of Research and Development, lobbied the Department of Energy for 
geothermal funds and "pushed full steam ahead" for geothermal development on the 
island. In the 1990’s, Shunichi Kimura was a Circuit Court Judge who presided over 
geothermal lawsuits. The State Supreme Court overturned many of his rulings (in favor 
of the citizen group plaintiffs).
Jack Keppeler
He was the Managing Director under Mayor Matayoshi (1976-1984) where he 
represented the County in the HGP-A Development Group. In 1982, he became a 
consultant for Campbell Estate's geothermal pursuits in the Kahauale'a and Wao Kele O 
Puna rainforests. He then moved to the Department of Land and Natural Resources 
(DLNR), where he continued to work on geothermal development as a staffperson. He 
was eventually promoted to Deputy Director of DLNR.
Roland Higashi
In 1982, he was on the Board of Land and Natural Resources during deliberations over a 
conservation district use permit to develop geothermal energy in the Kahauale'a 
rainforest in Puna (Upper East Rift Zone). He was also the president of the Japanese 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which had submitted written endorsements and 
official support for Campbell Estate's geothermal Project.
Mike Luce
He is a general contractor from Waimea. In 1989, while he was a member of the County 
Planning Commission, he and a couple members o f the County's Ethics Committee 
traveled to Honolulu to lobby the Governor to support PGV. He later became the 
chairman of the Planning Commission and refused to review or amend PGVs permit 
after the June 1991 blowout.
Marçery Bronster
She was the former lead attorney for PGV at Carlsmith Ball. She represented PGV in 
lawsuits with residents seeking compensation for damages after the June 1991 blowout.
In 1994, she became the State Attorney General. She was in charge of administrative and 
litigation matters related to geothermal regulation at the State level.
Gilbert Coloma-Agaran
He also represented PGV as a former attorney at Carlsmith Ball He became the deputy 
Chairperson of the Department of Land and Natural Resources in 1994 and then 
Chairperson in 2000.
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Bill Davis
He was the County Managing Director from 1992-2000 under Mayor Yamashiro. He 
was hired to head the County's Civil Defense Agency (with the highest civil servant pay 
scale) when Harry Kim retired in June 2000
Colin Love
He is a part-time substitute judge in Hawai'i County. In the early 1990's, he adjudicated 
geothermal trespass cases involving community members. In 2000, he applied for, and 
was appointed the mediator in the matter of PGVs application for a County permit 
amendment.
Ben Tsukasaki and Tom Yeh
These attorneys worked for Hawaii County Corporation Counsel in 1980's. They 
represented the County in Puna Speaks lawsuit, contested case hearings on Campbell 
Estate's project and other geothermal matters. They now have a private practice in Hilo 
and currently represent PGV in administrative proceedings and negotiations with the State 
and County.
James Fabian:
He was president of the nation's largest lobbying firms, Cassidy and Associates, and son of 
the chairman of the board of Pirelli Cable Company. Cassidy and Associates secured over 
$10 million in appropriations for Pirelli to conduct research and develop an interisland 
cable for Hawai'i.
Vince Versage
He was an aide to Senator Spark Matsunaga for eight years before joining Cassidy and 
Associates where he lobbied for geothermal funding on behalf of the State and cable 
research funding on behalf of Pirelli Cable Corporation.
Doug Carlson
He managed public relations for the State's geothermal program at Hill & 
Knowlton/Communications Pacific. He was previously a spokesperson for Hawaiian 
Electric Company.
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. - ^  rd,pJ^m3)92$^S305Mr. Roger TJlveling Aaémâk (as) $02-7594
Director, Depairxneu of Bosmess 
and Economie Devidopmrat 
State of Hawaii 
Kamamalu Building 
2S0 S. Hag Street 
Honolulu. Hawaii 96&13
Dear Roger
I would appreciate it if you would get the eodosed letter oS to Senator Inouye. It 
will help remind Sally Watanabe that these appoixxtmeois need to be mad*
I have also enclosed a copy of a letter whidi Greeopeace is drculatiog to all House 
Members in t^tpositioa to geothermaL This, I believe, will be duplicaied by other groups 
in the near fiituxe. It is, therefore, inperaxive  ̂ that materials be developed such as die 
Inoiqre qieedi, the DBED brochure, and another brochure which Acuses only on the rain 
forest issue, ^  ctrcnlated. Other dungs such as an Inouye or Governor op/ed piece 
should be considered.
The Inouye speech is now on die Senanu's desk and we expect hint to sign off on 
it by the end of this week. Next week, vdien you are in town, we should meet, perhaps with 
Ride Sprqrer, H31 and Enowlton, and the Inorgre and Akaka stags, and develop a strategy 
around and in follow-up to the speech.
I am sure I don't need to point out that your visit coincides with Danny Akaka's 
Senate swearing in on Wednesday, Mot 16th. We are planning to host a reception for 
Danny after the ceremoiy which T hope you wiB be able to attend.
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